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ABSTRACT 
The Great East Japan Earthquake’s unique scope and the actors involved in the ensuing 
disaster dispatch have the potential to significantly impact four areas influencing the 
SDF’s trajectory: security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and 
institutions.  Retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization are all plausible outcomes for 
the SDF’s trajectory.  Understanding what the disasters changed in these four areas is 
critical in determining the most probable SDF trajectory. 
 This thesis finds that the SDF will not likely embark on a retrenchment or rapid 
remilitarization trajectory.  Japan’s security and economic interests have not 
fundamentally changed but rather economic trends in place prior to the disasters were 
aggravated and its security policy was validated.  Japan’s norms were the most 
fundamentally changed as the SDF emerged from the disasters as the most trusted 
institution in Japan. 
 Changes will be limited to the fringes of the status quo bordering remilitarization 
as numerous disincentives restrain the SDF from rapidly moving toward remilitarization.  
These changes will come about from a growing sense of economic and security 
pragmatism that results in engaging rather than containing the SDF.  Improved civil-
military relations, more public support for the SDF’s expanding domestic and 
international roles, and more deference for the SDF as a useful tool of the state will 
characterize this new status quo. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 How has the Great East Japan Earthquake affected the Self Defense Force’s 
(SDF) trajectory?  This question is posed in light of three possible trajectories: 
retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization.  Retrenchment entails the SDF diminishing 
its operations surrounding or outside Japan because the disasters have focused Japan on 
its internal problems.  Potential reasons for this trajectory include, but are not limited to, 
Japan’s focus on economic recovery at the expense of its international security activities 
or a sense that the SDF is better utilized for domestic rather than international purposes.  
Status quo involves maintaining the types of operations currently conducted by the SDF 
such as United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO), anti-piracy operations, and 
humanitarian aid disaster relief (HADR).  The SDF would continue to face restrictions on 
the use of force in international security activities.  This trajectory may result because the 
disasters simply do not affect the SDF’s trajectory or they just reinforce the status quo.  
Remilitarization is defined as the SDF expanding its international security activity 
contributions and acting more like a “normal” nation’s military that is not so heavily 
restricted in its use of force.  This trajectory could possibly result from increased public 
appreciation for the SDF because of the SDF’s proven utility as a tool of the state in its 
disaster dispatch. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The answer to this major research question is significant on numerous fronts.  
Most of the areas affected are represented in the inner workings of Japan’s security 
policy.  First, the SDF’s involvement in international security activities provides analysts 
a sense of Japan’s security policy direction.  Understanding the SDF’s role in the Great 
East Japan Earthquake will highlight changes in Japan’s security policy with perhaps 
long-term implications. 
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Second, the SDF’s employment also gauges the public’s willingness or lack 
thereof to support operations abroad or even at home.  The effects on Japan’s pacifist 
norms as a result of the SDF’s disaster dispatch will signal shifts in these norm 
paradigms.  Significant changes in this spectrum of norms will have a direct spillover 
effect on Japan’s security policy, as public opinion is believed to be a prominent 
intervening variable. 
Third, the economic impacts from the natural disasters have the potential to affect 
the SDF’s ability to counter regional security threats such as China and North Korea.  If 
the SDF gains public support and maintains or increases its portion of the defense budget, 
it is likely to sustain counter-measures against regional threats.  If Japan retrenches its 
security policy and focuses on a domestic role for the SDF, China’s military expansion 
and North Korean missile programs may go unchecked by the SDF. 
Fourth, changes in the SDF’s status will directly affect the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance.  As the United States is engaged in an overseas war, contends with international 
threats such as terrorism, and shifts its overseas military footprint to that of an 
expeditionary force, this causes U.S. security policy to place pressure on the SDF to 
expand its regional responsibilities.  Shifting norms affecting the SDF may also have a 
spillover affect on U.S. military forces in Japan and the U.S.-Japan security alliance in 
general. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
The literature on Japan’s security policy has grown in the last decade signaling 
that there indeed exists a security policy within Japan to write about.  The SDF inevitably 
becomes the default weathervane used to determine the status and trajectory of Japan’s 
security policy. The SDF provides the most concrete measurement of Japan’s willingness 
to embark on security related operations outside its borders.  SDF operations therefore 
tend to represent the political and social environment of the times and indicate major 
shifts or gradual trends in Japan’s security policy. 
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Most of the literature regarding the SDF’s trajectory agrees that the SDF does not 
operate in a completely “normal” manner.  The SDF has not embarked on any overseas 
security operations in which it has been allowed the unrestricted use of force.  It has been 
severely limited in its arms exports and its legitimacy according to Japan’s constitution 
and article 9 has been called into question.  The restricted nature of the SDF’s operations 
contributes to its lack of normalcy and can be considered the status quo under which it 
has operated since its inception.  The point of contention amongst the literature lies in 
interpreting the nature of the SDF’s status quo and how quickly the restrictions 
surrounding the SDF are eroding.  The result is a debate between two main camps of 
academia.  On one end, a growing role and use of the SDF is seen as a road to 
remilitarization.  This interpretation of the SDF’s trajectory states that numerous 
restrictions impeding the SDF’s “normal” military status are quickly eroding and are 
facing fundamental changes in the near future.  The other end of the spectrum interprets 
Japan’s security policy as coming short of “normal” nation status.  In this argument, 
pacifist norms provide a serious constraint on the scope of Japan’s security policy and 
limit the emphasis on national interests abroad compared to other major economic 
powers.  This viewpoint generally reinforces the SDF’s status quo of continued 
restrictions on its operations. 
The following sections conduct an analytic survey of the two opposing sides of 
the SDF trajectory debate: remilitarization and status quo.  The final section illustrates 
how the status quo can be viewed as dynamic rather than static. 
2. Camp One:  Remilitarization 
In the last decade, several books have been written about Japan’s resurgence as a 
“normal” nation.  Although this trend is given different names by various authors, 
remilitarization of Japan’s security policy tends to occupy a large portion of the literature. 
Michael Green was one of the first to identify this trend at length in his 2003 
book.  He recognized that the world was changing around Japan with the rise of China, 
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economic globalization, and an unrivaled United States dominating world politics.1  
These changes forced Japan to reexamine its security policy along several lines.  A 
balance of power was necessary to remain competitive with China.  Idealism took a 
backseat to realism as national interests overtook international obligations as the method 
for justifying Japan’s security policy.  Perceived threats from China after the 1996 
Taiwan Straits crisis and North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong missile launch caused a 
heightened sensitivity to security.  A new generation of political leaders also prompted 
Japan to seek an independent foreign policy.  These trends translate into a greater role for 
the SDF as threats to Japan emerge in the region.  Green calls this development Japan’s 
reluctant realism.2 
In 2007, Richard Samuels contributed to the growing literature on Japan’s 
military resurgence.  He describes Japan’s historical approach to forming security policy 
as a series of periods of mainstream versus anti-mainstream political factions eventually 
coalescing into a period of consensus.  Samuels states the last period of consensus was 
the Yoshida doctrine during the Cold War.  The Yoshida doctrine simultaneously 
satisfied the major political factions by promising pacifism, providing economic benefits 
through liberal internationalism, and providing for its national security by allying with 
the United States and maintaining a limited defense posture.3  Samuels illustrates how the 
Yoshida doctrine is being incrementally transformed through the resurgence of Japan’s 
security policy, largely during the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro 
from 2001–2006.  After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the 
Diet approved measures allowing the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) to conduct 
coalition-refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.  In 2004, the Ground Self Defense 
Force (GSDF) was dispatched to southern Iraq in a non-combat role to support civil 
engineering projects.  The Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) was subsequently deployed to 
                                                 
1  Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 1. 
2  Ibid., 6–8. 
3  Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca; 
London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 58. 
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Baghdad in 2006 to provide air transportation.4  Japan agreed to jointly develop a 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system with the United States in 2004, which facilitated 
the elimination of Japan’s self-imposed arms exports ban.5  The elevation of Japan’s 
Defense Agency to full ministry status in 2007 also indicated the Yoshida doctrine was 
eroding.6  Samuels concludes that a new consensus is perhaps forming characterized as a 
dual hedging strategy between the United States and China.  This would allow Japan to 
strengthen the SDF and its alliance with the United States without threatening China.7 
Christopher Hughes most recently wrote a book on Japan’s remilitarization in 
2009.  He focuses on several areas in the era after Koizumi deemed to be self-imposed 
limitations on Japan’s security apparatus.  These areas include size and capabilities of the 
SDF, international and alliance military commitments, and domestic norm constraints on 
the military.  The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) defined Japan’s 
long-term commitment towards developing a more mobile force capable of dealing with 
regional threats and participating in multinational operations.  Although the SDF has 
quantitatively diminished in the last decade, the 2004 NDPG enabled the SDF to 
qualitatively improve its power projection capabilities within the GSDF, MSDF, and 
ASDF.8  Hughes notes that despite the short-lived missions supporting the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, these experiences with coalition forces allow the SDF to expand its 
overseas footprint in other areas such as HADR operations in the Indian Ocean, UN 
PKO, and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.9  Hughes points out increased 
domestic support for the SDF shown in opinion polls, the continued reinterpretation of 
Japan’s peace constitution, and patriotic education programs as examples of domestic 
norm erosion.10  By illustrating the erosion of these self-constraints in the short-term, he 
concludes that Japan is indeed on a path toward remilitarization. 
                                                 
4  Ibid., 96–98. 
5  Ibid., 104–106. 
6  Ibid., 93. 
7  Ibid., 198. 
8  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: Routledge, 2010), 35–36, 40–47. 
9  Ibid., 83–87. 
10  Ibid., 99. 
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3. Camp Two:  Status Quo 
On the other end of the Japan security policy debate are those that believe Japan is 
not remilitarizing.  Instead, this area of literature tends to see the changes in Japan’s 
security policy and use of the SDF as generally insignificant compared to those of 
“normal” nations.  Pacifist norms play a key role in creating the rather trivial operations 
conducted by the SDF. 
Andrew Oros is one of several authors to recently challenge Japan’s “normal” 
nation status.  He states Japan’s security policy remains driven by a policy of anti-
militarism as evidenced in its three R’s policy of reach, reconcile, and reassure.11  He 
illustrates the power of domestic norms through a case study of the BMD program, which 
finds that the program is responsible for bringing the issue of collective self defense to 
the forefront.  He determines from this that pacifist norms drive the BMD program’s 
policy course.12  He concludes that new threats presented to Japan since the end of the 
Cold War are not causing dramatic shifts in its security policy but are rather dealt with 
through old principles of pacifism through the three R’s policy approach.13 
Yasuo Takao also questions re-militarization theories about Japan’s security 
policy.  Instead of focusing on the end results such as the types of operations conducted 
by the SDF, he insists that the path toward these outcomes is necessary to develop a 
complete understanding of Japan’s security policy.  He focuses on two types of policy 
constraints: domestic and policy choices based on the regional environment and foreign 
pressures.  Analysis of these constraints illustrates how non-physical forces such as 
norms are translated into physical policy decisions.  Therefore, the emphasis of his work 
is on social norms and the causal mechanisms that transform these domestic constraints 
into security policy decisions.14 
                                                 
11  Andrew Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 33. 
12  Ibid., 150. 
13  Ibid., 171. 
14  Yasuo Takao, Is Japan Really Remilitarising? The Politics of Norm Formation and Change 
(Clayton, Australia: Monash University Press, 2008), 6–7. 
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Takao’s analysis of four areas generally accepted as key indicators of a “normal” 
nation shows that pacifist norms continue to affect these areas.  First, Japan’s defense 
budget remains at the self-imposed level of 1% of GDP and has not increased despite 
growing regional threats.15  Second, even though Japan has made qualitative 
improvements in its defense spending, Japan has avoided overtly offensive weapons 
capabilities like intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, and 
aircraft carriers.  Japan’s reluctance to become a nuclear power also illustrates domestic 
pressures of pacifism.16  Third, public opinion polls indicate more support for SDF 
involvement in UN PKO than combat operations.  Even under the right-wing Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) government led by Koizumi, SDF deployments to Iraq were 
limited to non-combat roles.  This minimalist approach illustrates the government was 
contending with domestic norms.17  Fourth, the public’s aversion to combat-related 
operations is also evidenced in the legalization of overseas deployments only for non-
combat purposes as seen in the 1999 Regional Crisis Law and the 2001 Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law.18 
Paul Midford also challenges the notion of Japan’s re-militarization toward a 
“normal” nation status and goes further to change the way Japanese public opinion is 
interpreted within the norms-based arguments.  He illustrates that public opinion has been 
relatively stable and consistent since the end of World War II and therefore influences 
Japan’s security policy.19  He determines that in the elitist versus pluralist debates 
regarding public opinion control, elites cannot exclusively mold public opinion as 
evidenced in the decreasing support for Koizumi’s ambitious SDF deployment plans in 
the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  The public dealt a final blow to the LDP-led government 
in the 2009 Lower House election, which put the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 
                                                 
15  Ibid., 135–137. 
16  Ibid., 137–139. 
17  Ibid., 139–140. 
18  Ibid., 140–142. 
19  Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 172. 
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power after five decades of LDP rule.20  Midford describes Japan’s security policy as 
defensive realism.  Despite the growing literature on Japan’s sudden transition from 
pacifism to realism, he argues that Japanese public opinion has never renounced the 
utility of military force regarding the protection of national territory, and has consistently 
disapproved of military force for offensive strategic operations.21  What has changed has 
been the erosion of anti-militarist distrust of the state to control the military.  This has 
allowed the state to utilize the SDF in new security roles and explains the expansion of 
SDF missions in the past two decades.22 
4. Dynamic Status Quo 
 The term status quo suggests a static environment where change is not possible.  
Indeed, the literature review of status quo interpretations illustrates that the SDF still 
faces numerous restrictions on its operations.  These restrictions do not necessarily mean 
the nature of SDF operations cannot change within its constrained environment.  Take 
Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines as an example of the SDF’s dynamic status 
quo.  Its sole purpose is to define the roles and composition of the SDF based on its 
current security environment.  Historically, this document has been revised at strategic 
crossroads such as after the Cold War (1995) and post-9/11 (2004).  The most recent 
revision was adopted on December 17, 2010.  The 2010 NDPG provides recent insight 
into the SDF’s changing role despite the persistent restrictions on its operations.  The 
following section will describe Japan’s security policy as laid out in the 2010 NDPG and 
note any trends or departures from previous NDPG revisions. 
 Figure 1 provides an overview of the basic elements of the 2010 NDPG.  The 
2010 NDPG is structured around three security objectives that each translates into three 
correlating roles for the SDF.  The three SDF roles serve the purpose of distinguishing 
 
 
                                                 
20  Ibid., 122–123, 144–145. 
21  Ibid., 48. 
22  Ibid., 67. 
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between internal, regional, and international policy areas.  Two categories, posture and 




Figure 1.   Overview of 2010 NDPG (From East Asian Strategic Review, 2011) 
                                                 
23  National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of 
Defense, 2010), 10–12. 
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 Three changes in the 2010 NDPG are noteworthy.  The first is the introduction of 
the term gray zones.  This term recognizes the trend that there are increasingly more 
potential areas for conflict that will not necessarily escalate into full-scale war.  These 
conflicts over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests do not necessarily fall within 
a strictly peacetime or wartime construct and are so complex that they require a diverse 
network of bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives to address.  As the focus on 
gray zone conflicts gains momentum, the 2010 NDPG also places less emphasis on 
defending against a full-scale invasion by advocating the retention of minimal knowledge 
in this area.24 
 The second change is the departure from a Basic Defense Force (BDF) to a 
Dynamic Defense Force (DDF).  A BDF is a Cold War-era term and is primarily 
concerned with building a defense force designed to deter simply by the existence of its 
forces.  A DDF focuses on how to operate forces in a changing security environment 
where security problems in gray zones are increasingly diverse and require a constant 
state of readiness.  The shift from a BDF to a DDF began in the 2004 NDPG when it 
retained the fundamental tenants of the BDF concept but introduced the need for a multi-
functional and flexible defense force.  The 2010 NDPG directly disavows the BDF 
concept and further reinforces the trend initiated in the 2004 NDPG toward a DDF.  The 
DDF concept serves to drastically change the nature of SDF operations in the future.  It 
calls for increased surveillance and reconnaissance activities specifically and raised 
operational tempo in general.  The DDF concept opens up the opportunity for increased 
cooperation with other nations, as complex security issues need to be addressed in bi-
lateral or multi-lateral frameworks.25 
 The third change is the application of dynamic deterrence.  Traditional concepts 
of deterrence such as deterrence by punishment or denial cannot adequately deter the 
types of conflicts in gray zones.  Therefore, dynamic deterrence is necessary to handle the 
two most probable situations in this environment:  a probing or fait accompli action.  
                                                 
24  Ibid., 2–4. 
25  East Asian Strategic Review 2011 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011), 252–
254. 
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Dynamic deterrence is accomplished through demonstrated readiness and continual 
operations that deny a gap in geographical or time coverage.26 
 Although Japan’s strategists have vowed their policies remain defense-oriented, 
the introduction of concepts such as gray zones, dynamic defense force, and dynamic 
deterrence, and increased attention placed on conducting operations to maintain regional 
and international security suggests that Japan’s security policy is increasingly blurring the 
line between offensive and defensive terms.  This type of security policy at first appears 
to be an indication of remilitarization.  The SDF must, however, execute its new roles in 
an environment that continues to restrict its operations.  Thus, the 2010 NDPG illustrates 
the SDF’s status quo is capable of change and can be aptly labeled a dynamic status quo. 
5. Conclusion 
The literature review illustrates a spectrum of interpretation on Japan’s security 
policy status.  It indicates that ones adherence to a particular worldview weighs heavily 
on the conclusion reached.  A realist will treat Japan as a black box, ignoring the impact 
of norms, and determine Japan’s security policy trajectory based on incremental policy 
changes.  In this case, Japan is on an unmistakable path to “normal” nation status.  A 
constructivist will look inside the black box and pay less attention to Japan’s evolving 
position within the international environment and relation to perceived threats.  In this 
light, pacifist norms are unchanging and triumph over realism, resulting in maintenance 
of the status quo.  Both academia camps provide a warning against teleological 
approaches to the interpretation of the Great East Japan Earthquake’s impact on the 
SDF’s trajectory.  Furthermore, the SDF’s status quo must be viewed in a dynamic sense, 
capable of change while restrictions on its operations endure.  Consideration must be 
given to all influences on the Japan security policy debate in order to arrive at well-
rounded conclusions. 
                                                 
26  Ibid., 255–256. 
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
One of the challenges facing this research topic is the lack of scholarly writing 
about the Great East Japan Earthquake.  This is because of its recent occurrence within 
the last year and limited primary source translations from Japanese to English.  For 
information on the Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent events, primary Japanese 
sources are needed to provide a sense of the disaster’s effect on the SDF’s trajectory.  
Major Japanese editorial newspapers such as the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and 
Yomiuri Shimbun provide English versions of their newspapers.  These sources are 
helpful in understanding the various positions taken by the major media outlets toward 
the SDF in the aftermath of the disasters.  They also provide Japanese public opinion 
polls on various areas related to Japan’s security policy and the SDF.  Although the 
English versions are used as source material throughout this thesis, they are generally 
representative of their larger Japanese versions.  Japanese ministry websites, specifically 
the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry, contain English translations of important statistical information, policy, 
official government statements, and assessments related to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake.  These sources give a solid indication of the SDF’s role in and after the 
disaster dispatch and the SDF’s trajectory.  Japanese sources that are not independent 
from the subject matter, such as the Ministry of Defense, may be biased in its portrayal of 
the SDF.  Independent scholarly sources or Japanese sources from various organizations 
are used to mitigate the chance of biased evidence when non-biased sources are available. 
The primary research method to be used is a case study.  The case is the Great 
East Japan Earthquake and approximately one year of subsequent events.  This will allow 
the research to be focused on a particular event and time period. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized thematically.  Chapter I has laid out the major research 
question, its significance, the status of the SDF’s trajectory debate, and the methods and 
sources to be used in answering the research question.  Chapter II describes the disasters 
and the SDF’s response in detail in order to provide a foundation for analysis in the 
 13 
following chapter.  Chapter III analyzes the four main areas that are likely to affect the 
SDF’s trajectory:  security interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and 
institutions.  The concluding chapter synthesizes the previous chapters’ information and 
answers the major research question. 
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II. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE:  THE EVENTS 
AND MANIFESTATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to analyze the affects of the Great East Japan Earthquake on the SDF, a 
basic understanding of the events and facts surrounding the disasters is necessary.  This 
chapter begins by describing the scope of the disasters in order to provide a glimpse into 
their catalytic nature.  The remainder of the chapter provides a series of manifestations.  
These manifestations encompass several themes related to the SDF’s disaster dispatch 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake.  The manifestations serve three purposes.  First, in 
the course of their description, they place the SDF’s disaster dispatch in context by 
covering a wide range of topics that attempts to avoid overemphasis on any particular 
element, which may lead to inaccurate or inflated conclusions.  Second, the 
manifestations highlight pre-existing characteristics that may not have been obvious prior 
to the disasters.  Third, they function as assumptions for subsequent chapters.  The 
manifestations are as follows: 




•  The SDF is the most capable HADR force within Japan. 
•  The domestic political environment is conducive to the SDF’s effective 
domestic application and integration of international assistance. 
•  The SDF’s HADR capabilities demonstrate ability for other operations. 
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B. SCOPE OF THE DISASTERS 
 The official title given to the disasters is the Great East Japan Earthquake.  This 
encompasses the earthquake, subsequent tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster.  The 
following sections describe the depth and breadth of these three disasters. 
1. The Earthquake 
 On March 11, 2011, at 2:46PM, a 9.0 earthquake struck Japan.  The nearest land 
to the hypocenter was Oshika Peninsula at 130 km off the eastern coast of Japan’s main 
island of Honshu. The closest city with over 1 million people, Sendai, was 180 km from 
the hypocenter and Japan’s most populous city, Tokyo, was 390 km away (see 
Figure 2).27 The earthquake was the largest recorded in Japan and the fifth largest ever 
recorded in the world.  The Japan Coast Guard reported that the seabed near the 
hypocenter shifted 24 m and the Oshika Peninsula moved 5.3 m during the earthquake.28 
 
                                                 
27  The largest seismic activity recorded on land was a 7.0 on the Richter scale recorded in Kurihara 
City in Miyagi Prefecture.  In Japan’s Tohoku region, northeastern Japan, 28 cities and towns recorded a 
greater than magnitude 6 earthquake. The main shock was felt throughout Japan from Kyushu in the South 
to Hokkaido in the North.  Japan’s most populous prefectures, Tokyo and Kanagawa, saw between a 4 and 
5 magnitude earthquake.  “The 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake,” Japan Meteorological 
Agency, http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake.html (accessed October 19, 2011). 




Figure 2.   Distribution of Seismic Activity from Great East Japan Earthquake (From 
“The 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake,” 2011) 
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 The damage caused by the earthquake was minor compared to that of the ensuing 
tsunami, yet its destruction reached further inland (see Table 1).29  Significant 
infrastructure damage caused by the earthquake included the destruction of 347 out of 
675 km of the Tohoku Expressway, the main transportation route for commercial 
industry connecting the Tohoku region to the Kanto region, which includes Tokyo.30 
 
 
Table 1.   Great East Japan Earthquake Damage Situation as of October 7, 2011 
(From Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures, 2011) 
2. The Tsunami 
 The 9.0 earthquake triggered a series of massive tsunami waves.  Within minutes 
after 2:46PM, the smaller first waves began to hit Japan’s eastern coast.  The waves 
continued to grow and in less than an hour the tsunami waves reached their maximum 
observed height in several locations, giving residents less than 30 minutes in some cases 
to make the decision to evacuate low lying areas.  The three hardest hit prefectures were 
from North to South: Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima.  The highest recorded tsunami 
height was 9.3m in Soma, Fukushima Prefecture at 3:51PM (see Figure 3).31  It was 
                                                 
29  Eighteen fatalities, presumably from the earthquake, occurred in prefectures not directly hit by the 
tsunami, Tokyo (7), Kanagawa (4), Yamagata (2), Tochigi (4), and Gunma (1).  These same prefectures 
also suffered minor property and infrastructure damage compared to the coastal prefectures.  “Damage 
Situation and Police Countermeasures,” Japan National Police Agency, 
http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf (accessed October 7, 2011). 
30  Road to Recovery (Tokyo: Government of Japan, 2011), 11. 
31  “The 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake.” 
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believed the tsunami reached much higher in numerous areas.32  When the waves reached 
their maximum heights and lost their momentum, the waters receded back into the ocean 
with the same devastating force.  The tsunami submerged an estimated total of 326 
square km in Miyagi Prefecture, 67 square km in Fukushima Prefecture, and 49 square 
km in Iwate Prefecture.33  The total amount represents an area seven times larger than 
Manhattan.  Figure 4 provides a visual approximation of the tsunami’s impact along 
Japan’s eastern coast.34 
 
Figure 3.   Observed Tsunami Heights (From “The 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of 
Tohoku Earthquake,” 2011) 
                                                 
32  Japan’s Port and Airport Research Institute estimated the wave heights reached 15m at the moment 
of impact with Japan’s Sanriku coast in Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures.  The mountainous and jagged 
coastline is believed to have pushed the tsunami waves up to 20m in some places once they reached land.  
The forces behind the tsunami were truly devastating.  In the three hardest hit prefectures, tsunami waves 
rushed inland, destroying everything in their path.  The tsunami devastated coastal towns and swept 
through low-lying areas as far as 5 km inland near Sendai and Ishinomaki Bays in Miyagi Prefecture.”  
Tsunami Topped 15 Meters on Sanriku Coast,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 18, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110318004192.htm. 
33  “Tsunami Flooding Hit Miyagi Pref. Areas Hardest,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 31, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110330005586.htm. 
34  USG Humanitarian Assistance to Japan for the Earthquake and Tsunami: April 2011 United States 
Agency International Development, [2011]). 
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Figure 4.   Assessed Areas Damaged by Tsunami (From “USG Humanitarian 
Assistance to Japan for the Earthquake and Tsunami,” 2011) 
 The damage caused by the tsunami accounts for an overwhelming majority of the 
damage inflicted.  The most devastating of these is the loss of human life.  As of October 
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7, 2011, 15,822 people were reported killed and 3,926 people remained missing.  Ninety-
nine percent of the killed or missing were from Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima 
Prefectures.  The missing are not likely to be recovered, which makes 19,748 the likely 
total number of people killed by the disaster.  Another 5,942 people were reported as 
injured (see Table 1).  The toll taken from the Japanese population is substantial, but the 
way in which it occurred adds to the devastating narrative left behind.  In the weeks 
following the tsunami, the Japanese news media began reporting on countless tragic 
stories from those that lost loved ones often by their side.35 36 37 
 Property and infrastructure was badly damaged along Japan’s eastern coast.  
Japan Railway East discovered 23 stations and portions of 7 lines damaged in Iwate, 
Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures.38  Sendai’s airport lies close to the coast and was 
inundated by the tsunami.39  Property damage was most prevalent in Iwate, Miyagi, and 
Fukushima Prefectures, which accounted for 96% of the 118,516 buildings completely 
destroyed and 82% of the 180,700 buildings half collapsed (see Table 1).  As a testament 
to the strength of the tsunami, it demolished the world’s deepest breakwater.40  The 
outcome was much the same in numerous other coastal cities that had spent decades 
fortifying their towns against tsunamis after experiencing similarly devastating tsunamis 
in 1896 and 1960.41 
                                                 
35  Hiroshi Sakamoto, “As Snow Falls, A Tearful Vigil for Wife, Mom,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 
18, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110317004504.htm. 
36  Naoto Takeda, Tatsuya Imaoka and Shigeru Yamada, “Pain Pours Out of Grieving Parents,” The 
Daily Yomiuri, March 15, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110314004973.htm. 
37  Yusuke Amano, “Ultimate Sacrifice Given for A Lifeline,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 24, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110323004438.htm. 
38  “Tsunami Washed Away 23 JR Stations,” The Daily Yomiuri, April/ 2, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110401004996.htm. 
39  Economic Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Current Status of Recovery (August 
2011) (Tokyo: Government of Japan, 2011), 6. 
40  The 2 km long, 20 m thick, 8 m high, 63 m deep, and 7 million cubic meter breakwater protecting 
the Kamaishi Bay in Iwate Prefecture could not withstand the force of the tsunami that left 800m of the 
breakwater completely destroyed.  Yasushi Kaneko, “Tsunami Tore Through Defenses: World’s Deepest 
Breakwater Couldn’t Withstand Momentum of 250 Jumbo Jets,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 22, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110321004432.htm. 
41  “50 Years of Effort Swept Away: Tsunami Wiped Out Dikes, Breakwaters That Took Decades To 
Build,” The Daily Yomiuri, April 10, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110409003380.htm. 
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 The economic impact of the tsunami was extensive.  Japan’s Cabinet Office 
estimated the total economic damage done in the affected areas to be 16.9 trillion yen, 
nearly 220 billion dollars based on a 77 yen / 1 dollar ratio.  A majority of the costs, 
10.4 trillion yen, are attributed to property damage (see Table 2).42  This figure makes the 
Great East Japan Earthquake the costliest natural disaster in the world’s history. 
 
 
Table 2.   Estimated Economic Damage (From “Road to Recovery,” 2011) 
3. The Nuclear Power Station Disaster 
 Four stations with a total of 14 nuclear power plants were in the immediate area 
affected by the earthquake and tsunami.43  Plants 4, 5, and 6 at Fukushima Dai-ichi were 
under periodic inspection outage at the time of the earthquake and plants 1, 2, and 3 were 
automatically shutdown.  External power at the station was cut-off due to the earthquake. 
 
                                                 
42  Road to Recovery, 10. 
43 These stations were Onagawa, Fukushima Dai-ichi, Fukushima Dai-ni, and Tokai Dai-ni.  All plants 
at Onagawa, Fukushima Dai-ni, and Tokai Dai-ni had no serious damage and were shutdown automatically 
when the earthquake hit. 
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An estimated 14 m tsunami wave washed over the 5.7 m breakwater at the station and 
inundated the emergency diesel power generator and the cooling pumps, making them 
inoperable at 3:41PM (see Figure 5).44   
 
 
Figure 5.   Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Damage (From “Great East 
Japan Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the NPSs,” 2011) 
 The lack of any cooling system set off a chain reaction of events that led to one of 
the worst nuclear disasters.  Prime Minister Kan Naoto ordered citizens to evacuate 
within a 20 km radius of Fukushima Dai-ichi and a 10 km radius of Fukushima Dai-ni on 
March 12.45  That same day, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the upper part of plant 1’s 
building after the primary containment vessel was vented.  Similar hydrogen explosions 
                                                 
44  Great East Japan Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the NPSs: July 2011 (Tokyo: Japan 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2011), 1. 
45  The 2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Pacific Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the 
NPPs: April 2011, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, 
2011), 48. 
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occurred at plant 3 on March 14 and at plant 2 on March 15.  In the first week after the 
earthquake, SDF, police, and fire department forces desperately tried to cool the plants 
and prevent further radiation leaks using helicopters and fire pump trucks.  As a result of 
low water levels in reactor pressure vessels due to disabled cooling systems, damage to 
plant structures from the explosions, and cooling attempts using seawater and freshwater, 
the plants emitted higher than normal doses of radiation into the atmosphere and 
surrounding water and soil.46,47  On April 12, Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency raised the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale level to a 7, the 
highest position representing a major accident.48  This put the incident on par with the 
1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident.49 
 In the several months following the nuclear accident, cooling systems were 
restored, contaminated water was contained, and radiation emission was brought down to 
acceptable levels.  Loss of life was averted and TEPCO was on track toward a cold 
shutdown by the end of 2011.50 
C. MANIFESTATIONS 
1. The SDF Is a Competent HADR Force 
 HADR as a source of legitimacy means nothing for the SDF if they do not 
perform well.  Furthermore, performance must be demonstrated to a large audience in 
order to have any significant impact on the SDF’s public perception.  The SDF’s role in 
                                                 
46  Great East Japan Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the NPSs: July 2011, 2–4. 
47  The Japanese government ordered some vegetable and dairy product shipments from Fukushima 
and Ibaraki Prefectures to be halted on March 24.  “Food Problems Worsen,”  Daily Yomiuri, March 24, 
2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110323005308.htm. 
48  “N-Crisis Upgraded to ‘7’: Fukushima Accident Boosted to Top Level of Global Scale,” Daily 
Yomiuri, April 13, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110412006650.htm. 
49  The two disasters differed in that the amount of radiation emitted by Fukushima Dai-ichi in 30 days 
was only 10% of the amount leaked in the first 10 days at Chernobyl.  No one died from Fukushima Dai-
ichi’s radiation as opposed to the 28 acute radiation sickness deaths at Chernobyl.  Also, the Japanese 
government quickly ordered citizens to evacuate before radiation doses became potentially dangerous 
whereas Soviet officials did not order evacuations until residents had been exposed to large amounts of 
radiation.  Major Differences Between the Chernobyl Accident and the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi 
Nuclear Power Station: April 2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, [2011]). 
50  Great East Japan Earthquake and the Seismic Damage to the NPSs: July 2011, 2–4. 
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domestic HADR is typically on a much smaller scale commensurate to the size of the 
disaster.  Nonetheless, the SDF is involved in a considerable amount of HADR 
operations within Japan each year.  In FY2010, the SDF participated in 529 different 
disaster relief operations of which 15 were in direct response to a natural disaster.  The 
average contingent of SDF personnel involved in the 15 natural disasters averages 
approximately 390 (see Table 3).51  These smaller operations provide limited experience 
to the SDF and do not get the attention as one might expect from a large disaster.  The 
Great East Japan Earthquake provided the SDF an opportunity to demonstrate that it was 
a competent HADR force to a much larger domestic and international audience.  The 




Table 3.   SDF Disaster Relief Dispatches, FY2010 (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011) 
a. Decisive 
  The SDF can be characterized as decisive due to their rapid and effective 
response to the Great East Japan Earthquake.  Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi 
immediately established the SDF Disaster Response Headquarters at 2:50 PM.  A total of 
11 SDF aircraft including two Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) UH-1 helicopters, two 
                                                 
51  Defense of Japan 2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2011), 244. 
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Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) P-3C patrol aircraft and one UH-60 helicopter and 
six Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) F-15 fighter aircraft responded within 30 minutes of 
the earthquake.52  Kitazawa then ordered large-scale disaster relief dispatch at 6:00PM 
followed by nuclear disaster dispatch at 7:30PM on March 11.  Approximately 8,400 
personnel and 190 aircraft were immediately mobilized as a result of these orders.53,54 
  The SDF quickly adapted to its first challenge as it had relatively little 
information about what areas needed search and rescue assistance.  The tsunami wiped 
out entire villages, leaving some survivors stranded on rooftops, and cut off other towns 
and villages entirely.  The disaster relief exercise Michinoku Alert in 2008 operated on 
the assumption that the SDF and other rescue participants would receive information 
from local municipalities affected by the disaster.  In most cases, even these facilities 
were destroyed leaving the SDF with no on the ground perspective.  The GSDF adapted 
to this situation by immediately deploying roughly 20 CH-47 and UH-60 helicopters 
from Kisarazu Air Field in Chiba Prefecture, Somabara Air Field in Gunma Prefecture, 
and Camp Kasuminome near Sendai in Miyagi Prefecture.  These helicopters performed 
some of the first rescues and reconnoitered the affected areas.  The ASDF also launched 
RF-4 reconnaissance planes from Hyakuri Air Field in Ibaraki Prefecture in order to 
assess the extent of damages.  The information gathered helped the GSDF begin large-
scale mobilization of its forces into the affected areas at dawn on March 12. 
  The MSDF also quickly sprang into action.  The Commanding Admiral of 
the Yokosuka District, which has responsibility for the seas adjacent to the affected areas, 
established his headquarters at the Self Defense Fleet’s Headquarters in Yokosuka and 
ordered ships to sortie immediately.  JDS HARUSAME (DD102) was the first ship to get 
 
 
                                                 
52  Road to Recovery, 4. 
53  “Activity Posture of the Minister of Defense and the Self Defense Forces,” Japan Defense Focus, 
August, 2011, 2. 
54  As a testament to the SDF’s rapid response, the GSDF’s 21st infantry regiment based in Akita 
Prefecture arrived in Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture to provide aid to a completely isolated town by 
7:30AM on March 12.  Road to Recovery, 37. 
 27 
 
underway on March 11.  By 10:00AM the next morning, 17 ships were underway from 
Yokosuka en route to areas in vicinity of Oshika Peninsula.  The first ships arrived off the 
coast at 5:00PM on March 12.55 
  Kan ordered Kitazawa to increase SDF personnel numbers to 100,000.  
The number of deployed personnel reached 50,000 by March 13 and 100,000 by March 
18.  At the peak of their operations the SDF forces numbered approximately 107,000 
personnel, 540 aircraft, and 60 ships.  This represents approximately 40% of the SDF’s 
240,000 personnel.  It was the largest mobilization of forces in the SDF’s 57-year 
history.56  The GSDF deployed the most forces with 70,000 troops.  The ASDF deployed 
21,600 personnel and the MSDF sent 15,000.57 
  The large-scale disaster relief operations prompted another decisive 
response when Kitazawa called up reserve and ready reserve personnel on March 16 for 
the first time in SDF history to serve in the disaster relief effort.58 59 
  The SDF’s rapid deployment displays competence not just because they 
were following procedure but also because the speed and degree to which the SDF 
responded was their choice.  After the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the 
primary method of requesting SDF assistance for disaster relief operations remained with 
the prefectural governor.  The discretionary dispatch method was expanded to allow unit 
 
 
                                                 
55  Hidemichi Katsumata, “Disaster Relief Operations of the JSDF for the Great East Japan 
Earthquake,” Ships of the World, June, 2011. 
56  Defense of Japan 2011, 3. 
57  Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and 
Other Foreign Countries (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, [2011]). 
58  “Disaster Call-Up of Reserve and Ready Reserve Personnel,” Japan Ministry of Defense, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2011/110316.html (accessed October 18, 2011). 
59  Initially, only GSDF reserve personnel were called up and then MSDF and ASDF reserves were 
activated on April 15.  A total of 2,210 ready reserves and 309 reserves participated in disaster relief 
operations, 26% and 1% of each category of reserve personnel respectively.  Most reserve personnel were 
activated for 1 to 2 weeks.  Defense of Japan 2011, 17. 
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commanders three circumstances under which they could deploy their forces.60  
Numerous SDF unit commanders made the decision to initiate discretionary dispatches 
based on these guidelines. 
b. Versatile 
  The SDF executed a wide variety of operations during their disaster relief 
efforts including search and rescue, rescue operations for missing persons, transport 
assistance, livelihood assistance (water supply, food, fuel, bathing, medical), and debris 
removal. 
  The mission priority immediately after the disaster was the search and 
rescue of survivors.  All elements of the SDF began search and rescue operations 
immediately.61  As a result of the massive and rapid deployment to the affected areas, the 
SDF played the most prominent role in search and rescue operations.  The SDF rescued 
19,286 people, which is approximately 70% of all those rescued.62  Of this total, 14,933 
are attributed to the GSDF, 3,453 to the ASDF, and 900 to the MSDF.63 64  The SDF was 
responsible for two of the highest profile rescues seen throughout Japan and the world.65 
  As the days passed by, the focus of the operation shifted to recovering 
missing persons.  The GSDF conducted numerous concentrated search operations with 
other rescue forces in the coastal regions of the most affected prefectures.66  The MSDF 
                                                 
60  First, SDF assets must be deployed to gather information from the affected region in order to pass 
on to relevant organizations.  Second, it is determined that the prefectural governor cannot make a request 
and immediate assistance is needed.  Third, life-saving operations are needed.  Ibid., 241. 
61 The GSDF took the main lead in rescue operations on the ground while the MSDF did so from the 
sea.  All services contributed their air assets in search operations as well.  Ibid., 4. 
62  Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and 
Other Foreign Countries. 
63  “Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake,” Japan Air Self Defense Force, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/touhokuoki/katudou/ (accessed October 19, 2011). 
64  “Situation of Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake,” Japan Maritime Self 
Defense Force, http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/operation/earthquake.html (accessed October 19, 2011). 
65  GSDF personnel rescued a 4-month old girl from the rubble in Ishinomaki City and JDS CHOKAI 
(DDG 176) rescued a man adrift in the ocean on a roof for two days.  Defense of Japan 2011, 4. 
66  Ibid., 5. 
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distributed their approximately 60 ships for search and logistics operations along a vast 
portion of Japan’s northeastern coast (see Figure 6).67 
 
 
Figure 6.   MSDF Dispatch Units, Right After the Disaster (After “Situation of 
Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake,” 2011) 
  Of all the bodies recovered, the SDF accommodated 9,505, which 
accounts for roughly 60% of the total fatalities.  SDF personnel also personally carried 
the bodies of 1,004 individuals.68  Because of the high fatality rates, the SDF conducted 
transportation of bodies to burial sites and helped receive them at mortuaries. 
  Along with search and rescue operations the SDF began transport 
assistance operations to get disaster relief personnel and supplies into the affected areas.  
                                                 
67  Situation of Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake. 
68  Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and 
Other Foreign Countries. 
 30 
The SDF transported a total of 175 patients and 20,240 people from Disaster Assistance 
Medical Teams and rescue units.  The transportation of supplies facilitated the delivery of 
roughly 13,906 tons of supplies.69 
  The MSDF’s role in the disaster relief operations was primarily 
transportation assistance.  Ships delivered supplies to the mainland via Landing Craft Air 
Cushion and helicopter.  The MSDF was also suited to deliver aid to isolated islands.70  
Of note for the MSDF, JDS HYUGA (DDH-181) proved its utility as a multi-mission 
platform.71  During the disaster relief operations, it served as a command center for other 
vessels in the area and helped coordinate efforts with the U.S. military.  Its flight deck 
was used as a relay station for all of the SDF services and U.S. military aircraft that were 
transporting personnel and delivering aid.  Its compliment of medical and dental 
technicians and ample bathing facilities were used to support a number of citizens from 
the disaster areas.72  The second DDH, JDS ISE (DDH-182), was recently commissioned 
on March 16, 2011.  As these ships are very new, it can be expected that they will play a 
vital role in HADR operations within Japan for years to come.  The successful 
deployment of JDS HYUGA in a HADR operation may continue to distract outsiders to 
the DDH’s primary missions of anti-submarine warfare and command and control. 
  As supplies and personnel began to flow into the disaster areas and bases 
of operation were established, the SDF conducted livelihood assistance activities by 
providing water, food, fuel, bathing facilities, and medical care.  GSDF personnel 
delivered water via water tank vehicles and trailers to shelters and established water 
stations in other areas.  A total of 32,985 tons of water was distributed in approximately 
200 places.  The GSDF also provided canned foods, emergency meals, bread, rice, and 
                                                 
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid. 
71  JDS HYUGA was commissioned in 2009.  Although it is capable of conducting multiple missions, 
it was designed to be an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platform and flotilla commander flagship with a 
robust communications suite.  Missions other than these including HADR are considered secondary 
missions for JDS HYUGA.  Nonetheless, its large flight deck with four helicopter pads and extensive 
command and control equipment make it one of the most capable HADR platforms in the MSDF fleet.  
Yoji Koda, “A New Carrier Race?” Naval War College Review 64, no. 3 (Summer, 2011), 31, 48–55. 
72  Defense of Japan 2011, 9. 
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other food items at outdoor cooking stations.  The MSDF transported disaster victims 
from isolated islands to their ships and opened up their dining facilities to feed them.  The 
SDF provided a staggering 5,005,484 meals in approximately 100 places.  Kerosene for 
heating and fuel for livelihood and emergency vehicles was also distributed throughout 
the disaster area.  Approximately 368,784 gallons of fuel was provided.  The GSDF set 
up outdoor bathing facilities while the ASDF opened Matsushima Air Base for public 
use.  The MSDF also allowed citizens to use its bathing facilities on Hachinohe Base and 
opened its bathing facilities on ships.  A total of 1,084,132 baths in nearly 35 places were 
provided to local citizens.  Mobile medical units traveled around the disaster area 
providing examinations and medical care to victims.  The SDF also utilized its medical 
facilities at the SDF Sendai Hospital and MSDF Hachinohe Base.  Roughly 23,370 
people received treatment from SDF medical personnel.73 74 
  The SDF also involved itself in reconstruction operations from the 
beginning of the disaster.  Priority was given to clearing roads in support of search and 
rescue operations.  Key infrastructure was cleared of rubble and restored to working 
order.  These areas included Sendai Airport, Hachinohe Airport, Miyako Port, and 
Kesennuma Port.  The SDF constructed temporary bridges where needed to connect 
isolated communities.75  In all, 322 km of road was cleared of obstacles.76 
  The nuclear disaster dispatch force conducted a wide variety of missions 
in vicinity of Fukushima Dai-ni and the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 
stations such as water supply and pumping to cool reactors, decontamination, monitoring 
operations, assistance to the local community, and search operations in areas near the 
nuclear power station.77 
                                                 
73  Ibid., 9–11. 
74  Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and 
Other Foreign Countries. 
75  Defense of Japan 2011, 12. 
76  Record of Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake by the Self Defense Forces and 
Other Foreign Countries. 
77  Defense of Japan 2011, 14–17. 
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  The nuclear disaster dispatch mobilized quickly after the earthquake.  
ASDF water supply vehicles pumped water onto reactors at Fukushima Dai-ni on March 
13 and 14.  The major effort concentrated on Fukushima Dai-ichi as it sustained the most 
damage.  As the situation intensified, the GSDF made its first attempt to cool plant 3.  On 
March 17, two CH-47J helicopters carrying firefighting water buckets dumped 30 tons of 
water over four trips on plant 3.78  In conjunction with the police and fire departments, 
the SDF used its fire trucks to pump water onto plant 3 from March 17–18 and on plant 4 
from March 20–21.  Altogether the SDF used 44 fire trucks and pumped 340 tons of 
water on the reactors.  Numerous SDF air assets monitored the status of Fukushima Dai-
ichi throughout the crisis by measuring levels of radiation.  GSDF personnel conducted 
decontamination operations at eight stations along major roads for local residents and 
rescue personnel.  As Kan established evacuation zones around the nuclear power 
stations, SDF personnel assisted the elderly and hospitalized citizens evacuate from the 
area.  When evacuated persons were allowed to temporarily revisit their homes from May 
11, the SDF assisted these residents through measurement and decontamination 
operations.  As the radiation threat decreased in April and May, the SDF conducted a 
series of searches near Fukushima Dai-ichi.79 
  The immense scope and effectiveness of SDF involvement after the Great 
East Japan Earthquake indicates the SDF is a versatile HADR force. 
c. Joint 
  The scope of the disasters meant that each service would be necessary in 
the disaster relief efforts.  After each service began mobilizing their forces, a joint task 
force was formed on March 14 to collectively strengthen the disaster relief operations.  
Kitazawa appointed the GSDF Commanding General of the Northeastern Army, 
                                                 
78  The intent was to replenish the water levels in the spent fuel pools in order to keep the temperature 
under control.  “Water Dumped on Reactor: GSDF Choppers Attempt to Cool No. 3 Fuel Rod Pool,” The 
Daily Yomiuri, March 18, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110317005354.htm. 
79 ASDF RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft and GSDF UH-1 helicopters conducted air reconnaissance and 
GSDF CH-47J helicopters fitted with thermal measuring devices monitored the reactor’s temperature.  
ASDF T-4 aircraft and SDF helicopters used dosimeter equipment to measure the types of radiation in 
vicinity of the power station.   Defense of Japan 2011, 14–17. 
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Kimizuka Eiji, to head the joint task force.  The joint task force represented the first time 
ground, naval, and air units conducted large-scale joint operations outside of an exercise 
(see Figure 7 for geographic reference).80  
 
 
Figure 7.   Location of Principal SDF Units as of March 31, 2011 (From “Defense of 
Japan,” 2011) 
  The joint task force encompassed two separate dispatch forces within the 
command structure.  Most of the SDF forces fell under the large-scale earthquake disaster 
dispatch.  The Central Readiness Force (CRF) was the nuclear disaster dispatch force.81  
                                                 
80  Ibid., 2–3. 
81  The CRF was created in 2007 along with the formation of the Ministry of Defense.  Its 
headquarters is in Asaka, Tokyo and its mission is to act as a rapid response force capable of handling a 
wide range of missions for domestic or international purposes.  It is comprised of various and elite SDF 
units including the 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, Special Forces Group, and Central NBC 
Defense Unit.  “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment (Japan- Army),” IHS Global Limited, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/j
apns110.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Japan%20Army&backPath=http://search.janes.c
om/Search&Prod_Name=CNAS& (accessed December 22, 2011), 2–3. 
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The CRF’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) unit, mobility, and close proximity 
to Fukushima Dai-ichi made it an ideal selection to deploy as the nuclear disaster 
dispatch force (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8.   MOD and SDF Organization for the Great East Japan Earthquake (From 
“Defense of Japan,” 2011) 
  Two central coordination centers were established to facilitate joint task 
force coordination and incorporate U.S. military assistance.  These were located at the 
Ministry of Defense building in Ichigaya, Tokyo and U.S. Forces Japan Headquarters at 
Yokota Air Base.  A field coordination center was created at the Northeastern Army 
Headquarters in Sendai where Kimizuka commanded the joint task force.82 
  The joint task force and coordination centers facilitated concerted efforts 
at the intra-service level and at the bi-lateral level with the U.S. military.  The mass 
mobilization of personnel and resources and their successful operations seen by the 
numerous accomplishments across a broad spectrum of HADR missions shows how 
                                                 
82  Defense of Japan 2011, 21. 
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effective the SDF functioned at the intra-service level.  The SDF’s relief supply 
transportation method exemplifies this joint functionality in particular (see Figure 9).83   
 
 
Figure 9.   Transport of Aid Supplies (From “Defense of Japan,” 2011) 
  At the bi-lateral level, the SDF and U.S. military demonstrated the 
effectiveness of their coordinated operations and validated years of joint exercises.  The 
United States provided the largest source of international military assistance to Japan 
under the name of OPERATION TOMODACHI from March 13 – April 8.  At the peak 
of operations, 16,000 U.S. military service members, 15 ships, and 140 aircraft supported 
the HADR operation.84  USS RONALD REAGAN carrier strike group participated in a 
massive joint search with the SDF comprised of 7,000 U.S. service members and 18,000 
SDF personnel.  Nearly 339 bodies were found as a result of the operation.85  U.S. Navy 
                                                 
83  Prefecture governments delivered donated supplies to local SDF bases in each prefecture.  These 
bases then consolidated supplies at the major air bases in each prefecture.  Supplies were sent from these air 
bases and other prefecture bases via GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF transportation assets to one of three major 
transfer locations: Hanamaki Airport in Iwate Prefecture, Fukushima Airport, and Matsushima Air Base in 
Miyagi Prefecture.  From these locations, supplies were delivered to evacuation shelters via helicopters and 
trucks.  Ibid., 6. 
84  Ibid., 19. 
85  Chiyomi Sumida, “Massive Search by U.S., Japanese Troops Wraps Up With 339 Bodies Found,” 
Stars and Stripes, April 4, 2011. 
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salvage units conducted port clearance operations in Hachinohe, Miyako, and 
Kesennuma.  USS ESSEX amphibious readiness group provided disaster assistance to the 
isolated Oshima Island.86  USS TORTUGA (LSD 46) transported 300 GSDF troops and 
100 vehicles from Hokkaido to the disaster area.  Logistics aircraft from U.S. Marine 
Corps Air Station Futenma transported disaster relief supplies to MSDF Iwakuni Air 
Base, Atsugi Air Facility, and Yokota Air Base.  The U.S. Air Force also played a large 
role in transporting relief supplies primarily through Yokota and Misawa Air Bases.87  
U.S. soldiers and marines worked with the SDF and civilian contractors to clear debris 
from the seriously damaged Sendai Airport.   The joint effort quickly restored the 
airport’s functionality on March 28.88  Small numbers of U.S. soldiers and marines 
conducted various livelihood activities in communities throughout the disaster area.  
These forces cleared debris from schools and train stations, and deployed portable 
bathing facilities for local residents.  For the nuclear accident, the U.S. military provided 
five water pumps, two large barges and pumps to aid freshwater cooling efforts, and 
roughly 18 tons of boric acid.89 
  As the situation became more stable and mass mobilization no longer 
became necessary, the joint task force disbanded on July 1 and the large-scale disaster 
dispatch concluded on August 31, 2011.90  The joint task force’s 109-day existence 
proved the SDF could function effectively in a joint environment for a considerable 
duration. 
                                                 
86  During their stay, U.S. military and SDF personnel restored power to the island, delivered 15,000 
lbs. of supplies, and cleared debris on several of the island’s beaches.  T. D. Flack, “Navy Scales Back 
Earthquake Relief Efforts in Japan,” Stars and Stripes, April 7, 2011. 
87  Defense of Japan 2011, 19. 
88  Economic Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Current Status of Recovery (August 
2011) (Tokyo: Government of Japan, 2011), 6. 
89  Defense of Japan 2011, 19, 21. 
90  Situation of Disaster Dispatch Activity of the Great East Japan Earthquake. 
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2. The SDF Is the Most Capable HADR Force Within Japan 
 There are those that still advocate a non-military disaster relief organization and 
wish to de-emphasize the SDF’s HADR role.91  This section finds that the SDF’s 
preeminent role in disaster relief operations after the Great East Japan Earthquake will 
help to further marginalize this line of thinking as it showed it was the most capable 
HADR force within Japan. 
 The SDF was certainly not the only participant in the disaster relief operations.  
The major participants include the police and fire departments, Japan Coast Guard (JCG), 
non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the international community.  The SDF 
stands out as the preeminent disaster relief organization because it was the best equipped 
to execute all of the various HADR operations.  The other major participants provided 
valuable services but did not have the SDF’s operational breadth.  For instance, the police 
department supplied 5,600 personnel, about 5% of the SDF forces involved.  Police 
forces rescued approximately 3,750 victims, which is about 20% of the amount rescued 
by the SDF.  The police also conducted a wide variety of other missions such as 
assistance to the elderly, disaster victim care at shelters, establishing emergency routes, 
identification of the dead and missing, and collection of recovered valuables.92  The 
police, however, lack the capacity to conduct large maritime and air search and rescue 
operations, and lack the logistical equipment needed to mobilize massive amounts of 
relief aid. 
 The JCG used its personnel and maritime and air assets in support of search and 
rescue operations, port clearance, and identification of hazards to navigation.  At the 
height of the SDF’s deployment on March 18, the JCG deployed 54 ships, 19 aircraft, 14 
special search and rescue units, and 14 mobile rescue teams.93  The JCG’s search and 
                                                 
91  “Towards a Non-Military Disaster Relief Organization,” Translated by James Simpson. The Asahi 
Shimbun, May 7, 2011, http://newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/?p=6160. 
92  Police Measures Regarding the Great East Japan Earthquake: October 2011 (Tokyo: Japan 
National Police Agency, 2011), 3–12. 
93  Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake:  March 18, Japan Coast Guard, [2011]). 
 38 
rescue operations resulted in the rescue of 360 personnel, about 2% of the amount 
rescued by the SDF and only one-third attributed to the MSDF.94 
 NGOs play a large part in funneling international and domestic relief aid to 
disaster victims.  Their contributions include a variety of livelihood assistance (food, non-
food items, health, psychological, wash facilities), logistics assistance, shelter 
management, telecommunications, education, debris removal, and pest control (see 
Figures 10, 11, and 12).95  Each NGO’s activities may last anywhere from a few days to 
months but their assistance is vital to address specific needs that organizations such as the 
SDF may not be equipped to address or cannot completely handle on its own.  NGOs 
typically outlast military disaster relief efforts, as is the case with Japan Platform, a non-
profit organization with 32 NGO members, which signed up for three years of NGO 
coordination efforts.  As of August 31, Japan Platform also collected approximately 
$88 million in donations and provided 60 million dollars in grants to its member NGOs.96  
Nonetheless, NGOs cannot contribute to search and rescue operations and require a great 
deal of coordination to efficiently allocate their varying resources. 
                                                 
94  These less significant contributions compared to the MSDF are to be expected as the JCG’s 
personnel numbers and ship sizes are smaller.  Search and rescue is also a primary mission for the JCG, 
which leads to a smaller and more mobile force that cannot contribute toward relief aid transportation like 
the MSDF.  Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake:  October 7, Japan Coast Guard, [2011]). 
95  “NGO Activity Map,” Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation, 
http://www.janic.org/en/earthquake/map/ (accessed October 15, 2011). 
96  Northeast Pacific Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Current Status of JPF’s Relief Efforts as of 








Figure 10.   JANIC and Japan Platform NGO Activity in Iwate Prefecture as of May 20, 













Figure 11.   JANIC and Japan Platform NGO Activity in Miyagi Prefecture as of May 
20, 2011 (From “NGO Activity Map,” 2011) 
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Figure 12.   JANIC and Japan Platform NGO Activity in Fukushima Prefecture as of 
May 20, 2011 (From “NGO Activity Map,” 2011) 
 International assistance in the form of rescue teams and military forces provide a 
valuable augmentation to search and rescue capabilities and transportation assistance but 
do not come close to matching the SDF’s capabilities.  Not counting U.S. military forces, 
international rescue teams and military forces totaled around 1,200 personnel, about 1% 
of the amount deployed by the SDF.  Most of the international rescue teams were only 
deployed for a matter of days (see Figure 13).97 Although the U.S. military supported the 
disaster relief efforts with a large contingent numbering 16,000 personnel, the bulk of its 
HADR support was also short in duration, 27 days, compared to the SDF’s 173 days of 
large-scale disaster dispatch.  International assistance is useful and appreciated but cannot 
be counted on for the obvious reason of lacking direct control over these forces. 
                                                 
97  Map of Sites Where Rescue Teams from Foreign Countries, Regions, and International 
Organizations are Operating:  August 3 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [2011]). 
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Figure 13.   Rescue Operations Map of International Assistance (From “Map of Sites 
Where Rescue Teams from Foreign Countries, Regions, and International 
Organizations are Operating:  August 3,” 2011) 
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 The Great East Japan Earthquake definitively showed the Japanese public that the 
SDF is the most capable HADR force in Japan and must be relied on in future disasters.  
The major participants in disaster relief operations provide assistance in some HADR 
operations but none came close to matching the SDF’s comprehensive HADR 
capabilities.  The SDF’s pool of 240,000 human resources allows it to mobilize a large 
amount of forces over a widely devastated area.  The SDF’s heavy equipment enables it 
to conduct search and rescue operations in any environment and efficiently deliver a vast 
amount of relief aid.  The SDF therefore provides the government centralized control 
over the largest and most capable HADR force within Japan.  Demonstrating the SDF’s 
utility as a HADR tool will help dissolve pacifist norms that support less reliance on the 
SDF. 
3. The Domestic Political Environment Is Conducive to the SDF’s 
Effective  Domestic Application and Integration of International 
Assistance 
 One of the reasons the SDF was able to deploy its forces so quickly and 
effectively and operate jointly with the U.S. military was because the domestic political 
environment did not impede these actions.  It seems logical that government officials 
would expect the SDF to become involved in disaster relief operations after such a large 
disaster.  This has not always been the case.  The SDF’s response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake is best understood and appreciated when compared to that of its response to 
the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995.  The 1995 earthquake provides the best 
point of comparison to the 2011 earthquake because it is the most recent large-scale 
natural disaster classified as a “great” disaster by Japan.  This section briefly summarizes 
the 1995 earthquake and the SDF’s response and identifies differences between the two 
disasters relating to the SDF. 
 The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck the Kobe area on January 17, 1995 
at 5:46AM.  Its magnitude was recorded at 7.2 and occurred in an urban area with 
approximately 4 million people.  The city of Kobe was the world’s sixth largest container 
port at the time but the affected area only represented a little less than 3% of Japan’s 
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economy.  This was slightly larger than the area affected by the 2011 earthquake.98  
About 6,500 people died from the earthquake. Almost 100,000 buildings were completely 
destroyed and the same amount was partially collapsed.  Much of Kobe’s infrastructure 
was damaged including utilities, railroads, and the primary coastal highway.  Nearly 
300,000 people were left homeless from the disaster.  The 1995 earthquake set the bar as 
the world’s most costly disaster of the time at 64 billion dollars.  It was a major disaster 
that required extensive disaster relief efforts.99 
 One would think that government officials would have knocked down the SDF’s 
door requesting their assistance.  This was not the case.  At the time of the 1995 
earthquake, the primary method for deploying the SDF in support of disaster relief 
operations was via a request from the prefectural governor.100 
 The earthquake occurred in 1995 amidst the only LDP rule interim in its 54-year 
stretch.  Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi was elected the previous year and was a 
member of the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ).  The SDPJ was known for its 
distrust of the SDF and acted in many ways to subvert its influence and role.  The Hyogo 
Prefecture Governor did not make a formal request to the GSDF until four hours after the 
earthquake at 10:00AM.  A similar request for MSDF support was delayed twelve hours 
until 6:00PM.  The distrust between government officials and the SDF is cited as one 
reason why government officials did not quickly submit a formal request for SDF 
assistance leading to a slow SDF response.101  
 Another reason for the slow response was that the hostile domestic political 
environment prevented the SDF from conducting any disaster relief exercises with local 
authorities.  SDF commanders erred on the side of restraint when involving their forces in 
                                                 
98  Economic Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Current Status of Recovery (August 
2011), 2. 
99  George Horwich, “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake,” Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 48, no. 3 (April, 2000), 521–522. 
100  The governor is in overall charge of disaster relief operations within the prefecture and best 
understands the needs of the people and extent of the damage.  A municipal mayor could also ask the 
governor to request assistance from the SDF.  SDF commanders could deploy small forces in the event of 
an emergency but still relied on a formal request from the prefecture governor to deploy large-scale disaster 
relief forces.  Defense of Japan 2011, 241. 
101  Hidemichi Katsumata and Ryoichi Nishida, “Delay in Calling Out SDF Rescuers Comes Under 
Fire,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 20, 1995: 3, available from LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
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the prefecture.  Their disaster relief activities prior to formal requests in the past brought 
cooperation refusals and criticism from local government officials.  For example, a 
MSDF transport vessel and destroyer were initially refused to dock at Kobe’s port in 
order to deliver relief supplies on the afternoon of January 17.102  The SDPJ’s Secretary 
General Wataru Kubo even advocated on January 28 that an organization other than the 
SDF should be established to conduct disaster relief operations and participate in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations.103 
 Despite the tense domestic political environment, the SDF did deploy small forces 
before a formal request was received.104  In the following months, the SDF conducted 
various HADR operations similar to those after the 2011 earthquake.  These operations 
included search and rescue, accommodating bodies, and transporting patients and relief 
supplies.  Other services were provided such as water and food, medical stations, and 
bathing facilities.105  At the peak of SDF HADR operations, approximately 26,000 
personnel participated.106  The SDF completed its large-scale disaster dispatch on April 
27.  SDF personnel rescued 165 people, served 730,000 meals, supplied 62,000 tons of 
water, and provided 480,000 baths for disaster victims.107 108  The SDF force was 
ultimately the largest disaster relief force to operate in the affected area.  The next largest 
besides the fire department was the police force with a maximum total of 5,500 at the 
onset of the disaster.  In the police department’s 196 days of disaster relief efforts, they 
                                                 
102  Ibid. 
103  “Kubo Advocates New Relief Force,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 28, 1995: 2, available from 
LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
104  At 7:00AM, the GSDF sent a helicopter to conduct reconnaissance and at 8:00AM GSDF 
personnel began rescue operations near a collapsed train station.  The MSDF also flew a helicopter in the 
affected area early that morning and sent a transport vessel and destroyer from Kure at 9:00AM.  After the 
formal request came at 10:00AM, the first large GSDF disaster relief force of 1,000 personnel reached the 
area at 3:00PM.  Katsumata and Nishida, Delay in Calling Out SDF Rescuers Comes Under Fire. 
105  Defense of Japan 1995, trans. Shimizu Yuko (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1995). 
106  Defense of Japan 2011, 3. 
107  “SDF to Withdraw from Kobe April 27,” The Daily Yomiuri, April 27, 1995: 1, available from 
LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
108  “SDF Ends its Quake Relief Mission,” The Daily Yomiuri, April 28, 1995: 1, available from 
LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
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supplied 426,500 man-days.109  In comparison, the SDF provided 2.2 million man-days 
in just 100 days approximately.110  These figures indicate that the SDF had the capacity 
in 1995 to conduct a similarly effective HADR operation as it did after the Great East 
Japan Earthquake.  A harsh domestic political environment in 1995, however, slowed the 
SDF’s response and detracted attention from its otherwise successful HADR operation. 
 Another criticism the Japanese government received from the 1995 earthquake 
was its slow response to receive international aid.  Within days of the earthquake, 38 
countries and three U.N. organizations offered aid to the Japanese government but only 
four countries were allowed to send rescue teams within the first five days after the 
earthquake.111  U.S. Forces Japan also comprised an extensive list of assets, supplies, and 
personnel available to assist in the disaster relief; the scope of which would have been 
similar to OPERATION TOMODACHI.  The Japanese government only accepted 
minimal supplies and support from the U.S. military.  It was suspected that the SDPJ 
leadership refused such offers because of its anti-militarist sentiments.112  About 60 U.S. 
Marines set up tents in the affected area, which represented the first time U.S. forces 
assisted Japan in disaster relief operations.113  The media eventually blamed the SDPJ 
government for letting it fall victim to bureaucratic red tape in the time of an emergency. 
 Because the SDF’s response was slow but ultimately effective, media reports after 
the 1995 earthquake did not praise the SDF’s actions to the degree that they did after the 
2011 earthquake.  The media and disaster victims were generally appreciative of their 
efforts, however.   In a January 1995 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 93% of respondents stated 
they wanted a rapid SDF dispatch in case of a disaster.  Another 32%, the largest 
percentage, said they wanted to depend on the SDF the most to provide relief support.114  
                                                 
109  Police Measures regarding the Great East Japan Earthquake: October 2011, 3. 
110  Defense of Japan 1995. 
111  “Countries Offer to Help but Govt Fails to Respond,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 23, 1995: 2, 
available from LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
112  Tatou Takahama, “Arrogant Quake Response Under Fire,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 27, 1995: 
13, available from LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
113  “4,387 Bodies Identified; SDF Puts Up Refugee Tents,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 22, 1995: 1, 
available from LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
114  “People Slam Govt for Slow Quake Response,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 31, 1995: 1, available 
from LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
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The Daily Yomiuri also advocated for more disaster relief drills between SDF and local 
governments and better communication amongst all participants in a disaster relief 
situation.115  The SDPJ’s views toward the SDF were also changed.  On January 28, 
1995, Murayama reversed the SDPJ’s long-standing resistance to the SDF by stating he 
now supported incorporating the SDF into disaster relief programs with local 
governments.116 
 The SDF’s successful deployment after the Great East Japan Earthquake indicates 
that the domestic political environment has drastically improved since 1995.  Anti-
militarist sentiment no longer permeates the government and has facilitated increased 
civil-military cooperation.  For example, the SDF’s largest emergency drill to date called 
Michinoku Alert 2008 was conducted from October 31 to November 1, 2008.  The 
scenario mirrored the effects of the Great East Japan Earthquake and included 9,839 SDF 
personnel and 18,000 participants from eight prefectures in Tohoku including Iwate and 
Miyagi Prefectures.  The drill exercised civil-military coordination between SDF and 
prefecture organizations and followed up with regular meetings with participants.117  The 
domestic political environment also does not impede the integration of international 
assistance.  This transition since 1995 is evident by the speed of acceptance and scope of 
international aid received after the 2011 earthquake.  The favorable environment also 
facilitated the SDF’s joint operations with the U.S. military in the largest show of support 
between the two allies to date.  These developments are significant because in the SDF 
trajectory debate, the SDF’s ability to conduct operations unimpeded at home is a 
necessary step to expanding the SDF’s operations outside its borders. 
                                                 
115  Ienao Matsuoka, “Disaster Practice With SDF Would Make Perfect,” The Daily Yomiuri, February 
21, 1995: 7, available from LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
116  “Premier Recognizes SDF Relief Role,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 28, 1995: 1, available from 
LexisNexis [December 10, 2011]. 
117  Road to Recovery, 4. 
 48 
4. The SDF’s HADR Capabilities Demonstrate Ability for Other 
Operations 
 The SDF showed the Japanese people and the world that it was a competent 
HADR force.  At the same time it illustrated numerous qualities and capabilities that 
indicate the SDF is able to conduct other operations.  If the 2010 NDPG is used as a 
framework, it is clear to see how the SDF’s demonstrated HADR capabilities may 
translate into other operations.  Under the SDF’s effective deterrence and response role 
outlined in the 2010 NDPG, the SDF showed its ability to conduct four of seven priority 
areas.  The SDF’s ability to simultaneously handle the affects from the tsunami and the 
nuclear disaster illustrates its ability to conduct the first priority area:  response to 
complex contingencies.  The SDF’s mass mobilization of personnel and resources shows 
its high state of readiness and flexibility to conduct the following three priority areas:  
ensuring security of sea and air space surrounding Japan, response to attacks on offshore 
islands, and response to attacks by guerillas and special operations forces. 
 The SDF’s determination to accomplish its mission in a harsh environment also 
indicates that SDF personnel have the will to execute these priority areas.  The SDF 
endured numerous hardships during its disaster dispatch.  Three SDF members died as a 
result of the disasters.  One died when the tsunami hit Miyagi Prefecture as he was 
leading disaster victims to a shelter.118  Camp Tagajyou in Miyagi Prefecture, home to 
760 GSDF troops, was inundated by the tsunami.  More than half of the regiment came 
from Miyagi Prefecture and many had families in the affected area.  Despite the personal 
hardships experienced, the unit participated on the front lines of the disaster dispatch.119  
Three SDF members that were deployed to help support water supply operations at 
Fukushima Dai-ichi’s plant three received minor injuries when the building exploded.  
The explosion was powerful enough that it destroyed all of the SDF vehicles at the 
site.120  The SDF personnel involved in the cooling operations via fire pump trucks and 
                                                 
118  Defense of Japan 2011, 4. 
119  Kohei Tsujisaka, Akio Oikawa and Yasuo Matsubara, “SDF Rescuers Work in Their 
“Hometown,”“ The Daily Yomiuri, March 29, 2011, 
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120  Water Dumped on Reactor: GSDF Choppers Attempt to Cool No. 3 Fuel Rod Pool. 
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helicopters were also under a great deal of stress as the stability of the nuclear plants and 
the full extent of their radiation leakage was unknown in the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster. 
 GSDF troops in the affected prefectures operated in harsh environments for 
extended periods of time.  Large aftershocks made the threat of another tsunami very real 
and the working conditions were made worse by freezing temperatures and snow, flooded 
and muddy land, and massive amounts of debris.  In a Sankei Shimbun interview with 
General Kimizuka during the large-scale disaster relief operations, he made several 
observations from the operation.  His policy for the troops was to treat every corpse with 
extreme dignity and to place the needs of the survivors over themselves.  SDF personnel 
enthusiastically embraced the self-restraint and serving attitude required by Kimizuka.  
SDF members refrained from drinking and eating a lot in the morning so that they would 
not need to use the bathroom in the disaster area where bodies may be found.  SDF 
personnel ate canned food for months while citizens ate hot meals.  This led to the 
development of vitamin deficiencies and debilitating mouth ulcers in tens of thousands of 
SDF personnel, which was rectified by switching to boil-in-bag foods.  SDF personnel 
were allowed to shower only once a week while citizens had access to hot bathing 
facilities.121  The adverse working conditions and long-term exposure to dead bodies 
took a toll on many GSDF personnel.  Psychological and physical fatigue became a 
concern as some SDF personnel exhibited signs of acute stress disorder.122 
 Of course, enduring hardship is an understood part of any military service.  This 
was the first time the SDF was able to demonstrate on a large scale its willingness to 
undergo such harsh conditions for the betterment of the people.  This willingness serves 
as a foundation for confidence in the SDF’s ability to execute similarly demanding 
operations.  Furthermore, the SDF’s demonstrated HADR capabilities indicate that if the 
SDF were to follow a remilitarization trajectory and expand its operations, then the SDF 
has the ability to do so. 
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21, 2011, http://newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/?p=6833. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
 The Great East Japan Earthquake has the potential to serve as a catalytic event for 
the SDF.  It affected almost every aspect of Japanese society and thrust the SDF into full 
view of the public.  Retrenchment, status quo, and remilitarization trajectories are all 
plausible outcomes.  Sorting through these possible trajectories and the forces that may 
influence a particular trajectory is the next chapter’s goal. 
 In the process of performing this analysis, the four manifestations detailed in this 
chapter enable better-informed analysis as they describe what the disasters divulged 
about the SDF.  First, the SDF is a competent HADR force and will need to be relied on 
in the future, as Japan is constantly under threat from natural disasters.  The SDF 
exemplified this competence through its decisive actions, versatile capabilities, and joint 
operations.  Second, the SDF is the most capable HADR force within Japan.  No other 
organization can match the SDF’s capabilities across a wide spectrum of HADR 
missions.  Third, the domestic political environment is conducive to the SDF’s effective 
domestic application and integration of international assistance.  Civil-military 
cooperation has improved tremendously since the 1995 earthquake.  Fourth, the SDF’s 
demonstrated HADR capabilities and willingness to operate under harsh conditions 




III. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE’S IMPACT ON 
THE SELF DEFENSE FORCE’S TRAJECTORY 
A. INTRODUCTION: THE LOGIC 
So far, this thesis has illustrated that the scope of the disasters and the SDF’s 
unprecedented disaster dispatch have the potential to alter security, economic, and 
normative interests within Japanese society.  This chapter builds on the previous 
chapter’s description of the disaster’s catalytic nature by focusing on four areas that 
presumably affect the SDF’s trajectory: security interests, economic interests, norms, and 
actors and institutions. 
Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between the four areas of analysis and how 
they theoretically lead to one of the three SDF trajectories: retrenchment, status quo, and 
remilitarization.  Security and economic interests serve as two major areas that 
traditionally affect a military’s application.  These areas provide tangible points of 
analysis as to how the Great East Japan Earthquake has affected these respective 
interests. In the context of dueling interests, security and economic interests have the 
potential to evenly impact factors influencing the SDF’s trajectory or unevenly if either 
security or economic interests dominate the trajectory agenda.  Norms is the third area 
that influences the SDF’s trajectory.  Although a certain trajectory may seem logical 
based on the emphasis of security or economic interests, norms have the ability to shape 
the perceptions of these interests and create an environment that is either hostile or 
conducive to a certain trajectory.  This area is therefore placed after security and 
economic interests because it has the ability to trump the balance between the dueling 
interests.  The final area that influences the SDF’s trajectory is actors and institutions.  
These represent the entities that have the capacity to influence a particular trajectory.  If 
one particular entity becomes more influential as a result of the disasters, then it will have 
the most direct control over the SDF’s trajectory. 
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Figure 14.   Trajectory Formation Process 
There is one necessary point of clarification needed in the argument’s structure 
presented thus far.  The four areas depicted in Figure 14 do not interact with each other as 
coherent units influencing a particular trajectory.  Instead, within each of the four areas, 
various elements exist that could potentially lead to any of the three trajectories.  Figure 
15 portrays these trajectory influences in the left hand column.  Each trajectory influence 
generally has a variation that corresponds to a particular trajectory with those influencing 
retrenchment on the left, status quo in the middle, and remilitarization on the right. 
This chapter is structured according to Figure 15.  Each trajectory influence 
within the four categories is scrutinized for how the disasters affected it along two 
possible causal chains.  First, the disasters themselves directly impact the trajectory 
influence, which in turn emphasizes a particular trajectory.  Second, an actor or 
institution’s response to the disasters impacts the trajectory influence, which likewise 
emphasizes a particular trajectory. 
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Figure 15.   Influences on Possible SDF Trajectories 
B. SECURITY INTERESTS 
1. Security Policy Focus 
 The first trajectory influence to be analyzed is Japan’s security policy focus.  
Japan’s security policy focus is indicative of the SDF’s trajectory as it steers the SDF 
toward more or less involvement outside its borders.  As previously discussed, the 2010 
NDPG provides an overview of what can be considered the status quo in Japan’s security 
policy.  It illustrates that Japan’s security policy focus is a hybrid divided amongst 
 54 
domestic, regional, and international roles for the SDF (see Figure 1).  The Great East 
Japan Earthquake has the potential to prompt a reevaluation of Japan’s security policy as 
laid out in the 2010 NDPG.  An emphasis on the SDF’s domestic HADR application may 
cause an inward-looking focus on Japan’s security policy leading to retrenchment.  The 
experience gained by the SDF from its disaster dispatch may prove as a useful tool and 
translate into more focus on the SDF’s participation in international security activities.  
This focus on the international environment could contribute to a remilitarization 
trajectory as the SDF becomes more involved in operations outside of its borders. 
a. Hybrid Focus Reinforced 
  The most telling shift of Japan’s security policy focus would come from a 
revision of its NDPG.  The 2010 NDPG stipulates that it is subject to revision at any time 
based on significant changes.  If the Great East Japan Earthquake were such a catalytic 
event that it prompted a major departure in Japan’s security policy, one could expect a 
revision forthcoming in the short-term.  There does not seem to be any indication that this 
is the case.  Instead, the disasters reinforced the hybrid focus already accounted for in the 
2010 NDPG.  The result is that the status quo in terms of Japan’s security policy focus 
was merely reinforced.123 
  Each of the three SDF roles expressed in the 2010 NDPG was reinforced 
by the SDF’s disaster dispatch.  In relation to the first security objective, the SDF 
demonstrated its effective deterrence and response role through one of the seven priority 
areas under this role, response to large-scale and nuclear disasters.  Many of the missions 
conducted within the overall disaster dispatch also illustrate the SDF’s ability to 
effectively and rapidly deploy large amounts of forces in support of other priority areas 
within the effective deterrence and response role.  This also reinforces the dynamic 
deterrence objective of reducing geographic and time coverage gaps. 
  In conjunction with the second security objective, the SDF demonstrated 
its further stabilization of the Asia-Pacific security environment role by building its 
                                                 
123  David Fouse, “Japan Unlikely to Redirect Defense Policy,” PacNet Number 26, (May 5, 2011). 
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capacity for non-traditional security operations, specifically in the field of HADR 
operations.  The SDF gained valuable experience in every mission area related to HADR 
such as search and rescue, transport assistance, livelihood assistance, and debris removal.  
The experience gained by the three services and 40% of SDF personnel will provide a 
substantial boost to the SDF’s HADR capabilities that can provide a significant 
advantage when promoting regional cooperation on HADR operations.124  
  In relation to the third security objective, the SDF showed its improvement 
of the global security environment role through its successful disaster dispatch in a 
similar manner as it did within the regional role. 
  The SDF also demonstrated three of the priority capabilities in the SDF 
posture.  First, the SDF illustrated its high level of readiness through its rapid response of 
ground, air, and naval assets within minutes of the earthquake.  Second, the SDF 
demonstrated its capacity for conducting joint operations on the intra-service and bi-
lateral levels.  Third, the SDF also demonstrated its capability to conduct international 
peace cooperation, specifically in the area of HADR operations for reasons previously 
mentioned. 
  In the SDF organization category, the following capabilities were also 
exemplified: strengthening of joint operations, strengthening of capabilities for 
international peace cooperation activities, and efficient and effective buildup of defense 
forces. 
  In short, the SDF’s disaster dispatch after the Great East Japan Earthquake 
is a resounding exclamation point for the 2010 NDPG.  Most of its elements are 
reinforced by the operations conducted and experience gained by the SDF.  If any 
particular element is emphasized more than the others it will likely be the SDF’s HADR 
capabilities, which could potentially open new doors for cooperation in a natural disaster 
abundant region.  This would simply allow the SDF to continue polishing and validating 
the policies laid out in the 2010 NDPG. 
                                                 
124 Defense of Japan 2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2011), 2–22. 
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b. Hybrid Focus Continues 
  This section examines evidence gathered after the disasters that may 
illustrate a change in Japan’s security policy focus.  Attention is given to several major 
SDF operations and developments in the months following the disasters.  This section 
finds that Japan’s security policy focus has not significantly increased or decreased its 
international security activities and remains a hybrid focus. 
  In the area of international peace cooperation activities, Japan is 
continuing the trend of more regular participation in UN PKO.  As of May 2011, the SDF 
maintained its pre-disaster SDF levels at 380 personnel: two in the UN Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 330 in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), two in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and 46 in the UN 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Golan Heights.125 
 
Figure 16.   SDF International Peace Cooperation Activities (From “Defense of Japan,” 
2011) 
                                                 
125  See Figure 16 for chronology of SDF participation in UN PKO.  Ibid., 348.   
 57 
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) had the opportunity to cut short the SDF’s participation 
in MINUSTAH and UNDOF in September and October 2011 as deployed units were due 
for rotation but opted to maintain troop levels by deploying fresh units.  The outgoing 
SDF unit commander for MINUSTAH even stated that the SDF’s ongoing participation 
after Japan’s own disaster would serve both Haiti and Japan.126  As UNMIS concluded in 
July 2011, the SDF made a new contribution to the successor mission, UN Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS).  In November 2011, Japan’s Cabinet approved the deployment 
of approximately 300 GSDF engineering troops to UNMISS.127 
  The SDF’s anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden were also not 
affected by the disasters.  In July 2011, the government extended the anti-piracy patrols 
for another year as it deemed the mission remained essential.  The SDF actually increased 
their commitment to this mission as it established its first overseas facility since World 
War II in Djibouti.  This new facility provides logistical support for the anti-piracy 
operations conducted by two P-3C patrol aircraft and two destroyers.128, 129 
  The SDF has also retained its domestic focus as it participated in disaster 
relief within its own borders in response to Typhoons number 12 and 15 in September 
2011.  Of note, the SDF dispatched 28,790 personnel after record-breaking rainfall 
following Typhoon number 12.130  Compared to the SDF’s typical disaster dispatch of 
390 personnel in 2010, the Typhoon number 12 deployment represents a dramatic boost 
in the SDF’s domestic role for natural disasters that are not considered major natural 
disasters. 
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  Although the SDF has not yet had the opportunity to apply its increased 
HADR experience in regional or international HADR operations, one can expect that the 
trend toward more participation in HADR operations, especially within the region, will 
continue as illustrated in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17.   SDF International Disaster Relief Operations (From “Defense of Japan,” 
2011) 
  The SDF’s domestic role seems to be gaining momentum as evidenced by 
the large disaster dispatch in response to Typhoon number 12.  This does not seem to be 
affecting the SDF’s international focus on security activities including UN PKO missions 
and anti-piracy operations at least in the short-term.  Instead, Japan’s security policy 
remains focused on a hybrid mixture of domestic, regional, and international roles for the 
SDF. 
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2. Defense Budget 
 The second trajectory influence to be analyzed is Japan’s defense budget.  Two 
aspects of Japan’s defense budget are accounted for in this section:  aggregate spending 
and allocation.  The status quo for Japan’s defense budget has been 1% of GDP since 
1976.  If the SDF were to remilitarize, the SDF might increase defense spending beyond 
the 1% norm.  If it were to retrench, the SDF might decrease defense spending by its own 
volition to support reconstruction efforts or out of necessity because of impacts to Japan’s 
GDP growth.  In regard to allocation, the defense budget currently mirrors the capability 
intentions outlined in the 2010 NDPG.  The result is a hybrid mix of expenditures on 
offensive and defensive type equipment and mission areas.  If the SDF were on a 
remilitarization or retrenchment trajectory, one might expect a shift in the balance of 
overtly offensive and defensive capabilities and missions, respectively. 
a. Aggregate Spending Maintained 
  The disasters presented themselves as an unexpected expense to the 2011 
defense budget.  Two SDF facilities in Miyagi Prefecture suffered serious damage from 
the tsunami: GSDF Camp Tagajyou and ASDF Matsushima Air Base.  Matsushima Air 
Base suffered extensive equipment and facilities damage with tsunami waters reaching 
the second level of its buildings.  In addition to vehicle, helicopter, and T-4 training 
aircraft damage, 18 F-2 multi-role fighters were severely damaged.131 
  In addition to the damage caused by the tsunami, the SDF accrued 
additional operational expenses as it mobilized a large portion of its personnel and 
equipment in support of the disaster dispatch.  The additional costs prompted a budget 
revision that allocated 188.6 billion yen for the 2011 budget and 54.1 billion yen for the 
2012 budget.132  The 188.6 billion yen for 2011 was included in the first supplementary 
                                                 
131  The MOD determined that only 6 of the 18 F-2s could be repaired.  Each repairable fighter would 
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132  Defense of Japan 2011, 3. 
 60 
budget and was procured in a zero-sum manner by reallocation and reduction of 
predetermined expenditures.133  It is unclear how or even if these funds were taken from 
the defense budget but even if it was, the figures represent only 4% of the 2011 defense 
budget.  The unforeseen expenses caused by the earthquake do not represent an 
insurmountable obstacle. 
  The FY2012 defense budget request and overall government draft budget 
indicate that Japan has not significantly deviated from the defense budget’s 1% of GDP 
norm.  The defense budget’s requested amount, 4,690 billion yen, represents only a .6% 
increase from 2011 (see Figure 18).134  The FY2012 overall draft budget indicates the 
defense budget will be allocated 4,827 billion yen.135  These figures suggest that 
although the defense budget has increased for the first time since at least 2003, there is 
not a significant deviation in the defense budget level as a function of the percentage of 
GDP.  Aggregate defense spending continues to follow the planned annual allotment set 
forth in the 2010 Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) with only a slight deviation.  The 
status quo continues to be enforced. 
 
Figure 18.   Japan Defense Budget Trend (From “FY2012 Defense Budget Request,” 
2012) 
                                                 
133  Outline of the Supplementary Budget for FY2011 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, [2011]). 
134  Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2012 Budget Request (Tokyo: Japan 
Ministry of Defense, [2012]). 
135  Highlights of the Budget for FY2012 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Finance, 2011), 5. 
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b. Hybrid Allocation Maintained 
  The 2010 MTDP was formulated along with the 2010 NDPG and 
addresses how the defense budget will pursue the goals set forth in the 2010 NDPG.  
Therefore, the 2010 MTDP provides clear insight into the types of capabilities the SDF 
will pursue in the next five years.  These capabilities are generally indicative of the 
SDF’s shift toward a dynamic defense force and represent a hybrid mix of offensive and 
defensive equipment (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19.   2010 Mid-Term Defense Program Major SDF Equipment Increases (From 
“Defense of Japan,” 2011) 
 
  The fragility of Japan’s economy in the next five years will make attaining 
the budget goals set forth in the 2010 MTDP more difficult.136  The 2010 MTDP 
provided 23.49 trillion yen for the next five years of the defense budget.  The annual 
                                                 
136  Ibid. 
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allotment works out to only a .1% budget increase compared to the 2010 defense budget.  
This illustrates that Japan’s defense budget for the next five years was already planned to 
remain constant prior to the disasters.  The 2010 MTDP states that it will be reviewed 
after three years and revised if the security environment or fiscal conditions warrant it.137  
If the reconstruction efforts impede Japan’s GDP growth and make obtaining the budget 
goals established in the 2010 MTDP difficult, a revision in 2013 or earlier reflecting 
these changes is likely.  If this is the case, allocation will become a greater issue, as 
equipment acquisition will need to be prioritized. 
  The disasters will likely have a direct impact on the defense budget’s 
allocation in the next five years in two areas.  First, the defense budget will be stressed by 
the procurement of a next generation fighter (F-X) at the rate annotated in the 2010 
MTDP.138  The MOD ultimately decided on the F-35 Lightning II.139  Defense officials 
hinted that the selection was made as a natural option from the viewpoint of the U.S.-
Japan security alliance.140  The U.S. military’s show of support following the disasters 
indicated the United States is a dependable alliance partner and can be counted on for the 
foreseeable future.  The strengthened alliance may have influenced the MOD’s decision 
to select the F-35 even though it was not necessarily the best option on paper.  Because 
the F/A-18 E/F and Eurozone Typhoon have been in production for 20 and 10 years 
respectively, the production costs are considered to be much lower than the F-35 that is 
still in joint development.  Furthermore, Japan’s domestic industries will not benefit as 
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much as if it had chosen the other fighters because information on the cutting edge F-35 
may not be as readily shared with Japan due to Japan’s lack of participation in the joint 
development process.  This will primarily limit Japan’s industries to assembly functions 
in the production process.141  Another driving force for the F-35’s selection appears to be 
the need for a fifth generation fighter that will assure Japan maintains parity with fifth 
generation fighter production ongoing in China and Russia.  The F/A-18 E/F and 
Eurozone Typhoon do not provide the cutting edge technology needed to outpace the 
competition.142 
  Japan’s commitment to the F-35 will be a significant portion of Japan’s 
defense budget as it attempts to purchase 40 in the next 20 years.  The 2010 MTDP plans 
for 12 of these aircraft to be purchased in the next five years (see Figure 19).  The 
FY2012 defense budget request has already allocated 55.1 billion yen for four F-35 
fighters.  This represents 12% of the overall FY2012 defense budget request.143  
Although the F-35 is designated as the ASDF’s F-4EJ Phantom replacement, the F-35 
will also likely serve the purpose of replacing the ASDF’s aging F-2 and F-15 fighters as 
it combines the mission capabilities of these three aircraft.  The 12 destroyed and six 
severely damaged F-2s represent 18 of 74 F-2s currently in ASDF service.  The 
capability gap created by this loss will eventually need to be filled by F-35 production 
since Japan concluded its 55-year history of domestic fighter production as Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries delivered its final F-2 to the ASDF on September 27, 2011.144  Japan’s 
aging fighters, diminished F-2 capabilities, end to domestic fighter production, and 
selection of the costly F-35 as a replacement fighter will make the goals set forth in the 
2010 MTDP difficult to obtain.  As Japan continues to pursue the F-X fighter 
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procurement plan laid out in the 2010 MTDP, this will have a zero-sum affect on other 
areas of the defense budget and will make a remilitarization trajectory less likely. 
  Second, the increased attention on improving the SDF’s CBRN and 
disaster relief capabilities has led to larger allocations within the defense budget.  In aThe 
Daily Yomiuri interview with General Oriki Ryoichi, Chief of Staff of the SDF Joint 
Staff, he explained that the SDF would increase its nuclear capabilities by reviewing its 
current nuclear contingency doctrine, increasing equipment capabilities, improve 
coordination with the United States and prefecture governments, and conduct more 
exercises.145  The defense budget’s CBRN allocation in 2011 was 6.8 billion yen and its 
disaster response capability allocation was 105.1 billion yen.146  The FY2012 defense 
budget request allocated 247.2 billion yen for its disaster response capabilities.  This is 
nearly a 240% increase but the FY2012 figures include 119 billion yen for 1 DDH, an 
expense already planned for in the 2010 MTDP.147  If the DDH’s cost is subtracted from 
the disaster response capabilities figure, a more representative figure of the disaster’s 
impact on disaster response spending is realized.  This figure, 128.2 billion yen, indicates 
a 23.1 billion yen increase from the 2011 budget.  The CBRN disaster response allocation 
increased to 9.8 billion yen, a 3 billion yen increase from 2011.148  The increases in the 
disaster response and CBRN disaster response categories can be considered moderate but 
illustrate that more attention is being placed on the SDF’s HADR capabilities. 
  Despite the addition of the costly F-35 to the FY2012 defense budget 
request and the increases in the SDF’s disaster response funding, the shift in defense 
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budget allocation has not been substantial and continues to focus on a hybrid mixture of 
capabilities and missions outlined in the 2010 MTDP. 
3. U.S.-Japan Security Alliance Strengthened 
 The third trajectory influence to be analyzed is the U.S.-Japan security alliance.  If 
the alliance was not affected by the disasters, one could assume the status quo in relations 
would persist.  If the alliance were strengthened, there would be less economic incentive 
to remilitarize as Japan could count on a reliable and capable alliance partner to augment 
its security needs.  This would provide Japan an opportunity to retrench and focus on its 
economic interests.  If the alliance was weakened, Japan may rely more heavily on its 
own efforts to confront its security threats.  This section argues that the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance was strengthened and that due to Japan’s uncertain economic and 
security situation, the strengthened alliance will continue to temper any emergent need 
for remilitarization.  Although remilitarization becomes less likely, a strengthened 
alliance does not necessarily mean Japan will retrench.  Instead, the improved security 
ties will reinforce the status quo as the alliance is portrayed as a useful tool to accomplish 
the security objectives listed in the 2010 NDPG. 
 The United States provided the largest source of international military assistance 
to Japan under the name of OPERATION TOMODACHI from March 13 – April 8.149  
The Japanese government, media, and citizens were very receptive and grateful for the 
United States’ show of support.  In a Mainichi Daily News survey conducted shortly after 
the disasters and before OPERATION TOMODACHI concluded, support for U.S. bases 
in Yokosuka from local residents rose to 34.7% from 17.1% in 2008.150  Local residents 
assisted during OPERATION TOMODACHI expressed their gratitude to U.S. military 
forces in many instances.151  In a PEW Research Center survey, a majority of Japanese 
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surveyed, 57%, felt that the United States provided the most disaster assistance compared 
to the runner-up European Union at 17%.152  The Daily Yomiuri also praised U.S. 
assistance and attributed the operation’s success to prior joint exercises and effective 
coordination, signaling deeper ties between Japan and the United States for the future.153 
 The most telling sign of a deeper alliance came from the U.S.-Japan Security 
Consultative Committee (SCC 2+2) meeting in June 2011 between the heads of the 
defense and foreign affairs departments.  It was the first SCC 2+2 meeting in four years 
and happened to occur shortly after the bulk of HADR support during OPERATION 
TOMODACHI.  The issued joint statements reaffirm the strengthened alliance but also 
indicate that Japan does not intend to retrench in terms of its security policy laid out in 
the 2010 NDPG.  The “Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake” 
statement shows that the joint effort pleased both sides and that it directly contributed to a 
deeper alliance.154  The “Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance” statement 
went on to describe the need to address challenges in an uncertain security environment 
and emphasized cooperation in many areas analogous to those found in the 2010 NDPG.  
In particular, the ministers agreed to focus on three areas:  “strengthening deterrence and 
contingency response, alliance cooperation in a regional and global setting, and 
enhancing alliance foundations.”155 
 It is apparent that the elite have taken this opportunity to show strengthened 
solidarity in the alliance.  A December 2011The Daily Yomiuri poll indicates that there is 
a possible divide between the elite and the public’s interpretation of the strengthened 
alliance.  Although 94% of Japanese are thankful for the U.S. military’s role in the 
disasters, a plurality of survey respondents, 41%, believe relations between the United 
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States and Japan are poor or very poor.  Only 35% believe relations are good or very 
good.  These figures are relatively unchanged from a similar 2010 poll and suggest that 
the U.S. military’s disaster relief assistance does not equate to improved relations 
between the allies from the public’s view.  A major reason cited for this poor public view 
of the alliance is the impasse over the Futenma Air Station relocation initiative that 82% 
of Japanese respondents think is having a negative impact on relations.156 
4. Regional Foreign Relations Strengthened 
 Regional powers affect the SDF’s trajectory by the cooperative or competitive 
nature of their relations with Japan.  Competition in the security realm stimulates the 
need for Japan to address the resulting security threats whereas cooperation mitigates the 
same needs.  The disasters had the potential to improve relations as it presented an 
opportunity for unprecedented cooperation.  If cooperation was the case and relations 
were strengthened, this might reduce the SDF’s need to remilitarize or at least slow down 
the pace along this particular trajectory.  This section argues that relations with China and 
South Korea were strengthened after the earthquake but that serious obstacles remain in 
their relations. 
a. People’s Republic of China 
  Prior to the disasters, relations between Japan and China were tense.157  
Combined with historical interpretation disagreements and a growing anti-Japanese 
sentiment within China, the security environment has become all the more volatile in 
recent years.  Tensions most recently ignited in September 2010 after a Chinese fishing 
boat rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel while operating within the disputed 
territorial waters off the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands.  The subsequent arrest and detainment 
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of the boat’s captain and crew initiated a wave of diplomatic protest, a ban on rare earth 
metal exports, and other social, economic, and military forms of protest from China.158 
  Despite the major setback from the Senkaku incident, the 2010 NDPG 
illustrated Japan’s desire to engage China in a cooperative manner especially in non-
traditional security fields, i.e., HADR. It further stated the desired goal with China is to 
create a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”159  
China’s view toward cooperation with Japan since the Senkaku incident is less 
transparent.  In the PRC’s 2010 Defense White Paper released in March 2011, little is 
mentioned directly pertaining to cooperation with Japan.  Instead, cooperation with Japan 
is limited primarily to a regional perspective under the auspices of the Association of 
Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) Plus Three.  Nonetheless, the white paper places 
exceptional importance on participation in international disaster relief operations.160  It 
would seem that the Great East Japan Earthquake would provide a substantial opportunity 
for the two countries to cooperate with each other and break out of the recent setback in 
relations. 
  The PRC provided a moderate to large amount of relief aid to Japan 
despite soured relations in 2010.  In material aid, the PRC was one of the largest donors 
with notable contributions comprised of 10,000 tons of gasoline and diesel oil.161  The 
Chinese Red Cross Society provided 2.3 billion yen, which was the fourth largest Red 
Cross contributor.162  The PRC also sent a team of 15 rescue personnel (see Figure 13). 
  Because of the PRC’s positive support in the wake of the disasters, the 
opportunity for cooperation created a series of positive diplomatic exchanges in the 
months following the disasters.  In March 2011, the foreign ministers of Japan, China, 
and South Korea met to discuss a wide variety of regional issues.  The mood was 
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markedly improved from the months following the Senkaku incident.163  In May 2011, 
the fourth Japan-China-South Korea Leaders Meeting was held in Tokyo.164  Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao started the trip by visiting the affected prefectures.  Wen later met 
individually with Kan and agreed to strengthen bi-lateral cooperation in a number of 
fields.  The trilateral summit was seen as especially productive as the three leaders agreed 
to deepen regional cooperation, investigate a trilateral free trade agreement, and form a 
secretariat to facilitate trilateral cooperation.165  Japanese foreign minister Matsumoto 
Takeaki met with PRC Vice President Xi Xinping in July 2011 and once again affirmed 
their intentions to strengthen bi-lateral ties.166 
  In every diplomatic exchange, the Great East Japan Earthquake served as a 
primary discussion topic and created a positive atmosphere for cooperation.  The 
exchanges also continued to focus on other unresolved issues such as territorial disputes 
in the East China Sea.  The disasters improved the weakened relations since the Senkaku 
incident but many obstacles impeding further substantive cooperation remain. 
b. Republic of Korea 
 Japan does not consider South Korea a serious security threat as evidenced 
by the lack of attention it received in the 2011 Defense White Paper compared to China, 
North Korea, and Russia.167  According to the 2010 NDPG, Japan is targeting Australia 
and South Korea specifically for strengthened cooperation as it shares many of the same 
security interests.168  South Korea is also optimistic, although more cautiously, over 
improved relations with Japan.  In its 2010 Defense White Paper, South Korea noted 
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increased defense cooperation with Japan in recent years but stated differences in 
historical perspectives and territorial disputes over the Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands remain 
serious obstacles to further cooperation.169  Both sides favor cooperation over 
competition.  If the disaster relief cooperation were able to facilitate improved relations 
then this would enable a concerted effort on one of their primary security threats: North 
Korea.  Cooperation on this issue would likely have an effect on the nature of the SDF’s 
trajectory, as the manner with which it approaches the North Korea threat would change. 
 The disasters sparked a burst of goodwill and aid from South Korea.  In 
addition to one of the largest donations of material aid, South Korea sent 107 rescue 
personnel and two rescue dogs transported via an Air Force C-130 (see Figure 13).  The 
total amount of Korean Red Cross donations at 2.8 billion yen was the largest amount 
ever given in disaster relief aid and was the second largest overall donor behind the 
United States.170 171  Rumblings of a Japanese middle school textbook’s scheduled 
release in late March 2011 laying claim to the disputed Dokdo/ Takeshima Islands began 
to emerge.  This along with the release of Japan’s Diplomatic White Paper making 
similar claims created a noticeable drop in donations reported by the Korean Red Cross 
and the state-backed charity agency Community Chest of Korea.172 
 Despite the rift caused by the renewed territorial tensions, the fourth 
Japan-China-South Korea Leaders Meeting held in May 2011 was positive from South 
Korea’s perspective.  South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the affected 
prefectures to show his support for Japan’s recovery and went as far as tasting local 
produce in Fukushima Prefecture affected by the nuclear disaster.  Discussions regarding 
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nuclear safety and disaster management were high on the agenda and led to both sides 
agreeing on enhanced cooperation in numerous areas including joint anti-disaster 
drills.173 
 Relations were strengthened in the wake of the disasters as evidenced by 
the unprecedented outpouring of support from the Korean people and government.  The 
drop in disaster relief support created by the territorial dispute issue illustrates that 
serious roadblocks remain to improving ties between the two states. 
C. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
1. Economic Conditions 
 As the world’s most costly natural disaster in recorded history, the Great East 
Japan Earthquake has the real potential to impact several of Japan’s economic conditions: 
growth, health, and focus.  Changes in these three aspects of Japan’s economy will likely 
influence or inhibit the SDF’s path along a specific trajectory.  Decreased GDP growth 
would directly affect the funds available for the defense budget and cause the SDF to 
retrench in terms of its stated objectives in the 2010 MTDP.  If Japan is able to capitalize 
on its reconstruction efforts and revive its economy after years of stagnation then 
remilitarization may become a viable option as the defense budget increases and creates 
new opportunities to expand SDF operations and equipment.  Japan may be able to 
overcome losses in the short-term and increase GDP growth but do so at the expense of 
the economy’s health in the medium to long term.  If this were the case, successful 
reconstruction efforts may simply delay the inevitable impact of other issues affecting 
Japan’s economic health.  For this reason, the growth section focuses on the short-term 
prospects for recovery, and the health section focuses on the medium to long-term 
impacts on Japan’s economy.  As Japan strives to resolve these issues, the focus of its 
reconstruction efforts may influence the government’s overall attention on or willingness 
to engage international issues.  In this light, a reconstruction effort focused strictly on 
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Japan’s domestic situation may affect the government’s appetite for utilizing the SDF in 
international security activities.  A reconstruction effort with an international focus would 
keep Japan’s economic interests externally focused, which would provide justification for 
increased participation in international security activities, i.e., remilitarization. 
a. Growth Maintained 
  How has the Great East Japan Earthquake impacted Japan’s prospects for 
GDP growth in the short term?  Short term in this case is defined as one year after the 
disasters.  Despite the seemingly overwhelming damage done to Japan’s economy, it has 
not been completely debilitating.  The estimated economic damage, 16.9 trillion yen, is 
only about 4% of Japan’s total stock approximated at 500 trillion yen (see Table 2).  
Furthermore, the affected areas did not contain a high concentration of industrial 
production as it accounts for only 2.5% of Japan’s economic output.174 
  Japan’s economy has already shown signs of improvement.  Many of 
Japan’s large companies affected by the disaster quickly recovered.175  The Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry’s (METI) second industry survey in the affected region 
portrays a generally positive message for Japan’s economic recovery as of July 1, 
2011.176 
  The Japanese government’s initial estimates after the disasters predicted 
that GDP would continue to increase in the following year.  The impacts from the 
disasters were less dramatic than the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers during the 2008 
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financial crisis (see Figure 20).177  It was not until late 2011 that these positive growth 
predictions were revised to figures showing a contraction of .2–.7% in FY2011.  The 
reason for the GDP growth reversal was attributed to a strong yen and a weaker European 
Union economy impacting its exports, not strictly the Great East Japan Earthquake.178  
The brief survey of GDP growth illustrates that the disasters have had little impact in the 
short-term and will not dramatically impact the SDF’s trajectory in terms of adverse 




Figure 20.   Economic Impact Comparison Between Great East Japan Earthquake and 
“Lehman Shock” (From “Road to Recovery,” 2011) 
b. Health Weakened 
  Although Japan’s economy avoided any severe negative impacts in the 
short term, it does not mean that the crisis is over.  Japan still needs to reconstruct the 
devastated region.  This task will be at the forefront of Japan’s economic interests for the 
medium term.  Medium term is defined as the next 10 years. 
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  The responsibility for implementing and overseeing reconstruction 
policies was assigned to the Reconstruction Headquarters established on June 24, 2011.  
This organization headed by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet announced its Basic 
Policy for Reconstruction on July 29.  This policy provided a blueprint for government 
action during the reconstruction process.  It established a reconstruction period of 10 
years with the first five being a concentrated reconstruction period.  The estimated budget 
scale for reconstruction efforts over the next 10 years is 23 trillion yen, of which 19 
trillion yen is expected to be used in the first five years.179  To finance such a large 
reconstruction budget, the government initiated a series of supplementary budgets.  As of 
late 2011, three supplementary budgets were approved.  The first totaled 4 trillion yen 
and was financed in a zero-sum manner by reducing and reallocating predetermined 
expenditures in the FY2011 budget.180  This represents a rather minor impact on the 
government’s original FY2011 budget set at 92.4 trillion yen.181  The second came to 2 
trillion yen and was also financed using zero-sum tactics, specifically leftover surplus 
from the FY2010 budget.182  The third provided 11.7 trillion yen for reconstruction 
efforts related to the Great East Japan Earthquake and was the first supplementary budget 
to be funded by the issuance of reconstruction bonds.183  The FY2012 draft budget set 
aside an additional 3.8 trillion yen for reconstruction efforts, which makes the total 
amount of reconstruction funds provided thus far at approximately 18 trillion yen.184 
  This figure is significant for two reasons.  First, it signals that the majority 
of the expected 19 trillion yen reconstruction costs in the first five years has already been 
allocated.  This leaves only an additional 4 trillion yen in the next 9 years to complete the 
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total estimated reconstruction costs of 23 trillion yen.  This means the majority of the 
reconstruction’s fiscal burden is over and that its impacts should only be felt in the 
medium term. 
  Second, the total amount of reconstruction funds shows that this is not 
Japan’s most challenging economic hurdle.  Japan’s aging demographics remains the 
biggest challenge.  In the FY2011 budget alone, 28.7 trillion yen was allocated to social 
security.  This figure is 25% larger than all of the expected reconstruction funds over the 
next 10 years.  As the proportion of Japan’s population over 65 increases and the birth 
rate declines every year, social security expenditures increase while tax revenues 
decrease due to a smaller tax base.  This trend has been in place since 1990 causing an 
ever-widening gap in total government expenditures and tax revenues.  The result is an 
increased reliance on government bond issuances to cover the gap, which drives Japan 
deeper into debt every year.  For the last four years, bonds have financed the annual 
budget more than tax revenues (see Figure 21).185 
 
 
Figure 21.   Trends in Government Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Government 
Bonds (From “Highlights of the Budget for FY2012,” 2012) 
                                                 
185  Highlights of the Budget for FY2012, 11. 
 76 
  The reconstruction bonds added to the FY2011 and FY2012 budgets will 
simply add to the stress already felt by Japan’s budget and contribute to an expansion in 
long-term debt.  These added constraints are apparent in the FY2012 draft budget.  The 
reconstruction funds pushed the total budget to a record 93.6 trillion yen.  The budget 
relies on a record 49% of new debt, driving Japan’s total long-term debt to 937 trillion 
yen.  This represents 195% of Japan’s GDP, which is the highest ratio among developed 
nations. 
  The Great East Japan Earthquake has contributed to the weakening of 
Japan’s economic health in the medium term as a majority of the reconstruction funds 
have already been allocated.  Any impacts on the defense budget in the next several years 
can be more closely attributed to the Great East Japan Earthquake.  Long-term impacts 
should not be attributed to the disasters entirely since more significant factors such as 
Japan’s aging demographics have a much larger effect. 
c. Hybrid Reconstruction Focus (Domestic and International) 
  This section argues that Japan is embarking on a hybrid reconstruction 
effort that provides a balanced focus of Japan’s economic interests from a domestic and 
international perspective.  The reconstruction focus may influence Japan’s desire to 
engage in international security activities. 
  The first indication of Japan’s path to reconstruction came from the 
Reconstruction Design Council established by the Cabinet Office on April 11.186  The 
council released its guiding philosophy on May 11, which included seven principles 
recommended to guide the overall reconstruction efforts (see Figure 22).  Principles 2–4 
place great emphasis on the affected regions.  It states that the recovery’s foundation is to 
be community-focused and that the affected region’s socioeconomic potential will be 
used to lead Japan in the future.  Principle 5 recognizes that the affected region’s 
economy cannot be revived without the entire nation’s economic restoration.  It further 
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implies that the reconstruction efforts will not focus solely on the affected regions but 
will do so simultaneously with the entire economy.187 
 
 
Figure 22.   Seven Principles for the Reconstruction Framework (From “Basic 
Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake,” 2011) 
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  The council’s final report submitted to the Prime Minister on June 25 
reflected the guiding philosophy in more detail.  It called for municipalities to be the 
main actors in the reconstruction process, as they understand each affected communities’ 
needs.188  The report also acknowledges the importance of incorporating the international 
community in its reconstruction efforts by stating the reconstruction is open to the world.  
It further states that Japan must not be inward-looking as it recovers because of the 
Japanese economies close linkage with the international community.189 
  The Reconstruction Headquarters based its Basic Policy for 
Reconstruction partly on the Reconstruction Design Council’s final report.  The policy 
also presents a hybrid approach to Japan’s reconstruction efforts and represents the first 
substantive reconstruction guideline released by the government.  The policy’s basic 
concept reinforces the Reconstruction Design Council’s recommendation to utilize 
municipalities as a leading role in the reconstruction and to keep the reconstruction open 
to the world.190  Regarding specific measures directly related to the SDF, the policy 
stated that the equipment capabilities of all disaster relief organizations including the 
SDF should be improved.  SDF information sharing and interoperability with other 
emergency organizations and local governments should increase.   It also expressed the 
desire for the SDF to participate in more disaster relief exercises with the central and 
local governments.191 
  Based on the Reconstruction Design Council and Reconstruction 
Headquarters’ policy recommendations and guidelines, it appears there is a general 
consensus among the business and academic communities and the government that the 
recovery should have a hybrid focus.  The devastated regions must be revitalized but this 
cannot be accomplished without engaging the international community in order to restore 
Japan’s economy as a whole.  Japan’s participation in Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
talks surrounding the November 2011 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Summit, illustrates that Japan is following this hybrid focus reconstruction approach. 
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  The TPP is a multi-lateral free trade agreement (FTA) among several 
Asia-Pacific countries including the United States that seeks to eliminate all tariffs within 
10 years.  TPP participation is significant because it illustrates the Japanese government’s 
break from protectionist policies toward its business and agricultural sectors.  Japan’s 
agricultural sector is highly protected because it cannot compete with cheaper imports 
due to small inefficient farm sizes in Japan.  For instance, a 778 percent tariff is placed on 
imported rice.  Participating in the TPP means that Japan would have to compete with 
cheaper foreign markets.  This would require restructuring Japan’s agricultural sector to 
make it more efficient, and therefore more competitive.  Japan’s participation in TPP 
talks has met strong resistance by farming communities in the affected regions that would 
be directly impacted and the politicians that protect the farmers’ interests and conversely 
depend on their political support.  Despite the obvious impact the TPP will have on the 
affected region, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko continues to press forward on the 
initiative.  This demonstrates that the government is not placing disproportionate 
deference on the affected regions compared to its engagements with the international 
community.  Although the TPP may hurt local farmers, the move to join the TPP is seen 
as a means to improve the overall health of Japan’s economy in the long term.192 193 194 
  Japan’s hybrid focus of its economic interests in both domestic and 
international terms suggests Japan’s focus will not be drastically pulled away from 
international issues, which will not seriously impact the SDF’s role in international 
security activities. 
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2. International Influence: Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
Decreased 
 One of the main tools used by the Japanese government for international influence 
purposes is its ODA budget. Japan’s ODA budget has been used for many years as a 
foreign policy tool to promote peace and prosperity in the developing world.  This in turn 
enables Japan to maintain peace and stability at home.  ODA is also seen as a means to 
improve Japan’s international status, expand its export markets, and garner sympathy 
from the international community for Japan’s interests.195 
 Japan maintained the largest ODA budget throughout the 1990s and utilized this 
tool disproportionately to the employment of SDF for international influence purposes.  
This method of international influence came under fire for Japan’s contribution to the 
1990–1991 Gulf War.  Instead of readily sending a contingent of troops to support the 
UN coalition, Japan opted to provide fiscal support totaling 13 billion dollars.  Although 
Japan gave the largest financial support to the coalition, the international community 
scoffed at its contribution and labeled it checkbook diplomacy.  After the Cold War, 
Japan could no longer sit on the sidelines and was expected to participate in international 
security activities, especially in a region that Japan relied on so heavily for its energy 
resources.  Japan’s Gulf War contribution criticism opened the door for the UN PKO 
Cooperation Bill in 1992.  The legislation ended the SDF’s overseas deployment 
restriction and paved the way for regular UN PKO participation that endures today.196 
 Since the 1990s, the ODA environment has changed both domestically and 
internationally.  The result is that Japan is relying less on ODA as a tool for international 
influence.  Domestically, it is harder for the government to convince the public that ODA 
is a wise use of taxpayer dollars, especially given Japan’s stagnating economy since the 
mid-1990s.  Younger generations also do not remember the aid that Japan received after 
World War II and therefore cannot see Japan’s large ODA budget as a means of 
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repayment for past support received.  Internationally, globalization is causing Japan’s 
ODA budget to spread more thinly as new regions require aid.  Developing countries are 
also playing a larger role in the international environment and lowering developed 
countries’ share of ODA throughout the world.197  These factors have contributed to a 
steady decline in Japan’s ODA budget over the last decade (see Figure 23).  Since the 
1990s, Japan has fallen from the largest ODA provider to the world’s fifth largest 
(see Figure 24). 
 
 
Figure 23.   Trends in Japan’s ODA Budget and Other Major Expenditures (From 
“Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper,” 2010) 
                                                 
197  Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2010, 19. 
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Figure 24.   Trends in the ODA of Major DAC Countries: Net Disbursements (From 
“Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper,” 2010) 
 The Great East Japan Earthquake contributed to Japan’s decreased reliance on 
ODA as a means of international influence.  The supplementary budgets funded in a zero-
sum manner took 50.1 billion yen from the ODA budget, nearly 10% of its FY2011 
budget.198  The FY2012 draft budget continued the trend of decreasing Japan’s ODA as it 
dropped by another 2%.199  This is significant because it signals ODA is the target of 
government expenditure cuts in the wake of the disasters as opposed to the defense 
budget which actually increased in the FY2012 draft budget.  The longer trend since 1997 
also shows that defense budget levels have remained relatively constant compared to the 
ODA budget that has steadily declined (see Figure 23).  The disasters’ impact on the 
ODA budget is another example of how the government is favoring the defense budget 
over ODA.  This will likely change the nature of how Japan seeks to gain international 
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influence.  A decreased ODA budget may prompt Japan to increase its international 
security activities as another means to influence the international community.  Indeed, the 
SDF has already increased its participation in UN PKO, HADR, and other forms of 
international security activities such as anti-piracy operations in the last 20 years. 
 A decreased ODA budget may therefore lead to a remilitarization trajectory, as 
the SDF becomes the preferred tool to gain international influence.  This may be an easier 
sell to the Japanese public because these operations provide Japan a significant amount of 
diplomatic and political capital as a responsible participant in the international 
community at a relatively low financial and personnel cost.  Under the SDF’s improving 
the global security environment role, the 2011 defense budget allocated a mere 5.6 billion 
yen to cover the operational and maintenance costs for its international security 
activities.200  This represents only .12% of Japan’s entire 2011 defense budget.  This low 
operational cost is due partly to Japan’s small military contribution, ranking 49th of 114 
contributing countries.201  Japan is the second largest financial contributor to UN PKO 
missions covering nearly 12.53% of an estimated $7.06 billion budget for 2011–2012.  
This figure, $884 million, is 12 times larger than the operational costs for SDF 
international security activities in 2011.202  It would seem logical to start cuts from this 
larger budget as opposed to the defense budget. 
3. Energy Dependency Continues 
 The nuclear power plant accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlighted the dangers 
of nuclear power, as it became the second worst nuclear plant disaster in history.  In the 
accident’s aftermath, it seemed logical that the government might decrease its 
dependence on nuclear power in the long term and substitute oil or liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) for its energy needs.  Increased usage of these energy sources would make Japan 
even more dependent on foreign sources for its energy requirements.  A more energy 
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dependent Japan would require added attention on international affairs that might affect 
Japan’s energy security.  A degraded energy security environment would in turn provide 
more incentive for a remilitarization trajectory, as Japan would need to protect its energy 
sources if a crisis arose.  Conversely, if Japan increased its usage of renewable energy 
sources and became less dependent for its energy needs then it would remove the 
incentive for a remilitarization trajectory.  This section argues that Japan’s energy policy 
will not make dramatic changes in Japan’s energy dependency but may in the long term, 
greater than 20 years, facilitate a more rapid shift toward the use of renewable energy.  
This will decrease Japan’s energy dependency but it will still remain relatively dependent 
compared to other developed nations. 
 Japan is the world’s fourth largest oil importer and the third largest natural gas 
importer, and consumes the fourth largest amount of electricity in the world.203  
Therefore, Japan relies heavily on nuclear power plants to generate a source of 
domestically produced energy.  Nuclear power provides Japan with the second largest 
power generating capacity source at 20% behind liquefied natural gas at 26%.204  For as 
much emphasis as it places on nuclear power, Japan is only about 18% energy self-
sufficient.205  If Japan reneged on its commitment to nuclear power and relied more on 
fossil fuels, its self-sufficiency would slide even further making its energy security 
situation direr. 
 The other option is more reliance on renewable forms of energy.  This is the 
approach that the government intends to take.  The Reconstruction Headquarters’ Basic 
Policy for Reconstruction advocates the promotion of renewable energy and energy 
conservation measures.206  The prospect for renewable energy to supplant nuclear power 
in the short and medium term is not likely, however.  Nuclear power is the cheapest form 
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of energy in Japan at 5–6 yen per kilowatt.  Other forms of renewable energy are 2 to 9 
times more expensive than nuclear power.207  In Japan’s restrained fiscal environment, a 
rapid shift to renewable energy does not seem likely.  The FY2012 draft budget illustrates 
the energy dilemma facing the government.  Despite a lack of support for nuclear power, 
the budget made only slight decreases totaling about 13 billion yen in nuclear power 
funding.208 
 The alternatives to safer forms of energy than nuclear power present an energy 
dilemma for Japan that is not likely to result in a dramatic shift in Japan’s energy 
dependency in the short and medium terms.209  It will take long-term commitment to the 
government’s renewable energy initiatives spelled out in its reconstruction policy before 
any significant shift is seen.  Japan’s continued lack of energy self-sufficiency will 
provide incentive for Japan’s remilitarization as the rise of developing nations stresses the 
energy market. 
D. NORMS 
1. Security Norms 
 The SDF trajectory debate boiled down to its most simple element is a question of 
whether or not the SDF will use military force to secure its interests overseas, i.e., 
remilitarization. Paul Midford argues that Japanese public opinion is an important 
intervening variable because it can influence this trajectory as evidenced by the thwarted 
attempts under Koizumi to become more active in the Iraq War.210  This represents the 
power that Japan’s pacifist norms have over the elite.  Andrew Oros defines the three 
central tenets of Japan’s domestic anti-militarism as follows: “no traditional armed forces 
involved in domestic policymaking, no use of force by Japan to resolve international 
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disputes except in self defense, and no Japanese participation in foreign wars.”211  
Considering the nature of anti-militarist norms outlined by Oros and their power 
illustrated by Midford, it can be assumed that in order to see any deviation in the SDF’s 
trajectory a change in Japan’s anti-militarist norms must occur.  Oros identified three 
scenarios in which it is plausible to imagine a change in Japan’s security practice given 
the limitations posed by domestic anti-militarism.  The Great East Japan Earthquake is an 
event that could spark change in line with the final two scenarios.  The first of these 
represents a sudden shift: “new security identity practices resulting from an unexpected 
shock that discredits the security identity of domestic anti-militarism.”212  The second 
scenario signifies a gradual change: “new security practices resulting from a growing 
irrelevance and subsequent abandonment of the security identity of domestic anti-
militarism.”213  The following sections will analyze several security norms embodied in 
the central tenets of domestic anti-militarism identified by Oros.  These include public 
trust of the SDF, utility of force, and utility of non-military force such as HADR. 
a. Public Trust of SDF 
  Anti-militarist distrust of the SDF is best understood in the context of 
Japan’s utter defeat in World War II.  In a matter of a few generations, Japan went from 
relative isolation and technological inferiority before the Meiji Restoration in the 1860’s 
to becoming the first non-western power to defeat a western power during the Russo-
Japanese War from 1904–1905.  Japan’s economic and military power rose tremendously 
in the following decades until it obtained relative parity in international status with other 
major western powers.  The erosion of civilian control over the military in the years 
leading up to World War II facilitated the rise of ultra-nationalism with the military 
dominating the domestic political arena.  In 1941, the military thrust the country into war 
with a larger and more resource rich nation, the United States.  The U.S. military victory 
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over Japan ended with dozens of fire-bombed cities, two nuclear-bombed cities, nearly 
three million dead, and a loss of 25% of Japan’s national wealth.214  The result of the 
military’s failed foreign and security policy in the wake of World War II left an intense 
distrust toward the government’s ability to maintain civilian control over the military.  It 
also led to distrust of the state’s ability to responsibly employ the military without 
obtaining disastrous consequences.215 
  The Great East Japan Earthquake provided an opportunity to demonstrate 
the state’s ability to effectively utilize the SDF.  If public trust were increased as a result 
of the SDF’s disaster dispatch, it would help break down a major normative barrier to 
remilitarization.  If public trust were maintained the status quo would persist.  If public 
trust were decreased then retrenchment would become more likely.  Because of the 
historical distrust toward the SDF, the public’s reaction after the SDF’s unprecedented 
mobilization was uncertain.  The disaster’s recent occurrence has also added to the 
ambiguity in determining the public’s response.216  Analysis during the disaster dispatch 
suggested the media and public were reacting very positively to the SDF and were 
treating them with unprecedented respect.217 218  This section analyzes the public’s 
reaction to the SDF’s disaster dispatch as seen through the eyes of the media.  It finds that 
the public’s trust of the SDF has noticeably increased because of its disaster dispatch. 
1) Positive Media Portrayal. Japan’s major newspapers provide 
the best representation of how the media portrayed the SDF during its disaster dispatch 
for two reasons.  First, Japanese receive a majority of their news from newspapers.  The 
ranking of major newspapers according to daily circulation is as follows:  Yomiuri 
Shimbun (10 million), Asahi Shimbun (7.9 million), Mainichi Shimbun (3 million), and 
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Sankei Shimbun (2.1 million).219  Second, Japanese found the information in newspapers 
more reliable than any other form of media after the disasters.  Newspapers were also the 
most credible source of media beating out the second most credible source, television, by 
three times the amount.220 
   Thomas Berger wrote in 1998 that the Asahi Shimbun and 
Mainichi Shimbun were on the left regarding security issues as they generally opposed 
the SDF’s overseas dispatch.  The Yomiuri Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun were on the 
right as evidenced by their support of a more active SDF in the international 
community.221  In the last approximately 10 years, major newspapers traditionally 
reluctant to report on the SDF began increasing the frequency of reports on the SDF as 
their profile increased due to international events such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program and China’s military modernization.222  In the aftermath of the disasters, the 
major newspapers generally reflected these two characteristics. 
   The SDF benefited from widespread coverage of their participation 
in the disaster relief efforts among all the major newspapers.  This was due to the media’s 
decreased aversion to reporting on the SDF in recent years and because it was hard for 
newspapers to avoid the SDF’s actions, as they were involved across the full spectrum of 
HADR missions.  The media did, however, focus disproportionately on the nuclear 
disasters compared to the devastation and loss of life suffered from the tsunami 
elsewhere.  This detracted some attention away from the SDF’s large-scale disaster 
dispatch force totaling around 107,000 personnel as opposed to the 500 CRF personnel 
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assigned to the nuclear disaster dispatch.  Despite the lopsided reporting, the SDF 
remained a key fixture of reports as they significantly contributed to the nuclear disaster 
response.223, 224, 225, 226, 227 
   Coverage amongst the major newspapers generally fell in line with 
the security viewpoints identified by Berger.  None of the major newspapers placed 
blame on the SDF for any problems encountered during the disaster dispatch, even when 
it came to the nuclear power station disaster.  The Sankei Shimbun, being the most 
conservative newspaper and supportive of the SDF, clearly supported the SDF’s efforts 
as seen in its lengthy interview with the SDF’s joint task force commander.228  The Daily 
Yomiuri also painted a very positive picture of the SDF.  Amidst the nuclear power 
station disaster, aThe Daily Yomiuri editorial described the SDF and other organization’s 
efforts to cool the reactors as herculean showing their respect for such a dangerous and 
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disaster dispatch.230 , 231, 232, 233  Even when The Daily Yomiuri addressed the SDF’s trial 
and error approach in handling the nuclear power station disaster, it did so from the 
perspective of implementing lessons learned from the SDF’s shortfalls in dealing with the 
nuclear disaster.  The newspaper continued to applaud the SDF for achieving remarkable 
results despite the difficulties faced during the nuclear crisis.234  The Yomiuri Shimbun 
and Sankei Shimbun command over half of Japan’s newspaper reading audience, which 
means that most Japanese saw an overwhelmingly positive image of the SDF during the 
disaster relief efforts. 
   The more traditionally liberal newspapers, Asahi Shimbun and 
Mainichi Shimbun, were not as outspoken in their support of the SDF.  These 
newspapers, however, did not take a critical view toward the SDF and generally 
portrayed the SDF positively to a lesser degree than their conservative counterparts.  For 
instance, a couple of days after the disasters, an Asahi Shimbun editorial called for a swift 
response by disaster relief organizations.  Emphasis was placed on disaster relief 
organizations other than the SDF but cooperation with the SDF was mentioned as a 
necessary component to the response and it supported the SDF’s large-scale 
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mobilization.235  The Mainichi Shimbun conducted an interview with the nuclear disaster 
dispatch’s commander, General Toshinobu Miyajima, in December 2011.  The focus of 
the interview was the SDF’s desperate situation surrounding the nuclear disaster.  It 
highlighted the SDF’s unpreparedness in handling the nuclear disaster but did so without 
being critical of the SDF itself.236  These examples are representative of the stance taken 
by Japan’s major liberal newspapers toward the SDF.  When combined with the 
unmistakably positive image portrayed by the conservative newspapers, the SDF enjoyed 
a large majority of positive media coverage with almost no critical viewpoints. 
2) Public Trust of SDF Increased. Given the widespread notion 
of the public’s distrust of the SDF in terms of the government’s ability to effectively and 
appropriately utilize the SDF, the positive media portrayal could very well alter the 
public’s trust in the SDF to carry out its duties.  If public trust of the SDF is increased, a 
remilitarization trajectory could be supported as the public becomes more comfortable in 
the SDF’s ability to responsibly execute its missions overseas.  This may lead to an 
expanded role overseas and the relaxation of restrictions on the use of force.  If public 
trust is decreased, the public may have less appetite for the SDF’s participation in 
international security affairs.  This section provides evidence illustrating public trust in 
the SDF has increased considerably after its disaster dispatch. 
   One measure of public trust in the SDF and possibly the most 
fundamental is the acceptance of the SDF’s role in the disaster relief operations.  
Newspaper interviews with disaster victims were filled with praise for the SDF and often 
children stated they would like to become a SDF member when they grow up.237 238 
                                                 
235  “Editorial: Swift Response Needed for Victims of Devastating Earthquake,” The Asahi Shimbun, 
March 13, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201103120308.html. 
236  “GSDF Commander Says He Thought Japan Done For as He Faced Fukushima Nuke Crisis,” The 
Mainichi Daily News, December 31, 2011, 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111231p2a00m0na013000c.html. 
237  Kuniaki Nishio, “Child Victim’s Story Resonates Beyond National Borders,” The Asahi Shimbun, 
June 23, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220164.html. 
238  Go Kobayashi and Suguru Takizawa, “Teens Open Time Capsule that Survived Tsunami,” The 
Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201105150229.html. 
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   Improved civil-military relations are another indicator of increased 
public trust of the SDF.   After the SDF’s large-scale disaster dispatch ended on August 
31, 2011, the Fukushima governor requested members of the CRF to stay and assist with 
the ongoing response to the nuclear disaster.  In November 2011, the SDF’s footprint in 
the no-entry zone increased by 300 GSDF personnel as the governor requested the SDF 
to spearhead the decontamination efforts in several Fukushima municipalities.239 240 241  
The large-scale deployment of SDF personnel after Typhoon number 12 shows improved 
civil-military relations as well.  Prefectural governors in Wakayama, Mie, and Nara 
requested a higher than average number of SDF personnel, primarily from the GSDF 
Middle Army, to assist in the disaster relief efforts.  Although the typhoon did usher in 
record-breaking rainfall, the natural disaster was of considerable smaller scale, less than 
100 casualties, than the Great East Japan Earthquake yet it received a dispatch of 28,790 
SDF personnel.242  The SDF’s central and more active role in domestic disaster relief 
indicates improved civil-military relations and increased public trust of the SDF. 
   The most compelling evidence of increased public trust of the SDF 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake comes from polling data released since the 
earthquake.  In a Mainichi Daily News survey conducted shortly after the disasters and 
while the SDF’s disaster dispatch was at the height of its operations, support from local 
citizens for the SDF stationed in Yokosuka rose 15.6 points to 54.1%.  Of the 54.1%, 
35.5% said they supported the SDF because they would feel safer in the event of a 
                                                 
239  This served to pave the way for private organizations to establish base areas from which to 
continue decontamination.  The SDF was chosen over private organizations because it provided the most 
expedient method to initiate the decontamination work.  The Fukushima governor did not request that SDF 
personnel leave the prefecture until the base areas had been established for private organizations to 
continue the decontamination efforts and when the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station was 
stabilized in December 2011.  “Fukushima to Ask SDF on Tuesday to End Relief Ops After Cold 
Shutdown,” The Mainichi Daily News, December 20, 2011, 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111220p2g00m0dm033000c.html. 
240  “Gov’t to Dispatch GSDF to No-Entry Zone,” The Daily Yomiuri, November 18, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111117005750.htm. 
241  SDF to Decontaminate No-Entry Zone. 
242  The Typhoon number 12 dispatch was one quarter of the dispatch size for the Great East Japan 
Earthquake.  “Disaster Relief in Response to Typhoons No. 12 and No. 15 “ Japan Defense Focus, 
December, 2011, 9. 
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disaster.243  The PEW Research Center found that an astounding 95% of Japanese 
surveyed felt the SDF did a good job and 62% believed they did a very good job.244  
AThe Daily Yomiuri public opinion poll conducted in December 2011 asked respondents 
to identify the domestic institutions that they trust the most from a list of over 10 
organizations.  The SDF topped the list with 75% stating it is the most reliable institution.  
This figure rose 12 percentage points from the same 2010 poll and signaled the first time 
the SDF commanded the top position.245  A cabinet office poll conducted in March 2012 
also found that 97.7% of those surveyed praised the SDF’s disaster dispatch and 91.7% 
stated they had a good impression of the SDF.  The SDF’s public image levels were the 
highest ever since the survey began in 1969.246  The public’s response to the SDF after 
its disaster dispatch shows a noticeable increase in the public’s trust of the SDF. 
   It has been established that the Japanese public trusts the SDF 
more after the Great East Japan Earthquake.  What does this increased trust mean in 
relation to the SDF trajectory debate?  Does the public now think that the SDF’s use of 
force in overseas operations is acceptable or does the public still prefer non-military 
approaches to resolving conflicts?  The evidence available to answer these questions is 
less obvious and requires an analysis of prior trends in Japanese public opinion to provide 
the most likely interpretation of this heightened trust.  The following two sections address 
this problem by analyzing two public opinion areas related to the perceived role of the 
SDF: utility of force, and utility of non-military force. 
                                                 
243  “Record Percentage of Yokosuka Citizens Support U.S. Base After Quake,” The Mainichi Daily 
News, July 22, 2011. 
244  The closest competitor was news organizations with only 54% stating they did a good job 
responding to the disasters.  The national government received a paltry 20% good approval rating for its 
response.  Japanese Resilient, But See Economic Challenges Ahead (Washington D.C.: PEW Research 
Center, [2011]). 
245  “Feelings About U.S. are Complex: Disaster Relief Operations Appreciated but Major Ally Not 
Fully Trusted,” The Daily Yomiuri, December 19, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111218003925.htm. 
246 Of those that praised the SDF’s disaster dispatch, 79.8% highly praised it and 17.9% praised it.  
Only 5.3% of respondents have a bad impression of the SDF.  “SDF’s Disaster Dispatch Praised at 97.7% 
and 91.7%, the Highest Ever, Have a Good Impression of the SDF,” Translated by Shimizu Yuko.  The 
Sankei Shimbun, March 11, 2012, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-
n1.htm. 
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b. Utility of Non-Military Force: Useful for Domestic and 
 International Purposes 
  Non-military force refers to the SDF’s participation in non-traditional 
security activities such as UN PKO and HADR.  Previous trends in Japanese public 
opinion indicate that the increased public trust of the SDF as a result of its disaster 
dispatch will have the most impact on the public’s perception of non-military force’s 
utility, especially regarding HADR.  Although the SDF’s response after the Great 
Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 was criticized for its lack of timeliness, the SDF ultimately 
played a major role in the disaster relief efforts and the public was appreciative of their 
participation.  The result was a 40% increase from 1994–1997 in the public’s perception 
that disaster dispatch is the SDF’s main function.  The SDF’s new primary perceived role 
even replaced that of ensuring national security.  The Japanese public still perceive 
disaster dispatch as the SDF’s main function as recent as 2006 (see Figure 25).  
Regarding the SDF’s future role, disaster dispatch jumped almost 20% from 1994–1997 
as well.  In 2003, the SDF’s most effective role remained disaster dispatch at 85% 
compared to ensuring national security at 29% (see Figure 26).  The SDF’s perceived 
future role also changed dramatically after the 1995 earthquake.  From 1994–1997, the 
SDF’s future role of disaster dispatch remained the primary role and dramatically 
increased from 35% to 70%.  In 2006, the SDF’s disaster dispatch future role at 69% 
continued to beat out its ensuring national security role at 55% (see Figure 27).247 
                                                 
247  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: Routledge, 2010), 158–159. 
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Figure 25.   Japanese Public Opinion Regarding the Main Function of the JSDF 1965–
2006 (From “Japan’s Remilitarisation,” 2010) 
 
Figure 26.   Japanese Public Opinion Regarding the Most Effective Role of the JSDF 
1961–2003 (From “Japan’s Remilitarisation,” 2010) 
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Figure 27.   Japanese Public Opinion Regarding the Future Role of the JSDF 1965–2006 
(From “Japan’s Remilitarisation,” 2010) 
  The preeminence of the SDF’s disaster dispatch role in public opinion 
regarding its primary, most effective, and future role indicate that the Great East Japan 
Earthquake will likely have a similar effect on public opinion.  Furthermore, the high 
levels of public opinion maintained in these three areas since 1995 suggest that disaster 
dispatch after the 2011 disasters will continue to be of primary importance in the public’s 
eyes.  These hypotheses held true after the most recent cabinet office poll conducted in 
2012.  The SDF’s highest perceived role continued to be disaster dispatch at 82.9%.248 
  These trends indicate that HADR conducted by the SDF will continue to 
be viewed as a useful tool.  This eliminates the possibility that non-military force is 
                                                 
248 This cabinet office poll has been conducted every 3 years since 1969.  Figures 25–27 are 
comprised of data from these polls.  Disaster dispatch was also the highest perceived role in the 2009 poll.  
“SDF’s Disaster Dispatch Praised at 97.7% and 91.7%, the Highest Ever, Have a Good Impression of the 
SDF,” Translated by Shimizu Yuko.  The Sankei Shimbun, March 11, 2012, 
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-n1.htm. 
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viewed as never useful and therefore the use of force is a preferred tool, which may lead 
to remilitarization.  The question then becomes how the SDF’s HADR capabilities will be 
applied in the future.  If the utility of non-military force is seen as useful for domestic 
purposes only then retrenchment can be expected.  The most likely outcome is that the 
SDF’s HADR capabilities will be used for domestic and international purposes.  As the 
SDF improved its HADR capabilities after the 1995 earthquake and enacted new laws 
permitting SDF participation in international security activities, the SDF participated in 
more HADR operations starting in 1998.  The trend since 1998 has been that of more 
regular participation in international HADR operations (see Figure 17). 
c. Utility of Force:  Defensive Force Useful 
  The previous section illustrated that the Japanese public sees non-military 
force as the SDF’s primary, most effective, and future role.  Figures 25–27 do not provide 
any data showing the public’s willingness for the SDF to engage in offensive force, 
however.  Instead, most of the alternative roles provided in Figures 25–27 only show 
roles supporting defensive force.  Is there any situation in which the Japanese public 
might find it useful for the SDF to engage in offensive force?  According to a Study of 
Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE) public opinion poll conducted in 2004, most 
Japanese are skeptical of offensive force.  A majority of Japanese surveyed believes that 
offensive force is not legitimate for preventing human rights abuse or when a country is 
suspected of harboring terrorists.  Only a slight majority believes that it is legitimate for 
preventing genocide.  A super-majority of 78.1%, however, believes that defensive force 
is legitimate if a country is attacked (see Table 4).  Midford found in a series of other 
Japanese public opinion polls relating to the use of force and the United States’ role in 
Iraq that the SAGE report’s findings of a public aversion to offensive force holds true.249  
Based on these findings, it is highly problematic to link an increase in the public’s trust of 
the SDF to the Japanese seeing an increased utility in offensive force.  Therefore, 
remilitarization is not likely in this regard. 
                                                 
249  Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?, 30–38. 
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Table 4.   Japanese Public Opinion Regarding the Legitimate Reasons for Going to 
War (From “Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From 
Pacifism to Realism?,” 2011) 
  As stated earlier, Japanese do find defensive force quite legitimate.  
Figures 25–27 indicate that ensuring national security is considered a very credible role 
for the SDF, although not the most significant.  Connecting the public’s increased trust of 
the SDF with an increase in utility of defensive force seems more plausible.  Despite the 
lack of data illustrating these linkages, there seems to be a logical connection between the 
two.  Figures 25–27 show that from 1994–1997 the SDF’s ensuring national security role 
increased with its disaster dispatch role more than any other three-year period.  These 
figures could be a result of other threatening factors that occurred during this time such as 
the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis.  Little else happened that might have warranted 
such large increases in these public opinion figures, however.  A more likely explanation 
is that the SDF’s disaster dispatch after the 1995 earthquake increased its profile and the 
public became more aware of the SDF’s other roles.  As SDF participation in domestic 
disaster relief increased in the following years, this only added to the public’s awareness 
of the SDF’s roles. 
  The SDF’s disaster dispatch for the Great East Japan Earthquake seems to 
have had a similar effect on public opinion.  The 2012 cabinet office poll found that 
78.6% of those surveyed, the second highest number, believe ensuring national security is 
the SDF’s primary function.  This figure rose 8.6% from the 2009 poll.  The primary 
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reason given for this increase are the threats posed by China and North Korea.250  It is 
reasonable to believe, however, that the SDF’s successful disaster dispatch is also aiding 
these figures by increasing the SDF’s profile and showing the public that the SDF can be 
trusted to execute defensive roles.  Therefore, the SDF’s successful disaster dispatch is 
likely to increase public support for defensive force.  This is especially true now that the 
SDF did such an incredible job, the media portrayed their performance as exceptional, the 
public reacted positively, and more clear security threats exist such as China’s military 
expansion and North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program.  These factors will 
help marginalize pacifists that believe the use of force is never useful.  The result is that 
the SDF’s disaster dispatch emphasizes the utility of defensive force, which will maintain 
the status quo. 
2. Legal Norms: Arms Export Ban (Less Restriction) 
 Japan operates its security policy through a web of legal norms that significantly 
restricts its security activities at home and abroad.  Some of these legal norms are clearly 
codified and others are informal policy statements that are perpetually followed. The 
following is a list of several legal norms that have come to characterize Japan’s security 
identity of domestic anti-militarism:  Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, “Three Principles 





                                                 
250 For those that answered ensuring national security is the SDF’s primary role, 72.3% stated they 
believe so because of the threats posed by China and North Korea.  “SDF’s Disaster Dispatch Praised at 
97.7% and 91.7%, the Highest Ever, Have a Good Impression of the SDF,” Translated by Shimizu Yuko.  
The Sankei Shimbun, March 11, 2012, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120311/plc12031101020000-
n1.htm. 
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defense budget limits at 1% of GDP.251 , 252, 253  These legal norms are not impenetrable 
as many have been modified and reinterpreted over the years.  Taken as a whole, 
however, these legal norms limit the speed at which a remilitarization trajectory can be 
achieved, as they need to be addressed when considering making changes to Japan’s 
security practices. 
 Continuing the logic discussed under the previous security norms section, if 
public trust of the SDF increased because of their superb performance during its disaster 
dispatch then it might allow for some of the legal norms restricting the SDF’s activities to 
be relaxed.  This may call the legal norms into question as the SDF is seen as a 
responsible institution capable of conducting itself honorably certainly at home and 
reasonably abroad.  The disasters’ economic impact may also call some of these legal 
norms into question as Japan’s heightened sense of economic vulnerability stemming 
from the disasters prompts a more pragmatic approach to making Japan’s defense 
industries more competitive.  The Great East Japan Earthquake’s recent occurrence limits 
the sample data available to evaluate all of the legal norms mentioned.  The following 
section analyzes the arms export ban as actual changes have been the most apparent in 
this area after the disasters. 
 Oros recognizes that changes to Japan’s arms export ban in 1983 and 2004 were 
relatively small but states that a move toward unrestricted weapons exports would signify 
                                                 
251  Article 9 of Japan’s constitution renounces war as a sovereign right of the state, and prohibits the 
maintenance of military forces and the use of force to settle international disputes.  The “Three Principles 
for Restricting Arms Exports” codified in 1967 states that Japan would not export arms to communist 
nations, countries subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo, and countries where the risk of 
international conflict is high.  This ban was later extended to all countries in 1976.  Oros, Normalizing 
Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice, 106. 
252  The International Peace Cooperation Law passed in 1992 allowed the overseas dispatch of SDF 
troops in order to participate in UN PKO.  However, it severely limited their use of force by limiting the 
use of weapons for the minimum necessary for self-defense and allowed for SDF troop withdrawal in the 
event hostilities erupted.  Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an 
Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 197, 322. 
253  Japan’s three non-nuclear principles declared in 1967 state that Japan will not “produce, possess, 
or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons.”  Japan has also informally limited its defense budget to 1% 
of GDP since 1976.  Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East 
Asia (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 43, 56. 
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a fundamental shift in Japan’s security identity of domestic anti-militarism.254  It appears 
that a large step toward this has occurred due in part to the disasters.  In December 2011, 
the DPJ government announced that it was easing the restrictions on Japan’s existing 
arms export bans.  Up to then, revisions occurred on a case-by-case basis.  The new 
regulations represent a more comprehensive change that will allow fundamental changes 
in the way Japan approaches arms exports.  The new regulations are comprised of two 
main elements.  First, Japan will be allowed to participate in joint development of 
military equipment and technology with the United States, European nations, specifically 
those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other friendly 
nations.  Second, Japan will be allowed to export defense-related equipment to enable 
PKO and HADR.  These two areas will require government approval and strict 
administrative procedures will be in place to ensure defense equipment is properly 
transferred to third-party nations.  The DPJ government announced that the previous 
three principles guiding Japan’s arms export ban remain in effect.255 
 These fundamental changes can be partially credited to the economic pressure 
placed on Japan after the disasters but also stem from hollowing out fears in Japanese 
industries prior to the disasters.  After the 2010 NDPG’s release and before the disasters, 
attempts were made to revise the arms export ban but were eventually thwarted by strong 
opposition from the Social Democratic Party.  Senior vice ministers from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), METI, and MOD met in November 2011 to reopen the 
issue.256  Japan’s exacerbated economic health due to the disasters seems to have 
provided the added rationale to enact the new regulations.  The first element increases the 
defense industry’s production base and will help increase their capabilities as they 
                                                 
254  Japan’s arms export ban codified in 1967 and 1976 has been subject to slight revisions over the 
years.  The first came in 1983 when Japanese defense technology transfers to the United States were 
approved.  The second occurred in 2004 as the United States and Japan agreed to jointly develop a ballistic 
missile defense program.  Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security 
Practice, 92. 
255  Yukiko Ishikawa, “Gov’t Decides to Ease Arms Export Ban/ Way Clear for Joint International 
Arms Development,” The Daily Yomiuri, December 28, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111227003855.htm. 
256  “Gov’t Eyes Eased Ban on Weapons Exports,” The Mainichi Daily News, December 24, 2011, 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111224p2a00m0na007000c.html. 
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become involved in more joint development projects.257  This will lower its defense costs 
in the future. The previous arms export ban kept Japan out of the F-35’s joint 
development process, which will increase the fighter’s cost. 
 The economic rationale for the new regulations and maintenance of the previous 
three principles suggests that Japan is not going to embark on an unrestricted weapons 
export policy.  It will enable Japan to become much more active in its development and 
procurement of defense equipment.  The less restrictive nature of the new regulations will 
therefore emphasize remilitarization. 
 The changes in Japan’s arms export ban illustrate how Japan’s changing 
economic situation can affect the rationale for its legal norms that are most directly 
connected to Japan’s economic interests.  Other legal norms more closely related to 
normative constraints than economic interests have not shown as much movement since 
the disasters.  The one exception is the SDF’s five PKO principles, which was called into 
question because of the SDF’s deployment to UNMISS and South Sudan’s potentially 
unstable condition. 258, 259, 260  This type of sentiment best represents what might occur if 
the public’s increased trust in the SDF makes changes to legal norms more palatable. 
                                                 
257  “Japan Gives Green Light to Limited Arms Exports,” The Asahi Shimbun, December 27, 2011, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201112270053. 
258  The UN official in charge of UNMISS stated that Rwandan soldiers would safeguard the SDF 
troops because use of force is limited to self-defense according to the five PKO principles. Yoshiaki 
Kasuga, “U.N. Official Says GSDF Troops Will Be Protected in South Sudan,” The Asahi Shimbun, 
November 8, 2011. 
259  The unstable situation in South Sudan brought the five PKO principles into question as the SDF 
would be limited in their ability to provide for their own safety.  The Daily Yomiuri released an editorial 
calling for the relaxation of the weapon use standard.  “GSDF’s South Sudan Mission Significant for 
Nation Building,” The Daily Yomiuri, November 3, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T111102004580.htm. 
260  Senior Vice Defense Minister Shu Watanabe also advocated that SDF troops should be allowed to 
use weapons in the line of duty like other armies and called on the political parties to discuss the matter 
further.  “SDF Troops on Int’l Duty Should Be Allowed to Use Weapons: Vice Minister,” The Mainichi 
Daily News, December 30, 2011, 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111230p2g00m0dm014000c.html. 
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3. U.S.-Japan Security Alliance Norms: Trust Maintained 
 As mentioned previously, the U.S.-Japan security alliance was strengthened due 
to the utility of the alliance and the interoperability demonstrated through OPERATION 
TOMODACHI.  It was shown that a strengthened alliance combined with Japan’s 
reconstruction concerns provides less incentive for a remilitarization trajectory.  Another 
result of the shifting strength or lack thereof in a security alliance relationship is the fear 
of abandonment or entrapment.  In the context of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the 
result of a strengthened alliance could increase the fear of entrapment in American led 
wars as Japan comes closer to its ally.  The inverse effect is that a weakened alliance may 
cause Japan to fear abandonment and force Japan to embark on a remilitarization 
trajectory in order to fulfill its security needs.  Fear of abandonment does not seem likely 
based on the evidence of a strengthened alliance already given.  The more possible 
reaction to a strengthened alliance would be fear of entrapment. 
 Midford writes that the fear of entrapment in American wars amplifies Japan’s 
own domestic anti-militarism sentiment and leads to stronger resistance to even small 
expansions in SDF activities and capabilities.261  He illustrates this point through what he 
calls the Iraq syndrome.  The Iraq syndrome encompasses the Japanese public’s 
opposition to the Iraq War after hawkish leaders’, Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe 
Shinzo, aggressive pursuit of a larger role in the conflict.  The Japanese public’s support 
for constitutional revision, the hawkish LDP, and even the SDF’s reconstruction and non-
combat missions in Iraq subsequently decreased.262 
 Although fear of entrapment seems the more likely of the two, a crucial ingredient 
that would spur an entrapment reaction is becoming less potent: American wars.  As of 
December 2011, the Iraq War is over and Obama has made known his intentions to bring 
the Afghanistan War to an end in the next couple of years.  Furthermore, the Obama 
administration has not pressured Japan into increasing its role in the Afghanistan War or 
any other major international security activity for that matter.  Instead, Obama announced 
                                                 
261  Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?, 41. 
262  Ibid., 146–170. 
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in November 2011 that the United States would shift its strategic focus to the Asia-
Pacific region as it ends its overseas conflicts, a statement welcomed by Noda.263  The 
result is that Japanese and American security interests are merging since both express 
major concern over China’s expanding military and nuclear weapons armed North Korea.  
This will likely facilitate greater cooperation in the future between the U.S. military and 
SDF on mutual strategic objectives.  Therefore, the traditional fear of entrapment does 
not seem a likely reaction by Japan either. 
 Even though the United States is decreasing its footprint in the Middle East and 
provided the largest form of international military assistance after the disasters, this does 
not necessarily mean the Japanese public will automatically be more inclined to trust the 
United States.  Midford found that the Japanese public grew more skeptical than trusting 
of the United States and its perceived role in the world, especially in the years following 
the initiation of the Iraq War.264  Trust levels have improved in the last two years along 
with the drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq.  A December 2011The Daily Yomiuri poll 
indicates 47% of Japanese trust the United States very much or somewhat and 42% do 
not trust the United States very much or at all.  The trust levels decreased 5% and distrust 
levels increased 5% from the same 2010 poll.  A vast majority of Japanese, 94%, is 
thankful for the U.S. military’s role after the disasters, but the lowered trust levels 
indicate other factors are limiting the public’s trust in the United States.265  Although 
trust levels have shifted against the United States’ favor after the disasters, it does not 
seem to be driven by the disasters.  Furthermore, the changes were slight and can be 
considered as maintained. 
E. ACTORS/ INSTITUTIONS 
 This section examines the various internal and external actors and institutions that 
impact the SDF’s trajectory.  It focuses on several aspects.  First, how powerful is that 
                                                 
263  “Japan Welcomes Stronger U.S. Presence in Asia: Noda,” The Mainichi Daily News, November 
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264 Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?, 43–46. 
265  “Feeling About U.S. Are Complex/ Disaster Relief Operations Appreciated, But Major Ally Not 
Fully Trusted.” The Daily Yomiuri, December 19, 2011. 
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actor when it comes to their ability to impact the SDF’s trajectory?  This aspect becomes 
problematic to measure empirically so the second aspect provides a better understanding 
of how much capacity a particular actor or institution has to influence the SDF’s 
trajectory.  Second, what portion of the SDF trajectory does that actor or institution 
mostly affect?  Third, what SDF trajectory is that actor most likely to support? 
 Because previous sections have addressed how the Japanese public, the United 
States, and Japan’s neighbors, China and South Korea, were affected by the disasters, this 
section will go into more detail on how the disasters have affected Japan’s politicians.  
The concluding chapter takes into account the entire system of actors and institutions 
discussed hereafter and analyzes where this might take the SDF given the impact to 
Japan’s security interests, economic interests, and norms.  Therefore, the actors and 
institution section is in some cases about how the disasters impacted those particular 
entities but more so about how the system in its current state will direct the SDF. 
1. Japanese Public: Primed for a Dynamic Status Quo 
 The norms section demonstrated that public opinion does have an impact on the 
SDF’s trajectory.  Midford outlines the Japanese public’s impact on security policies in 
Figure 28.  This figure illustrates that public opinion impacts elites’ willingness to pursue 
certain security policies in response to real-world developments.266  He further identifies 
eight circumstances when public opinion is most likely to be influential on elite security 
policy formation.267  Figure 28 also implies that elites are able to shape policy outcomes 
by way of breaking down certain norms such as pacifism through demonstration effects.  
Demonstration effects are used to influence public opinion through gradual policy 
                                                 
266  Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? 
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election is near, when the public has recently engaged in retrospective voting, when the ruling coalition 
worries about the consequences of defying a stable opinion majority for other important issues, when a new 
policy is proposed or an old policy has perceptible costs, when consensus democracy norms and institutions 
are present.” Ibid., 21–25. 
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development as opposed to radical departures.  Therefore, Midford’s detailed analysis 
indicates that the Japanese public has considerable power to thwart security policies that 
run counter to its public opinion especially under the eight circumstance listed, but elites 
maintain the ability to gradually shape public opinion. 
 
Figure 28.   Public Attitudes, Measureable Opinions, and Policy Outcomes (From 
“Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to 
Realism?” 2011) 
 Based on this relationship, what SDF trajectory is the public most likely to 
support in the aftermath of the disasters?  As demonstrated in the norms section, the 
Japanese public sees the security norms of trust in the SDF and utility of military force 
and non-military force as distinctly separate.  Increased trust in the SDF does not 
necessarily directly translate into perceived utility of military force.  Through 
demonstration effects, elites have cautiously expanded the SDF’s roles since the end of 
the Cold War and demonstrated the state’s ability to safely manage the SDF at home and 
abroad.  The SDF’s unprecedented and highly successful disaster dispatch can be 
considered the capstone event from a demonstration effects perspective in solidifying the 
 107 
SDF’s domestic role.  Public trust in the SDF is at an all-time high but as was previously 
discussed, this will likely serve to boost the SDF’s profile and make the public more 
aware of the SDF’s other roles.  The utility of defensive force will likely gain support but 
the public’s aversion for offensive force will continue to slow attempts to remilitarize.  
Now that the public is almost completely accepting of the SDF’s domestic role, elites 
have more room to test the waters on the fringes of a remilitarization trajectory without 
facing dramatic public resistance.  The result is that the public is primed for changes 
within the status quo. 
2. SDF: A More Confident Force 
 The SDF was formed in an environment of severe distrust of the military 
following World War II.  Civil-military relations evolved with the focus on protecting the 
people from the SDF vice the protection provided by the SDF.  The resulting civil-
military structure subjugated the SDF to civilian institutions in numerous areas.  Despite 
changes in the international environment after the Cold War, the theme of civilian control 
over the SDF has remained largely in place.  This fact is evident in the MOD’s structure 
(see Figure 29).268  The Internal Bureau, comprised of approximately 22,000 civilian 
personnel, exerts the most influence over security policy within the MOD.  Uniformed 
SDF officers are not included in the Internal Bureau and are limited to the Joint Staff 
Office and the three services (GSDF, MSDF, ASDF).  The Chief of Staff for each service 
is primarily concerned with equipping and training its forces as a force provider and the 
Chairman of the Joint Staff aided by the Joint Staff Office acts as a force user.269  
                                                 
268  “Japan MOD Organization Chart,” Japan Ministry of Defense, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/organization/chart_a.html (accessed February 19, 2012). 
269  Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, Global Security Watch: Japan (Santa Barbara, Denver, 
Oxford: Praeger, 2010), 48, 57. 
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Figure 29.    Japan MOD Organization Chart (From Japan MOD website, 2012) 
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 This does not mean that the SDF was completely powerless to control any aspect 
of its trajectory.  Throughout the Cold War, politicians delegated authority to bureaucrats 
to control the SDF because it was seen as relatively risk or cost free.  The rationale 
behind this was that the SDF’s use in the Cold War was deemed much less likely and the 
numerous legal norms in place to control the SDF’s remilitarization facilitated a hands-
off approach to control the SDF.270   SDF officers could take advantage of the delegation 
relationship when the bureaucracy threatened SDF interests.  For instance, SDF officers 
could appeal to politicians if the SDF faced budget cuts for bases in a district.  The SDF 
could also appeal to outside actors such as the United States to further their interests.271  
Because of their taboo nature, the SDF also enjoyed relative autonomy on areas requiring 
military expertise such as procurement, recruitment, public relations, military education, 
and training.272 
 Even though the structure for civilian control over the SDF remains in place, the 
SDF is becoming more influential within the MOD.  After a series of SDF scandals in 
2007, reforms were adopted to address accountability issues in the SDF.  Containing the 
SDF even further was seen as a counterproductive measure.  Instead, it was decided to 
engage the SDF in the policymaking process.  This will allow for SDF officers to work 
more closely with civilian bureaucrats in the MOD.  Although these reforms will not 
produce dramatic results in the short term, it shows that there is a growing trend to grant 
the SDF more influence as they are seen as a necessary tool of the state.273  The SDF’s 
notable disaster dispatch will serve as more incentive to continue this trend. 
 The SDF’s disaster dispatch will also aid the SDF’s trajectory in two areas: SDF’s 
public image and the SDF’s confidence.  Japan realized after its checkbook diplomacy 
during the Gulf War was berated that the international community would demand more 
                                                 
270  Peter D. Feaver, Takako Hikotani and Shaun Narine, “Civilian Control and Civil-Military Gaps in 
the United States, Japan, and China,” Asian Perspective 29, no. 1 (2005), 247–249. 
271  The MSDF is best known for using this tactic with the U.S. Navy.  Ibid., 250–251. 
272  Takako Hikotani, “Japan’s Changing Civil-Military Relations: From Containment to Re-
Engagement?” Global Asia 4, no. 1 (2009), 23. 
273  Ibid., 24. 
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SDF participation in international security activities.  Along with the rise of security 
threats within the region, China and North Korea, the likelihood of the SDF being used at 
home and abroad became much more likely.  These factors created the need to shape the 
SDF’s public image as the SDF became more visible in a society with deep pacifist 
roots.274  One of the methods aimed at creating a positive SDF image is equating the 
SDF’s roles with those for the collective good. These roles are comprised of three 
elements that emphasize the SDF’s unique bond with the public, contact with local 
communities, and the SDF’s indispensable capabilities that are used for non-violent 
missions.275  Disaster relief is at the heart of this initiative as it satisfies all three 
elements.  The SDF sees HADR as a means to gain legitimacy at home and in the 
international community.  The SDF’s disaster dispatch in response to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake has provided an enormous source of material to improve its public 
image.  The SDF has taken advantage of its successful operation and used its disaster 
dispatch for numerous public relations materials.276 
 HADR also serves the purpose of building morale and confidence within the 
SDF’s ranks.  Because the SDF contributes most regularly to domestic disaster relief 
and international security activities, these are the things that provide satisfaction to 
SDF personnel.  SDF personnel look back at their involvement in the Great Hanshin 
Earthquake as an incredibly positive experience and see it as a significant boost to 
their public image.  Stories of rescuing victims and receiving gratitude for their 
efforts are what motivate SDF personnel.  The impact on SDF morale after the Great 
East Japan Earthquake can be considered even more profound since 40% of SDF 
                                                 
274  Sabine Fruhstuck, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2007), 118. 
275  Sabine Fruhstuck and Eyal Ben-Ari, ““Now We Show It All!” Normalization and the 
Management of Violence in Japan’s Armed Forces,” Journal of Japanese Studies 28, no. 1 (Winter, 2002), 
30–31. 
276 The Defense of Japan 2011 included a lengthy special feature in its front pages highlighting the 
SDF’s disaster dispatch.  The SDF also included prominent articles on its disaster dispatch in the Japan 
Defense Focus and other smaller pamphlets.  Each SDF service website also highlights their contributions 
to the disaster dispatch. 
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personnel participated in the disaster dispatch and the public recognized their efforts 
in almost exclusively positive terms.277 
 Given the SDF’s boosted confidence and the trend to more SDF involvement in 
the policy formation process, is there any need to worry that the SDF will embark on a 
remilitarization trajectory?  In 2008, fears that the SDF represented a force for 
remilitarization were rekindled when ASDF Chief of Staff General Tamogami Toshio 
published an essay questioning Japan’s role as an aggressor nation in World War II.  He 
further stoked the public’s fears by stating 99% of SDF officers held views similar to his.  
On the other hand, a survey conducted amongst SDF officers in 2003 found that the SDF 
is only moderately conservative.278  It has also been noted that SDF officers are less 
concerned about making the SDF stronger and increasing its influence over civilian 
authorities than they are with managing the SDF’s role in society and becoming accepted 
by the public as a legitimate asset for the nation.279  Although the SDF is likely to attract 
those that have a more conservative mindset, it does not seem apparent that the SDF 
would push for radical remilitarization as Tamogami suggested but rather seek a more 
fitting role for the SDF in society within the grey area between the status quo and 
remilitarization. 
3. Bureaucrats:  Shifting Control Over Security Policy 
 The bureaucracy has traditionally been the most influential actor in Japan’s 
security policymaking process because of the post World War II desire to contain the 
SDF from embarking on a remilitarization trajectory.  This historical legacy of exerting 
                                                 
277  Ibid., 33. 
278  They support the U.S.-Japan alliance but not unconditionally.  A request from the United States to 
participate in UN PKO was not as good of a reason to send troops as humanitarian needs or national 
interests.  58% believe that the SDF should be a role model for society but 64% also believe that the SDF 
and the public should interact more in order to introduce civilian values into the SDF.  More than 50% 
indicated only less than 100 casualties would be acceptable in operations surrounding Japan.  This shows 
the SDF’s aversion to causalities as a similar survey given to the U.S. military showed more than 83% 
would find more than 500 causalities acceptable if defending South Korea.  70% also stated officers should 
not criticize the government or society.  Hikotani, Japan’s Changing Civil-Military Relations: From 
Containment to Re-Engagement?, 25–26. 
279  Fruhstuck, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army, 6. 
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civilian control over the SDF embedded itself in the bureaucratic structure that still exists 
in many aspects today.  The MOFA emerged during the Cold War as the most powerful 
actor influencing security policy.  Three of the MOFA’s bureaus continue to hold 
considerable influence over security policy formation: Foreign Policy Bureau, North 
American Affairs Bureau, and International Legal Affairs Bureau (see Figure 30).280 , 281 
 
 
Figure 30.   Japan MOFA Organization Chart (From Japan MOFA website, 2012) 
                                                 
280  “Japan MOFA Organization Chart,” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/chart.html (accessed February 19, 2012). 
281  The Foreign Policy Bureau and specifically the National Security Policy Division within this 
bureau is considered the most important bureaucratic actor influencing Japan’s security policy.  Its position 
was elevated even higher as the lead division shaping Japan’s security policy after MOFA reorganization 
efforts in 2004.  The MOFA also highlighted the prominence of the Foreign Policy Bureau by appointing 
its most talented bureaucrats to senior positions within this bureau.  The North American Affairs Bureau, 
specifically the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty Division and Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division, also 
hold significant influence over alliance relations with the United States.  The International Legal Affairs 
Bureau is another significant actor that is involved with reconciling Japan’s international agreements with 
its domestic laws and ensures they are in keeping with Japan’s peace constitution.  Oros and Tatsumi, 
Global Security Watch: Japan, 28–30. 
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 The preeminent role that the MOFA plays in determining Japan’s security policy 
is significant for two reasons.  First, as one of Japan’s oldest ministries, it has the stature, 
talent, and capacity to sustain its control over other ministries such as the MOD and 
particularly the SDF.  Any attempts to erode the MOFA’s control face many obstacles.  
Second, the MOFA’s disproportionate control of security policy over the MOD distances 
SDF interests from security policy as the MOFA does not deal directly with the SDF. 
 The other bureaucratic institution that plays an important but subordinate role in 
Japan’s security policy formation is the MOD.  Prior to 2007, the MOD was only an 
agency known as the Japan Defense Agency (JDA).  Throughout the Cold War, the JDA 
served primarily as a management agency for the SDF rather than a policy agency.  This 
historical legacy is still manifest in the MOD’s structure even though its status was raised 
to that of a full ministry in 2007.  Many of its roles continue to revolve around managing 
relations between the U.S. military, SDF, and local governments where those forces are 
located.282 
 The MOD’s two most important bureaus regarding security policy formation are 
the Operational Policy Bureau and the Defense Policy Bureau.  The Strategic Planning 
Office was created in 2007 under the Defense Policy Division in this bureau.  It is tasked 
with handling long-term strategy planning issues like the NDPG.  The Defense Policy 
Bureau also expanded its strategic planning capacity in 2007 by adding the U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation Division and the International Policy Division.  These additions 
illustrate a gradual reorientation of the MOD’s responsibilities from a purely domestic 
standpoint to a broader focus on international issues and more responsibility in areas 





                                                 
282  For example, many of these responsibilities that were held by the Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency under the JDA were folded into the newly established Bureau of Local 
Cooperation, Bureau of Finance and Equipment, and the eight Regional Defense Bureaus.  The Ministry of 
Defense Reorganized (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2007), 4–5. 
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also suggests it will have more negotiating influence in areas such as the defense budget 
and it can theoretically demand a more equal say in Japan’s security policy formation 
with the MOFA.283 
 Despite the MOD’s status elevation and reorganization geared toward increasing 
its policy planning capacity, its security policy planning capacity compared to the MOFA 
remains relatively low due to understaffed divisions and the MOFA’s higher status 
among the ministries.  The National Police Agency (NPA) also continues to hold 
significant influence over areas concerning Japan’s domestic security and numerous NPA 
officials hold senior government positions affecting security policy formation (see Figure 
31).284 285  Given these limitations on the MOD’s influence over security policymaking, 
the trend since the end of the Cold War has been greater MOD involvement in security 
policymaking.  This is coming about because of the increased demand for the SDF to 
participate in international security activities and the increased likelihood of the SDF’s 
involvement in other roles in and out of Japan.  The MOD can no longer be avoided, as it 
is the only ministry that commands the SDF.286 
                                                 
283  The Operational Policy Bureau is charged with employing the SDF’s capabilities for the purposes 
of securing Japan’s national interests.  The Defense Policy Bureau is primarily tasked with developing a 
defense strategy that accounts for Japan’s national security policy and interests.  Oros and Tatsumi, Global 
Security Watch: Japan, 33–35. 
284 The Commissioner General’s Secretariat, Criminal Investigation Bureau, and Security Bureau are 
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Figure 31.   Japan NPA Organization Chart (From “Police of Japan Report,” 2011) 
 Considering the slow inclusion of the MOD in the security policymaking process 
along with the powerhouses MOFA and NPA, what trajectory is likely to be influenced 
by the bureaucracy?  Since the MOFA and NPA will remain very influential in the short 
to medium term, the SDF will remain isolated from the security policymaking process.  
Therefore, emphasis on including the SDF in activities that resemble remilitarization will 
likely continue to be a slow process.  Nonetheless, the MOD’s increasing bureaucratic 
influence trend suggests that the MOD and SDF will not be the outlier in the long term, 
which will aid the “normalization” of bureaucratic control over the SDF.  This will make 
remilitarization more likely in the long term.  The MOD’s successful deployment of the 




a. Gaining Influence Over the Bureaucracy 
  Politicians in general have been gaining influence in the security policy 
realm since the 1990s.  This is evident in the growing capacity and stature of two 
institutions at the Prime Minister’s disposal.  First, the Prime Minister’s Office expanded 
from 582 in 1999 to 2,200 after administrative reorganizations were implemented in 
2001.  Second, the Cabinet Secretariat had a staff of only 184 in 1999 but it has 
dramatically increased to 716 as of 2008.287  Even though it is comprised of a mix of 
politicians, bureaucrats and retired NPA officials, this institution bolsters the Prime 
Minister’s ability to initiate and coordinate important policy issues amongst various 
ministries.  This organization contains several positions with considerable control over 
Japan’s security policy: Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for 
Administration, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management.  The 
Cabinet Secretariat’s structural changes suggest politicians, namely the Prime Minister 
and Chief Cabinet Secretary, are gaining influence over the bureaucracy especially in its 
crisis management capacity.  Its policymaking capacity is still considered in its nascent 
stage, however.288 
  As previously mentioned, this trend is occurring due to the perceived high 
political costs of delegating authority to the bureaucracy.  The end of the Cold War 
created a demand for the SDF to participate in international security activities, which 
raised the need for politicians to be able to quickly influence policy in a crisis 
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second to the Prime Minister and critical in pushing through the Cabinet’s policies.  The Deputy Chief 
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management situation.  The 1993 electoral reforms created the structural incentives for a 
shift to a two-party system.  Politicians then became more vocal on defense issues as 
differences between party security policies became more important.  Politicians have 
therefore begun to take back control of security policy formation from bureaucrats, as the 
cost of not doing so could be potentially disastrous for their electoral survival or during a 
national emergency.289  Although the political leadership was criticized for its handling 
of the nuclear power station disaster, it was able to rapidly and effectively deploy the 
SDF and other national assets to the disaster-stricken regions.  This shows the fruits of 
more political control during crisis management situations and will likely provide added 
incentive to continue this trend. 
  The DPJ has taken this trend to another level.  The DPJ began a campaign 
to break from old patterns of bureaucratic-led governance after its historical majority win 
in the 2009 Lower House election.  The DPJ formed in the mid to late 1990s under the 
guise of a progressive party aimed at countering the pork-barrel tactics of the ruling LDP.  
The LDP was able to use these tactics along with other factors throughout its 54-year 
reign of electoral dominance to cement its position in Japanese politics.  This built a close 
working relationship between the LDP and bureaucracy.290  Once in office, the DPJ 
began dismantling this relationship.291  As an example in the security policymaking 
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review the policy because its revision was initiated under the LDP government.292  In this 
light, the DPJ’s personal vendetta against the bureaucracy will aid the growing trend to 
increase the political leadership’s role over the bureaucracy as long as the DPJ is in 
power. 
b. A Political System in Flux 
  Even prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan’s political system 
was in flux.  The end of the Cold War and the 1993 electoral reforms provided less 
ideological and structural incentives for the LDP’s main opposition party, the JSP, to 
thrive.  At the same time, Japan’s stagnating economy that began in the early 1990s 
called into question the LDP’s pork barrel political tactics, as it could no longer rely on 
positive socioeconomic conditions to sustain its power.  With the decline of the JSP, 
increasing pressure on the LDP to produce economic results, numerous factions split 
from the LDP, JSP, and New Frontier Party and eventually coalesced into the DPJ in the 
late 1990s.  Koizumi kept the LDP alive and the DPJ out of power from 2001–2006 by 
embarking on a progressive campaign to break the status quo by “changing the LDP or 
destroying it.”  His popularity kept the LDP in power but after his administration ended, 
the following three LDP prime ministers reverted to the old style of LDP governance and 
found themselves unable to manage Japan’s worsening economy.293  The DPJ found 
itself in a position to carry on the reform banner and provided voters the most credible 
alternative to the LDP, a choice voters resoundingly supported in the 2009 Lower House 
election.  Once in power, however, the DPJ’s own factional makeup and inexperience 
made a concerted effort at governance difficult to obtain.  The inability to handle issues 
such as the Futenma U.S. military base relocation contributed significantly to Prime 
Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s drop in public support and ultimately to his resignation in 
2010.  His successor, Kan, also came under fire for his handling of the Senkaku incident 
in late 2010.294  
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  Given this backdrop, the political system was already in flux prior to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake.  The disasters merely added to the difficulties facing the 
DPJ administration.  Kan’s disapproval ratings after the disasters continued to be high 
(see Figure 32).295  In April 2011, 60% of survey respondents stated they did not 
appreciate the Kan cabinet’s response to the earthquake and 67% did not appreciate the 
cabinet’s response to the nuclear power station disaster.296  Amid Kan’s continuing 
unpopularity, the LDP called for a no-confidence vote in the Diet in June 2011.  Before 
the vote, Kan announced his plans to resign once the situation surrounding the nuclear 
disaster had been stabilized and other crucial steps had been taken in the reconstruction 
process.  The no-confidence motion was rejected with 293 votes to 152.  It highlighted 
not only the failed governance of another DPJ prime minister but also the intense 
factional rivalries within the DPJ itself.  Prior to the vote, the Hatoyama and Ozawa 
Ichiro factions within the DPJ indicated they would side with the LDP in the no-
confidence vote.  The factional infighting that ensued threatened to break apart the party.  
Hatoyama went as far as saying, “Kan couldn’t be a worse human being.”  Hatoyama 
eventually changed his mind and voted against the no-confidence vote, as he feared 
Ozawa’s siding with the LDP and New Komeito would break up the DPJ.  The public 
became dissatisfied with the events surrounding the vote as 65% believed the no-
confidence motion was improper and 73% could not understand why so many in the DPJ, 
including Hatoyama and Ozawa, initially supported the no-confidence motion.  The 
DPJ’s infighting caused 60% to have a worsened view of the DPJ.297, 298 
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Figure 32.   Poll Question:  Do You Support the Current Cabinet? 
  Voter confidence in the DPJ remained low even after Kan stated his 
intention to step down.  In June 2011, 61% of survey responders stated they did not think 
the situations surrounding the disaster areas would improve with a new prime minister.  
Over half, 55%, stated they believed the DPJ should split up and 78% felt the Diet was 
not fulfilling its duty to handle the reconstruction efforts.299  Voters preferred that the 
LDP and DPJ work together to deal with the situation.   In another June 2011 survey, 
84% believed the DPJ and LDP should cooperate more in the Diet.  A plurality, 42%, 
supported the forming of a grand coalition between the DPJ and LDP.300  Surveys before 
and after also showed majority figures supporting a coalition.  Despite voter desire for 
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political cooperation to pull the nation through this disaster, the LDP refused to form a 
grand coalition with the DPJ because it saw the DPJ request as an attempt to build its 
support.301 
  Kan eventually stepped down in late August 2011 once the situation 
surrounding the nuclear disaster was under control.  The race for the next prime minister 
showed once again the divide amongst DPJ factions, specifically the pro-Ozawa versus 
anti-Ozawa factions.  Ozawa’s support of METI Minister Kaieda Banri in the final race 
united the anti-Ozawa factions to support MOF Minister Noda who won the race with 
215 of 392 votes.  The results show that the DPJ continued to suffer from intense 
factional divides.302 
  Noda enjoyed public support at the beginning of his administration, but 
faced with the difficulty of dealing with the reconstruction efforts in a hostile political 
environment, his public support decreased in December 2011 due to perceived inability 
to get things done and unpopular policies (see Figures 32 and 33).303  In order to fund the 
reconstruction supplementary budgets, the DPJ originally proposed a tobacco tax along 
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The public supported including the tobacco tax with a 63% approval rating.304, 305  The 
DPJ had to compromise on the means to finance the budget since the LDP and New 
Komeito did not support the inclusion of the tobacco tax, a stance reminiscent of their 
pork barrel tactics.  In order to reach a compromise, the DPJ was forced to remove the 
tobacco tax and place the full burden of reconstruction funding on income, corporate, and 
individual residential taxes.306  The compromise proved to be unpopular as 56% did not 
support the revised funding sources.307 
 
Figure 33.   Poll Question:  For Those Who Do Not Support the Current Cabinet, Why 
Do You Not Support the Current Cabinet? 
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c. Voter Uncertainty 
Given the dissatisfaction that voters have shown toward the Kan and Noda 
cabinets as a result of their unpopular policies and inability to lead the government, let 
alone their own party, towards effective reconstruction legislation, is the voting public 
ready to retaliate against the DPJ in upcoming elections?  Polling data from 
January 2011–January 2012 indicates voters are uncertain about their party loyalties.  
When asked what party they support, both the DPJ and LDP received about 20% support 
with the DPJ leading in most opinion polls.  The largest majority, about 45%, 
consistently stated they support no particular party, however (see Figure 34).308  When 
asked what party they would vote for on the proportional representation ballot if a general 
election were held, the DPJ and LDP received around 25% support ratings with the LDP 
in the lead in most polls.  Those who did not know what party they would vote for 
represented a majority in all polls with figures around 35% (see Figure 35).309  New 
parties hoping to gain the support of this large group of disenfranchised voters are 
emerging, signaling more party shuffling in the future.310  The DPJ’s minor coalition 
partner, New People’s Party, is also threatening to split from the DPJ and form a party 
with Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro.311  The LDP stands to benefit most from 
churning within the DPJ, but it does not appear voters are swinging enthusiastically back 
to the LDP. This may afford the LDP the opportunity to win back some Lower House 
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seats in the 2013 election.  Because parties other than the DPJ and LDP have yet to 
solidify into a formidable third force, voter decision will likely come down to the lesser 
of two evils. 
 
Figure 34.   Poll Question: What Political Party Do You Currently Support? 
 
Figure 35.   Poll Question: If a General Election Were to be Held, Which Party Would 
You Vote For in the Proportional Representation Vote? 
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d. DPJ and LDP Here To Stay:  What Do They Stand For? 
Unless a snap election is held and the DPJ loses, the DPJ will be in power 
until the next scheduled Lower House elections in 2013 and they will likely remain a 
strong force in the government even if they do lose.  In that case, what SDF trajectory are 
they likely to support?  Because the DPJ was formed of former conservative LDP and 
less liberal socialists in the late 1990s, their security policy views do not dramatically 
differ from those of the LDP.  On the liberal-conservative spectrum, they are generally 
considered a centrist or slightly right of center party.  Therefore, the ends of the DPJ’s 
security policy do not significantly diverge from the LDP’s but the means do in several 
areas. 
  First, the DPJ emphasizes the importance of the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance but seeks a more equal relationship with the United States in the alliance and 
more autonomy in its security policy in general.  This translates into a desire to reduce 
the burden of U.S. military bases in Japan, an initiative proving difficult particularly in 
Okinawa.312 
  Second, and related to the first, the DPJ places less emphasis on the 
primacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance and seeks regional solutions to its security interests.  
The result is that DPJ leaders are more accommodating to its neighbor’s interests.  This is 
seen in the desire to create an East Asian Community (EAC) and solidify Japan’s identity 
in Asia.  The DPJ also takes a less hardline approach toward China but still expresses 
their concern over China’s growing power.  They also seek to engage Japan’s neighbors 
over historical issues.313 
  Third, the DPJ believes that Japan’s international security activities should 
be done through UN auspices rather than solely based on support for the United States.  
This was evident in the DPJ’s opposition to the Iraq War and their ending of the MSDF’s 
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Indian Ocean mission in 2009.  This clearly distinguishes the DPJ from the LDP after 
Koizumi’s emphatic support for the U.S. war in Iraq.314 , 315 
  Although the DPJ generally reflects these three elements in its security 
policy, the DPJ’s factional makeup and its relatively short existence has hindered the 
solidifying of its security policy foundation.  Different DPJ factions can therefore embark 
on different methods to obtain its security policy goals.  For instance, Maehara is one of 
the leading proponents of realist views in the DPJ and takes a more alliance-centric 
approach in dealing with China’s rise.316  Noda has also stated he will not seek an EAC 
originally proposed by Hatoyama.317 
  The DPJ’s security policy characteristics suggest that it will be less 
provocative in its application of the SDF after the disasters.  Rather than capitalizing on 
the public’s increased trust in the SDF, the DPJ is less likely to push for a more active 
SDF international role as it understands this may be provocative to its Northeast Asia 
neighbors.  Instead, the DPJ may seek more opportunities to cooperate with its neighbors, 
specifically South Korea.  The DPJ’s preoccupation on Japan’s economic issues and 
keeping itself together before the next round of Lower House elections will further 
decrease the likelihood of any dramatic changes in the way it employs the SDF. 
  The LDP is also likely to remain a credible force in Japanese politics for 
the foreseeable future.  With the churn among the DPJ since it took office in 2009 and the 
legitimacy blow from the disasters, the LDP is positioned to perhaps reclaim seats at the 
next Lower House elections.  It has already done so in the 2010 Upper House elections.  
It behooves those concerned with the SDF trajectory debate to not forget what the LDP 
stands for in terms of its security policy. 
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  The LDP’s 54-year governance connotes the idea that it is a relatively 
homogenous party.  On the contrary, it stayed in power for so long in part because of its 
ability to unite various factions against the communists and socialists on the ideological 
left.  So labeling the LDP under one identity is problematic but considering the decades 
worth of LDP security analysis compared to the DPJ’s short time in office, it is somewhat 
easier to identify the LDP’s security policy mainstream positions.  Richard Samuels 
attributes the LDP mainstream to the normal nationalists identity.  As the name suggests, 
these individuals support Japan’s remilitarization as a “normal” nation.  Therefore, the 
LDP can be considered a strictly conservative party.  This identity takes on several 
characteristics. 
  First, normal nationalists advocate a global perspective that states Japan 
should contribute to international security activities commensurate to its economic status.  
The SDF must therefore be strengthened to fulfill these roles.  Stemming from this 
stance, the LDP supports constitutional revision and the exercise of collective self 
defense.318 
  Second, normal nationalists also contain two views that diverge in 
interpretation but converge on purpose.  Both the revisionists and the realists believe that 
Japan should be a “normal” nation and should not be weighed down by its past.  The 
revisionists, however, support a nostalgic view of the past and are less apologetic and 
more provocative in their stance with historical issues as seen in their support for visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine.  Realists see this sentiment as unnecessarily provocative and advocate a 
focus on Japan’s post-war democratic status.319 
  Third, the normal nationalists proclaim the efficacy of the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance.  In this regard, the LDP is less supportive of regional security initiatives 
and is more likely to build up the SDF’s joint capabilities with the U.S. military.  Like the 
DPJ, the LDP also pushes for a more equal alliance relationship.320 
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  Fourth, the normal nationalists take a more realist approach toward China 
and are wearier of its military rise and are more vocal about China as a potential threat.  
Combined with their less apologetic stance toward historical issues, this makes conflict 
rather than cooperation more likely between Japan and China.321 
  The LDP’s security policy characteristics suggest that if given the chance 
it will push for a remilitarization trajectory as it did under the last four LDP prime 
ministers, especially Koizumi.  Its stance on historical issues and the efficacy it places on 
the U.S.-Japan alliance will impede any opportunity for regional security cooperation.  
The LDP may also be more likely to take advantage of opportunities to increase the 
SDF’s international role as it did during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  The LDP’s fall 
from power after its unpopular security policies may temper any strong attempts to push 
for remilitarization. 
5. Japan’s Precarious Position 
In terms of Japan’s geostrategic position between the United States and its 
Northeast Asian neighbors, Japan is caught between diametrically opposed opinions 
regarding the SDF’s trajectory. 
a. Northeast Asia:  Pro-containment 
  Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors, particularly China, North Korea, and 
South Korea, generally represent forces that desire to contain Japan’s military potential.  
Having endured Japan’s occupation in the early to mid–20th century, it is no surprise 
Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors are skeptical of a remilitarized SDF.  Continued 
isolation between North Korea and Japan, growing anti-Japanese nationalism in China, 
and China and South Korea’s improving economic situation relative to Japan only 
embolden these actors to exert more pressure on Japan to remain militarily subjugated in 
the region. 
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  Because the North Korean threat, minus the ballistic missile threat, is 
primarily contained on the Korean peninsula, North Korea exerts less of an influence on 
the SDF’s trajectory than China.  South Korea is also heavily invested in the North 
Korean threat and shares a common ally with Japan in the United States.  The hub and 
spoke security alliance structure between the United Sates, Japan, and South Korea also 
prevents security interests between Japan and South Korea from escalating into conflict 
but also creates a situation where they are developed independently from each other and 
allows historical grievances to fester.  For these reasons, the two Koreas represent a 
potent but contained force against SDF remilitarization. 
  China is therefore left as the actor with the most direct influence over 
containing Japan’s military resurgence.  The power they exert in this regard is seen in two 
areas.  First, China’s rhetoric against any sign of rising Japanese nationalism or 
remilitarization serves as a means to express its desire to contain Japan.  This rhetoric has 
only increased since the 1990s partially because of a patriotic education program initiated 
after the Tiananmen crisis, which serves as a useful tool to deflect attention away from 
China’s own domestic problems.  The anti-Japanese sentiment that is making deeper 
roots in Chinese society provides a powerful means to show its growing suspicion toward 
Japan.  For instance, Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine visits sparked large anti-Japanese 
protests in 2004 and 2005.322 
  Second, China’s growing military capability and operational expansion 
into waters surrounding Japan provides a direct means of containing the SDF’s own 
expanding roles in the region.  China’s demonstrated capability to rapidly modernize and 
grow its military strength serves as an indirect check on Japan’s remilitarization in the 
sense that it would provide less incentive for Japan to begin an arms race with an 
opponent that has much less limiting its ability to do so.  The historical legacies of the 
Yoshida doctrine such as Japan’s security and legal norms have boxed Japan into a corner 
in this regard.  If it breaks from these precedents rapidly, Japan threatens to initiate a 
disastrous escalatory response from China.  On the other hand, Japan cannot ignore the 
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new threats that a growing China presents and must approach them within a structure that 
severely limits Japan’s ability to remilitarize. 
b. The United States:  Pro-remilitarization 
The United States takes a polar opposite approach to the SDF trajectory 
from the rest of Northeast Asia.  Although the U.S.-Japan security alliance was formed 
with the partial intent to contain Japan, the United States has consistently placed pressure 
on Japan to increase its military contributions within the alliance.  This only intensified 
after the end of the Cold War when it seemed that America’s formal alliances could be 
replaced by coalitions of the willing.  This elevated Washington’s expectations for 
Japan’s international security contributions as the key elements to alliance structures 
became how much one was willing to risk.  Decades of operating under the Yoshida 
doctrine left Japan ill-prepared to meet Washington’s new expectations.  This growing 
trend is best exemplified in Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s spurring 
statement to Japan to “show the flag” after the September 11, 2001, attacks.323 
  Considering the U.S.-Japan security alliance has been embedded and 
institutionalized in the ways that the United States and Japan interact with each other in 
regard to their security issues, it is safe to say that the United States has the capacity to 
exert strong pressure on the SDF’s trajectory and is most likely to support a 
remilitarization trajectory.  The means by which the United States goes about exerting its 
influence are likely to take place within a hub and spoke mentality.  The U.S. military’s 
successful OPERATION TOMODACHI will likely increase the United States’ influence 
over the rest of Northeast Asia.  Furthermore, the successful joint operations conducted 
between the U.S. military and SDF may also embolden the U.S. military to pressure SDF 
forces along a remilitarization trajectory.  Controlling the United States’ expectations for 
the SDF is a crucial concern addressed further in the conclusion chapter. 
  Between the pro-containment forces of Northeast Asia and the United 
States’ pro-remilitarization stance, Japan is stuck in the middle.  Considering Japan’s 
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close economic ties with both entities, it is essential to understand the predicament Japan 
faces in order to avoid pushing Japan in a direction that are harmful for its own interests 
and may in turn be counterproductive for American interests. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed four key areas that affect the SDF’ trajectory: security 
interests, economic interests, norms, and actors and institutions.  The following chapter 
provides a comprehensive conclusion based on the analysis of these four areas. 
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter concludes the analysis conducted thus far in the previous chapters.  
The first section provides a brief summary of the analysis conducted on the four areas 
affecting the SDF’s trajectory in the previous chapter: security interests, economic 
interests, norms, and actors and institutions. Themes within these four areas are 
highlighted in order to identify the key findings of this research.   
 Figure 36 illustrates what trajectory influence aspect was emphasized or altered 
by highlighting that particular element in green.  Based on this analysis, the second 
section details the most likely SDF trajectory according to the trajectory formation 
process outlined in Figure 14. 
 The three possible trajectories considered are retrenchment, status quo, and 
remilitarization; all of which address two key elements of the SDF trajectory debate: 
capacity and will.  Retrenchment is defined as a decrease in the SDF’s capacity to 
conduct international security activities because the defense budget may be reduced.  The 
will to use the SDF in these international roles may also diminish because Japan becomes 
internally focused as domestic HADR is emphasized at the expense of international 
security activities.  The status quo means that the SDF’s capacity and will to conduct the 
types of international security activities it is currently conducting is not significantly 
altered.  In this case, the SDF would see little change in Japan’s will to expand or 
retrench from these roles.  Remilitarization is defined as the increased capacity and will 
to use force as a coercive tool of the state.  An increased defense budget and shift to more 
offensive oriented capabilities would increase the SDF’s capacity to remilitarize.  
Removal of legal norms restricting the SDF’s use of force and application of the SDF in 
offensive roles would signify an increased will for remilitarization.  Increased trust in the 
SDF generated by a successful HADR operation may also translate into more deference 
for the SDF to expand its roles and become more externally focused.  This thesis finds 
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that the SDF is most likely to move toward a new status quo defined by economic 
pragmatism and inclusion of SDF interests in domestic policy formation. 
 The third section gives several policy recommendations based on this thesis’ 
findings.  The recommendations are intended for those that directly influence U.S. 
security policy in the Asia-Pacific region in general and specifically those that manage 
various aspects of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.  It is also applicable for those that 
indirectly participate in the U.S. security policy formation process in order for them to 
understand how their actions influence the various forces that affect the SDF’s trajectory. 
 The final section provides a short synopsis of the significance and shortfalls of 
this research, and areas for future research. 
 
Figure 36.   Most Likely SDF Trajectory Post 3/11 
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B. ANALYSIS SUMMARY: KEY FINDINGS 
1. Security Interests 
 Japan’s security policy focus and defense budget was not severely altered 
primarily because they were not discredited.  The 2010 NDPG provided an appropriate 
framework of security objectives, roles, posture characteristics, and organization 
attributes, which allowed the SDF to carry out a highly successful domestic HADR 
operation.  The SDF continues to stress a hybrid focus on its domestic and international 
roles as seen in its enduring commitment to UN PKO and anti-piracy missions abroad.  
Notably, the SDF continues to engage in domestic HADR and seems to have boosted its 
profile in this mission area, as seen in its large-scale disaster dispatch for Typhoon 
number 12. 
 Japan’s defense budget weathered the fiscal burdens created by the disasters and 
has not dramatically changed in terms of its aggregate level and allocation between 
defensive and offensive equipment and missions.  The SDF did, however, make minor 
adjustments in these two areas.  First, the 2012 defense budget broke a decade long 
decline in defense spending but the increase does not represent a fundamental change in 
the 1% of GDP defense spending norm.324  Second, allocation for the SDF’s disaster 
response and CBRN capabilities received minor budget increases.  Japan’s aggravated 
economic health after the disasters create uncertainty in its ability to maintain the goals 
spelled out in the 2010 MTDP.  If economic conditions decline in the medium term, a 
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revision of the MTDP can be expected in the next several years.  Furthermore, Japan’s 
selection of the F-35 as its F-X will place added stress on these goals if its cost continues 
to rise. 
 The U.S.-Japan security alliance was strengthened following the disasters.  The 
U.S. military’s OPERATION TOMODACHI illustrated a functional alliance relationship 
and validated years of joint training between the SDF and U.S. military.  Evidence of a 
strengthened alliance emerged primarily at the elite level in such forums as the SCC 2+2.  
A strengthened alliance does not preclude a closer step toward remilitarization.  The 
fiscal constraints and governance issues facing Japan’s leadership provide less incentive 
for this trajectory and make retrenchment or at least maintaining the status quo more 
favorable as Japan recovers from the disasters. 
 The disasters provided numerous opportunities to strengthen relations with its 
Northeast Asian neighbors, particularly China and South Korea.  Both provided 
considerable levels of support to Japan.  High-level government official visits, 
specifically the Japan-China-South Korea Leaders Meeting, took advantage of the 
goodwill generated by the disasters and marked a more positive mood in the region.  This 
was a significant improvement especially with China after the Senkaku incident in late 
2010.  Despite the improved relations, a foundation for sustained cooperation does not 
exist, which will allow heated issues between Japan and its neighbors to quickly squander 
any goodwill generated.  Territorial disputes and historical interpretations continue to 
plague their relations.325 
2. Economic Interests 
 Japan’s economic conditions were the most susceptible to change by the disasters.  
Serious impacts to GDP growth in the short term, however, were averted because the 
affected areas only represented a little less than 3% of Japan’s economy.  Furthermore, 
many industries in the affected region were able to avert disruptions in supply chains and 
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recovered to pre-disaster production levels.  GDP decline since the disasters is more the 
result of multiple factors affecting Japan’s economy than the disasters themselves. 
 Although severe immediate impacts to Japan’s economy were averted, Japan’s 
economic health defined in the medium to long term was worsened.  In order to finance 
the third and fourth supplementary budgets that provided funding for Japan’s 
reconstruction efforts, reconstruction bonds were issued that increased reliance on long-
term debt to finance its budget.  As most of the expected 23 trillion yen in reconstruction 
funds has already been allocated, the impact on Japan’s economy from the disasters will 
likely be felt in the medium term.  Long-term impacts can be better attributed to the 
larger stress on Japan’s budget: social security.  If these added fiscal burdens manifest 
themselves in the medium-term, the 2010 MTDP and defense budget in general may 
require re-evaluation, which could lead to retrenchment in terms of more drastic defense 
budget cuts. 
 Japan is placing great emphasis on its reconstruction agenda.  The idea that this 
might lead to a redefinition of Japan’s economic interests in internal or domestic terms 
rather than external or international terms does not seem likely based on reconstruction 
guidelines released by the Reconstruction Design Council and the Reconstruction 
Headquarters.  The Japanese leadership understands that Japan’s economy cannot be 
revived through domestic measures only and is advocating a hybrid reconstruction effort 
focused on domestic and international elements.  The DPJ’s closer leaning toward the 
TPP illustrates less deference toward domestic economic issues that are perceived as 
detrimental to a revival in Japan’s economy. 
 In the battle between guns (defense budget) and goodwill (ODA), guns continue 
to win.  Japan’s traditional source of international influence has been economic aid in the 
form of ODA.  Since 1997, the ODA budget has declined in comparison to the defense 
budget that has remained relatively constant.  This trend continued in the 2012 draft 
budget and illustrates a growing deference of defense spending over ODA.  This is 




justifiable than ODA.  More reliance on defense spending as a means for international 
influence through its international security activities indicates a shift toward 
remilitarization. 
 Despite the controversy surrounding nuclear power after the disasters, Japan’s 
energy dependency will likely continue into the long-term because of Japan’s energy 
dilemma.  Japan needs a significant source of domestically produced energy provided by 
nuclear power because it lacks energy resources.  Even with nuclear power it remains 
highly energy dependent in several aspects.  Switching to less risky forms of energy such 
as renewable energy would become costly as nuclear power is the cheapest form of 
energy currently available.  Making a dramatic shift to renewable energy is not feasible in 
the short and medium term.  With or without nuclear power, Japan will remain dependent 
on foreign energy sources and will require close attention to the changing international 
environment and its impact on energy resources.  This will continue to provide incentive 
for Japan to exert its influence in the international system. 
3. Norms 
 The SDF’s central and successful role in the disasters has helped break through a 
foundational security norm: public trust of the SDF.  The large-scale disaster dispatch and 
nuclear dispatch thrust the SDF into the media spotlight, which rewarded the SDF’s role 
in the disasters with a positive portrayal.  Public opinion regarding trust in the SDF has 
never been higher as a result.   This is significant as the SDF has a reputation as an 
outsider in its own country and calls into question the meaning of domestic anti-
militarism.  Civil-military relations regarding domestic HADR seem the most likely area 
to improve as a result. 
 Translating gains in public trust for the SDF into utility for non-military force in 
the form of non-traditional security activities such as HADR is another likely outcome.  
The public’s perception after the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake regarding the SDF’s 
primary, most effective, and future role significantly boosted the SDF’s HADR role in 
each category.  The SDF’s perceived HADR role has received a similar boost after the 
recent disaster, which will maintain high levels for at least the medium term.  As the 
SDF’s non-traditional international security activities increased after the 1995 
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earthquake, a similar trend can be expected in the future.  These past trends signal that the 
utility of non-military force will be seen as useful for domestic and international 
purposes. 
 Public opinion did not peg the SDF as a strictly HADR force after the 1995 
earthquake.  Instead, the SDF’s role of ensuring national security also increased 
exponentially with its HADR role.  This is most likely due to the SDF’s increased profile 
from the disasters.  The SDF’s defensive role also received a boost in support after the 
recent disasters.  A 2004 SAGE report found that the public remains averse to the use of 
offensive force, but mostly supportive of defense force.  The Iraq syndrome detailed by 
Midford illustrates a skeptical public toward the use of offensive force.  Therefore, it does 
not seem probable that increased public trust in the SDF will directly translate into the 
utility of offensive force.  These linkages are addressed more explicitly in the next 
section. 
 Numerous procedural limitations, legal norms, still exist that would slow a 
remilitarization trajectory: five PKO principles, Article 9 of the Constitution, and the 
three non-nuclear principles.  One of Japan’s long-standing legal norms has changed 
since the disasters, however.  Legislation passed in December 2011 now allows Japan to 
freely engage in joint weapons development with the United States, European Union, and 
other friendly nations.  This represents a fundamental shift from taking a case-by-case 
approach to arms exports in the past to now having blanket authority to embark on joint 
weapons development.  The fact that this legal norm was the first to change after the 
disasters is significant because it is one that is most directly linked to Japan’s economic 
conditions rather than pacifist norms such as the three non-nuclear principles.  This 
suggests that a degree of economic pragmatism is driving changes to Japan’s legal norms 
since the arms export ban was revised in order to improve Japan’s industry 
competitiveness and keep defense costs down. 
 The U.S.-Japan alliance norms of entrapment and abandonment and trust in the 
United States were not significantly affected.  Abandonment fears do not seem probable 
because of the U.S. military’s demonstration as a reliable alliance partner through 
OPERATION TOMODACHI.  Entrapment fears are also not likely to be triggered since 
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the United States has recently ended the Iraq War.  Obama has also stated his intention to 
end the Afghanistan War by 2014 and redirected his defense strategy focus toward the 
Asia-Pacific.  A merging of security interests between Japan and the United States is 
taking place that would mitigate entrapment fears.  The United States’ foreign policy in 
the Asia-Pacific may still trigger entrapment fears if a hardline approach is taken in the 
region.  This method of engagement will become critical to U.S.-Japan relations 
depending on the outcome of the 2012 U.S. presidential election.  Another aspect of the 
alliance norms is surprising.  Despite the public’s explicit appreciation of the U.S. 
military’s assistance after the disasters, it has not had any major impact on trust levels 
between the Japanese public and the United States.  The perceived impasse over the 
Futenma relocation issue is a critical variable in this dynamic.  It is worthy to note that 
there seems to be a gap between elite and public opinion regarding the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance. 
4. Actors and Institutions 
 The analysis regarding the actors and institutions affecting the SDF trajectory 
examines two areas.  First, what structure of actors and institutions that affect the SDF 
trajectory existed prior to the disasters and what trends were already in motion?  This will 
describe the filter in which the SDF trajectory is formed after the disasters.  Second, how 
have the disasters altered the makeup of this structure? 
 The public exerts indirect control over the SDF trajectory in the sense that it 
cannot actively manipulate the SDF’s application within the confines of Japan’s security 
policy.  Instead, the public’s power is felt in an indirect manner in relation to politicians 
and the security policy to which they subscribe.  This provides them substantial leverage 
over politicians when the SDF is applied in ways that run counter to public opinion.  
These beliefs include a strong aversion to anything that resembles the offensive use of 
force.  This explains the Iraq syndrome developed by the public as this war became 
increasingly unpopular due to its perceived illegitimacy and is one of many reasons the 
public voted against the LDP leaders in support of this war in the 2009 Lower House 
elections.  Furthermore, as the SDF’s roles changed after the Cold War from a BDF to a 
more active force in the domestic and international arenas, the pubic has had more to 
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discuss regarding security policy and has therefore become more powerful in relation to 
politicians by addressing SDF activities that it does not support. 
 The same increase in SDF activity after the Cold War is affecting the dynamics of 
bureaucratic control over the SDF.  The likelihood of SDF activity at home and abroad is 
causing the bureaucracy to loose some control over security policy to politicians as they 
need to be more involved in the formation process for their own political survival as 
security matters become more relevant topics in every day political discourse.  The 
bureaucracy’s capacity and talent to craft security policy remains intact as a result of the 
delegation relationship between the bureaucracy and politicians, LDP, during the Cold 
War.  Changes are also taking place within the bureaucracy between the MOFA and 
MOD.  Because of the SDF’s increasing domestic and international roles, the need to 
include SDF interests in the security policy formation process is becoming more 
important.  The MOFA continues to have a majority of control over areas affecting the 
SDF as opposed to the MOD.  The MOD’s elevated status in 2007 and restructuring to 
allow for more security policy formation capacity shows the trend of including SDF 
interests in security policy, however.  This process is slow as the MOD is in the nascent 
stage of being able to significantly impact security policy. 
 The political system is also changing the nature of the SDF’s application.  As 
politicians become more assertive in security policy and crisis management in particular, 
the SDF is subjected to a political system in flux.  The power of the ideological left, 
communists and socialists, which supported the containment of the SDF and 
characterized the main political opposition party during the Cold War, has diminished 
significantly in the last two decades.  Today, the two largest political parties, DPJ and 
LDP, support engaging the SDF and increasingly rely on the SDF as a tool of the state to 
manage domestic crisis such as natural disasters, and growing potential threats in the 
region such as China and North Korea.  The disasters have complicated this changing 
political system even further as the pubic is dissatisfied with the DPJ’s crisis 
management.  This may serve to once again shift the balance of power away from the 
ruling party in the next Lower House elections.  Although the LDP may benefit from the 
DPJ’s poor performance because it is the only credible alternative, voters do not seem 
 142 
enthusiastic about returning to LDP-style governance.  Voter dissatisfaction is creating 
more opportunities for third parties to present a valid alternative to DPJ or LDP rule that 
may further complicate the SDF’s trajectory if these parties gain any significant 
representation. 
 Despite the evolving internal structure of actors and institutions affecting the 
SDF’s trajectory, Japan remains stuck between Northeast Asia and the United States.  
Northeast Asia continues to advocate containing the SDF.  China’s distanced relationship 
with the United States and Japan in terms of security interests, its rapid military 
modernization, and economic growth present an increasingly strong force against SDF 
remilitarization.  The United States continues to be an external force for remilitarization.  
The U.S. military’s OPERATION TOMODACHI will likely embolden the United States 
to place added pressure on the SDF to expand its joint interoperability and in doing so 
fuse their security interests. 
C. ANSWER: TOWARD A NEW STATUS QUO 
1. Security Interests: Staying the Course 
 Japan’s security interests remain relatively unchanged after the disasters.  The 
only trajectory influence within the security interests category that seems to have been 
altered in any significance was the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.  Yet, 
the implications of this still seem to be limited within the confines of the status quo.  
Japan’s security relationship with the United States remains based on a hub and spoke 
alliance structure originally designed to allow the United States to build strong bi-lateral 
relations with Northeast Asian states with the desire to balance against a well-defined 
threat, the Soviet Union and its communist ideals. 
 Japan’s security policy and defense budget were not severely affected because 
they proved relatively successful in handling the disasters.  Only minor changes in these 
areas have occurred as the SDF incorporates lessons learned from the disasters. 
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2. Economic Interests: No Cause for Alarm … Yet 
 Changes in Japan’s economic interests have not been radically different with most 
changes exacerbating trends already in place.  Japan averted catastrophic economic 
effects because the widespread destruction was limited to a fairly limited portion of 
Japan’s economy in the less industrialized and populated Tohoku region.  The 
devastation in this region has caused some industries and businesses to relocate 
elsewhere, especially in large industrial centers such as Tokyo.  This will make Japan’s 
economy more susceptible to disasters in the future in these areas with dense industry and 
population concentrations.  Another “great” disaster striking an area like Tokyo in the 
medium term is considered likely and in the long term deemed inevitable.326  A disaster 
of the Great East Japan Earthquake’s magnitude in these areas will have a much greater 
impact on Japan’s economy and subsequently its defense budget. 
 The disasters did, however, aggravate several trends already in motion that may 
have a medium-term affect on the SDF trajectory.  Japan’s budget is increasingly reliant 
on new debt as its social security costs climb.  Significant restructuring of Japan’s tax 
system to alleviate this financial burden is required and is taking place at a heightened 
pace as a result of the fiscal pressure from the disasters.  Japan’s inability to weather this 
economic storm may continue to place pressure on Japan’s defense budget and further 
complicate the political system affecting the SDF trajectory, as voters become dissatisfied 
with a lack of economic progress.  Japan’s increased deference to the defense budget over 
ODA for a source of international influence signals a degree of economic pragmatism is 
infiltrating Japan’s security interests.  Because the international community demands 
participation in international security activities more so than financial contribution, the 
SDF is becoming a more attractive and justifiable tool to legitimize Japan’s position in 
the international community. 
                                                 
326 The authoritative Earthquake Research Institute in Japan placed the likelihood of a 7.0 magnitude 
earthquake hitting Tokyo in the next 4 years at 70%. “Anxiety and Inattention Over Tokyo’s Next Big 
One,” Mainichi Daily News, January 30, 2012, 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/pulse/news/20120130p2a00m0na002000c.html. 
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3. Dueling Interests: Economic Interests Win 
 In Figure 14, it was suggested that economic and security interests are positioned 
in a manner that could allow one to become more influential than the other.  In the course 
of analysis regarding security and economic interests, Japan’s economic interests have 
received the most attention following the disasters. Japan’s economic conditions, 
reconstruction agenda, and Japan’s energy situation has received the most attention in 
particular.  The Japanese media since the disasters has been saturated with stories related 
to these three economic interests.  Japan’s politicians have spent a heavy dose of political 
capital on managing Japan’s economic interests as well.  This economic preoccupation 
does not suggest that changes in Japan’s security interests are inconsequential but that a 
heightened awareness of Japan’s economic interests will make changes in these areas 
more likely. 
 The result is that the direction of the SDF’s trajectory will be driven primarily in 
terms of its impact to Japan’s economic interests.  That is likely a partial explanation as 
to why Japan’s arms export ban was the first legal norm to change after the disasters, as 
politicians and the bureaucracy saw it as detrimental to Japan’s economy in the long-
term.  In a sense, Japan’s weakened economic situation is facilitating a transition in the 
SDF’s trajectory from ideological dogmatism based on a security identity of domestic 
anti-militarism to economic pragmatism. 
4. Norms: Conducive Environment for a Dynamic Status Quo 
 Of all the areas analyzed, norms seem to be the most profoundly impacted by the 
disasters.  It is not necessarily the area where the most aggregate changes were realized 
but where the most significant change occurred.  This significant change occurred at the 
foundation of Japan’s security identity of domestic anti-militarism.  The three central 
tenets of domestic anti-militarism defined by Oros all hinge on the public’s trust in the 
SDF.  If the public does not trust the SDF or the state’s ability to maintain adequate 
control over the SDF, then they will certainly not tolerate the SDF’s involvement in 
domestic policymaking (first tenet), the use of force to resolve international disputes 
(second tenet), or the SDF’s participation in foreign wars (third tenet).  The SDF’s 
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successful disaster dispatch demonstrated to all of the internal actors and institutions that 
affect the SDF’s trajectory that the three central tenets of domestic anti-militarism are 
partially flawed. 
 The way in which this has occurred can be thought of in two ways identified by 
Oros.327  The first scenario is part of a long-term trend that was set in motion from the 
early 1990s.  The SDF’s role as an effective domestic tool became elevated after a series 
of significant natural and man-made disasters:  Mount Unzen’s eruption in the early 
1990s, the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, and the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin gas 
attacks.328  Increased SDF participation in domestic HADR since then has been a long-
term trend that makes the first central tenet increasingly irrelevant.  The SDF’s disaster 
dispatch after the Great East Japan Earthquake provided a significant shock to domestic 
anti-militarism in line with the second scenario.  The long-term trend initiated in the 
1990s culminated in the SDF’s response to the Great East Japan Earthquake.  Thus, two 
different scenarios, one long-term and the other sudden, show the irrelevance of the first 
central tenet of domestic anti-militarism.  The trends in increased deference toward the 
defense budget, public trust in the SDF, and more inclusion of SDF interests in the 
security policymaking process show this lesson has been learned. 
 The environment in which the SDF trajectory is forming is therefore more 
conducive to a remilitarization trajectory.  The changes in legal norms since the disasters 
suggest the nature of this environment is more conducive to changes in legal norms that 
are more related to economic interests than pacifist norms. This is manifest in the 
relaxation of Japan’s arms export ban.  Other legal norms that are rooted primarily in 
pacifist norms remain intact.  This suggests that sufficient will still exists to prevent more 
overt forms of remilitarization from emerging like revising Japan’s peace constitution.  
The result is that the SDF’s trajectory is more likely to see changes between the status 
quo and remilitarization that benefit Japan’s economic interests.  This will lead to a 
dynamic status quo. 
                                                 
327  Andrew Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 187. 
328  Ibid., 72. 
 146 
5. Actors/ Institutions: Pushing The Envelope toward Remilitarization 
 The survey of actors and institutions shows that most are in favor of something 
between the status quo and remilitarization.  The opposition to this trajectory is limited to 
Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors, which are growing increasingly powerful in their 
ability to contain the SDF, specifically China.  The JCP and SDP have lost significant 
power since the 1990s leaving the DPJ and LDP to guide the SDF’s application, both of 
which are pushing the SDF in a dynamic status quo or remilitarization direction.  The 
third political parties that are forming from the recent churn in Japan’s domestic politics 
do not want to contain the SDF but actually support security policies that resemble 
remilitarization.  The trends in the majority of internal actors and institutions that 
influence the SDF’s trajectory are twofold. 
 First, the SDF is increasingly included rather than excluded in matters related to 
domestic security.  The public relies on the SDF for its HADR and ensuring national 
security roles and shows more deference to the SDF in these areas through public opinion 
polls and more civil-military cooperation.  The MOD’s growing influence in the 
bureaucracy ensures SDF interests are included in security policy.  Politicians cannot 
ignore the SDF and must employ them effectively in crisis situations in order to maintain 
their party’s validity.  The SDF is able to capitalize on this trend by creating an image of 
itself within the public of contributing to the collective good; a marketing tool made all 
the more powerful by its successful disaster dispatch. 
 Second, actors and institutions are replacing or being forced to replace ideological 
dogmatism with economic pragmatism.  The defense budget is winning over the ODA 
budget in part because the SDF is an easier sell to the public in terms of preserving 
Japan’s well-being at the lowest price possible.   Legal norms based on domestic anti-
militarism that impede economic growth cannot survive this transition either, as seen in 
the collapse of the arms export ban.  The SDF stands to benefit from this transition as 
well, since it is able to increase its operational tempo in areas surrounding Japan and 
internationally without creating significant pressure on the defense budget.  This is being 
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manifest in the switch from a BDF to a DDF, where capabilities are eliminated in some 
areas, concentrated in others, and replaced overall with more flexibility and operational 
capacity. 
6. The New Status Quo: A Brief Summary 
 In light of the two key elements that define the SDF trajectory debate, the new 
status quo that is forming has several implications for Japan’s capacity and will. 
 In regard to capacity, major changes in defense budget levels or allocation will 
not occur and will be geared toward maintaining the status quo in terms of the 
capabilities laid out in the 2010 MTDP in accordance with the 2010 NDPG.  This 
represents a dynamic rather than static status quo that increases the policy space allowing 
for a more active SDF in domestic, regional, and international roles.  Although the 
defense budget will not change dramatically, it continues to survive fiscal austerity 
measures that are targeting Japan’s more traditional source of international influence: 
ODA. 
 In regard to will, the SDF will not significantly depart from a focus on domestic 
or international roles.  The SDF stands to become more utilized within the roles identified 
in the 2010 NDPG.  The SDF will become more active in its domestic role as civil-
military relations improve regarding the SDF’s domestic HADR role.  This was 
exemplified in the SDF’s robust response to Typhoon number 12.  The SDF’s increased 
activity in the domestic arena will not come at the expense of its regional and 
international roles either.  The new SDF facility in Djibouti, continued anti-piracy 
mission, and participation in UNMISS attests to this.  The public’s increased trust in the 
SDF and its proven utility as a tool of the state will allow for more public and elite 
support of the SDF’s roles already defined in the 2010 NDPG.  The SDF’s elevated status 
will also create a more conducive environment that allows a re-evaluation of legal and 
security norms that limit the SDF along a remilitarization trajectory.  Economic 
pragmatism will be the most influential driving force when these norms are addressed 
given the prominence of economic issues after the disasters. 
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D. NATURAL DISASTERS AS AGENTS FOR CHANGE 
 Natural disasters will be a persistent threat to Japan and the SDF will play a larger 
role in domestic HADR for the foreseeable future.  It behooves those that shape security 
policy in relation to Japan to understand where these disasters affect change, as another 
“great” disaster is likely within another generation’s time. 
1. Direct Impact 
 There are several SDF trajectory influences that are most likely to be affected by 
natural disasters.  The first are those areas that the natural disasters directly impact that 
actors or institutions have no control over.  This is primarily related to the economic 
damage caused by natural disasters.  Increasing urbanization, industrial concentration, 
and the need to remain close to the sea as a source of food and trade will make Japan’s 
economy more vulnerable to major disasters in these areas.  This could have a 
detrimental impact to Japan’s economy as a whole and subsequently its defense budget if 
these areas suffer a major disaster. 
2. Crisis Management Capacity 
 All of the other SDF trajectory influences affected by natural disasters can be 
controlled to some degree and they all fall under the umbrella of crisis management.  
Crisis management can be further broken down into capacity and competency.  Capacity 
deals with the adequate structure and tools to handle a natural disaster.  Pressures on 
capacity are felt in several areas. 
 First, Japan’s security policy is tested in this regard as it must provide the SDF 
with the authority and flexibility to adequately handle natural disasters.  No significant 
changes were realized in Japan’s security policy because it already accounted for natural 
disasters and promoted certain SDF characteristics that allowed it to react quickly and 
effectively. 
 Second, the SDF’s HADR capabilities were also tested.  The areas that the SDF 
found lacking were identified and were targeted for improvement in the 2012 defense 
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budget.  These include the SDF’s disaster response and CBRN disaster response 
capabilities.329 330  With a transition toward a DDF, however, the type of equipment that 
can be related to HADR is expanding as seen in the inclusion of a DDH under the 
defense budget’s disaster response capabilities. 
 Third, the political structure comes under pressure for its capacity to manage 
crisis and incorporate assistance from the international community.  This occurred after 
the Great Hanshin Earthquake when the public found that bureaucratic red tape hindered 
a quick reaction and receipt of international assistance and pacifist norms created a 
hostile environment that limited the SDF’s capacity to immediately react to the disaster.  
This placed pressure on the political leadership in following years to exert more 
executive control in crisis management situations and incorporate rather than exclude the 
SDF in domestic HADR.  The public’s dissatisfaction with the DPJ’s handling of the 
disasters seems to be directed more at their handling of the nuclear disaster and the speed 
of their reconstruction efforts than their employing of national assets to include the SDF 
to handle the affected areas.  Years of improved civil-military relations were validated in 
that regard but more pressure will be placed on the political leadership to increase its 
ability to rapidly respond to natural disasters.331  The LDP’s latest constitution revision 
draft takes aim at expanding the prime minister’s power in the event of a large natural 
                                                 
329 The disasters did highlight the SDF’s lack of transport capabilities as many SDF members and 
relief goods had to be moved by private ferries. “Revitalizing Japan: Building a Disaster Resistant Nation; 
How Should We Be Prepared for Calamity in 1,000 Years?” The Daily Yomiuri, January 18, 2012, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120201006982.htm. 
330 Changes in the defense budget regarding the SDF’s transport capabilities were not realized because 
making changing in this area would require a significant rise in the defense budget.  The current fiscal 
constraints are preventing the SDF from addressing this deficiency.  The SDF is not completely unable to 
mobilize, however, and is using contracts with private ferries to augment its transport capabilities in the 
event the SDF needs to conduct contingency operations in areas surrounding Japan. “Tanks to Reach Oita 
Exercises by Private Ferry,” The Daily Yomiuri, October 27, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111026005221.htm. 
331 A Daily Yomiuri editorial emphasized the need for the government to improve its crisis 
management capabilities and address states of emergency. “Editorial: Talks on Revising Constitution 
Should Focus on Emergencies,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 5, 2012, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T120304004012.htm. 
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disaster.332  Pacifist norms that hinder the SDF’s ability to cooperate with local 
governments were also tested but it seems that there were no major issues since this 
lesson was learned after the Great Hanshin Earthquake.  The recent disasters will help 
discredit any remaining sentiment along these lines. 
 Fourth, natural disasters present an opportunity to test the capacity of the U.S.-
Japan security alliance to function effectively.  The test is less related to the U.S. 
military’s ability to assist Japan in the event of a large natural disaster since Japan is not 
reliant on the U.S. military to provide support for natural disasters.  The relatively 
unchanged alliance norms after the disasters show the public did not translate their 
appreciation for OPERATION TOMODACHI into increased trust in the United States or 
improve their view of U.S.-Japan relations.  This indicates that the U.S. military’s 
assistance during domestic HADR in Japan should be used as a tool to show the 
functionality of the alliance and as a simple gesture of goodwill.  Attempts to improve 
relations or trust in the United States through U.S. military assistance does not seem to 
have any long-term benefit. 
3. Crisis Management Competency 
 Natural disasters in Japan mobilize the actors and institutions that have the most 
to lose through failure to competently respond.  These actors include the SDF, governing 
party (DPJ), and the U.S. military.  The SDF stands to lose legitimacy as a competent tool 
of the state if it does not respond effectively.  The SDF’s effective performance of all 
HADR missions demonstrated to the public its rightful domestic role.  Therefore, 
domestic HADR is an important tool for the SDF to boost its public image and garner 
trust.  The DPJ needs to maintain its reputation as a competent governing party so a 
natural disaster will cause its reactions in several areas to be under the spotlight.  Its 
ability to manage Japan’s economic conditions and energy dependency has been subject 
                                                 
332 The recent draft is the first LDP constitution revision draft since 2005 and provides power to the 
prime minister to declare a state of emergency.  The Cabinet can create and enforce ordinances during a 
state of emergency with the same effect as law.  The public is also obligated to obey state and local 
government instructions during a state of emergency. “LDP Constitution Revision Draft: Expands Govt 
Power in Emergencies and Calls for Self-Defense Right,” The Daily Yomiuri, March 4, 2012, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120303003947.htm. 
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to criticism from the public.  The DPJ was also forced to examine the utility of ODA and 
legal norms such as the arms export ban because of the disasters.  The U.S.-Japan 
security alliance stands to lose credibility if the U.S. military does not function 
effectively with the SDF.  OPERATION TOMODACHI served to highlight the U.S. 
military and SDF’s joint functionality. 
 In all cases, the performance of the SDF, DPJ, and United States in a domestic 
HADR situation is key to determining how natural disasters affect change on these 
entities.  Consider what might have happened if these actors’ response was perceived 
differently.  A poor SDF performance could result in less public trust, which would make 
the public more skeptical of changes to legal norms and the SDF’s international security 
activities.  A proactive response to the nuclear disaster and quick movement on 
reconstruction efforts might have boosted the DPJ’s popularity with the public and given 
it a better chance of maintaining power at the next Lower House elections.  If major 
confrontations emerged from OPERATION TOMODACHI between the SDF and U.S. 
military, it could have seriously damaged Japan’s faith in one of the alliance’s main 
functions: the U.S. military’s commitment and ability to defend Japan. 
4. Limited But Significant Capacity for Change 
 The main takeaway from this is that natural disasters have a limited capacity for 
change but where change is likely it can create serious shifts in the influences governing 
the SDF trajectory.  The effect on Japan’s economic conditions depends on the location 
and magnitude of the disaster.  Japan’s security policy, SDF capabilities, and political 
structure are tested in terms of its crisis management capacity.  The U.S.-Japan security 
alliance is also tested but more as a function of the alliance’s broader strength to fulfill its 
purpose of defending Japan.  The three actors and institutions with the most to lose in 
terms of being found incompetent in crisis management are the SDF, governing party 
(DPJ), and the U.S. military.  These entities are tested more than any other. 
 Natural disasters do not directly test on any foundational level relations with its 
Northeast Asian neighbors, the need to remilitarize with offensive capabilities, the utility 
of force, or legal norms that do not have economic repercussions nor do they place direct 
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pressure on the bureaucracy, as their competency is predetermined in the policy they 
formulate.  This partially explains why some of these factors did not change.  The next 
section deals with how some of these areas may be affected indirectly based on the nature 
of the SDF trajectory revealed earlier in this chapter. 
E. PROSPECTS FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 
1. Economic Pragmatism Leading to Remilitarization 
 The SDF trajectory debate comes down to two elements: capacity and will.  So 
far, this thesis has indirectly demonstrated that the SDF has the capacity to operate as a 
“normal” military so long as it breaks down the legal barriers to remilitarization.  SDF 
capabilities are robust as demonstrated by its disaster dispatch and for 20 years it has 
participated in international security activities.  The final step to becoming a “normal” 
military rests in Japan’s will to wield this type of force.  Public opinion polls have 
demonstrated that the public remains extremely averse to anything that resembles the use 
of force outside of non-preemptive defense.  A fundamental change has come about in its 
arms export policies, however, that runs counter to the third central tenet of domestic 
anti-militarism identified by Oros: no participation in foreign wars.  It is reasonable to 
assume that under the new regulations, military equipment developed jointly between 
Japan and other friendly nations will be used in tomorrow’s foreign wars.  If one asked 
the Japanese public if they should supply the United States with military equipment to be 
used directly in the Afghanistan War today the likely answer would be no.  This does not 
preclude that this will occur in the future under the new regulations.  This change is 
occurring because of a growing relevance of economic pragmatism over the forces of 
ideological dogmatism.  As Japan becomes more focused on its current economic 
situation it becomes near-sighted and distracted from thwarting long-term ideological 
based goals, namely remilitarization.  The result is that decisions made to improve 
Japan’s economic situation now provide the capacity to remilitarize according to the third 
central tenet of domestic anti-militarism.  This growing sense of economic pragmatism 
will become stronger as long as its economy continues to stagnate and its economic 
situation vis a vis Northeast Asia continues to decline. 
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2. Security Pragmatism Leading to Remilitarization 
 Although it is possible that Japan could find itself in a position that breaks the 
third central tenet because of growing economic pragmatism, it still does not address 
Japan’s willingness to directly break any of the three central tenets of domestic anti-
militarism. 
 In regard to the first central tenet, the SDF’s crucial role demonstrated in domestic 
HADR stands to aid a shift from ideological dogmatism that seeks to contain the SDF at 
all costs to security pragmatism that increasingly includes the SDF in domestic 
policymaking.  This trend has been in motion at least since the early 1990s and has made 
significant improvements in the area of civil-military relations and elevation of SDF 
interests in conjunction with the MOD. 
 Breaking the second and third central tenets require a more fundamental step 
toward remilitarization.  Once again, Japanese public opinion and SDF employment to 
date shows a lack of willingness to use force to resolve international disputes or 
participate directly in foreign wars.  Based on the trends in the SDF trajectory identified 
thus far, there are two plausible scenarios where the second and third central tenet could 
be broken. 
 First, creeping remilitarization occurs where inertial forces aided by certain 
conditions facilitate a gradual change that eventually breaks the second and third central 
tenet.  For instance, the constitutionality of sending SDF troops abroad for the first time 
after the Gulf War was fiercely contested but 20 years later SDF participation in UN 
PKO has become the new norm.333, 334  Now that the SDF is a routine participant in UN 
PKO it is more susceptible to international pressure to expand its areas of operation away 
from safe places.  MOD and SDF officials expressed this pressure regarding its 
                                                 
333  Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca; 
London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 65–67. 
334 Although commonplace, The Mainichi Daily News made notice of this trend in a September 2011 
article, which suggests the constitutionality of SDF participation in UN PKO has not completely eluded the 
public. “Overseas SDF Deployment Becoming the Norm as Constitutional Questions Left Hanging,” The 
Mainichi Daily News, September 13, 2012, 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/column/archive/news/2011/09/20110913p2a00m0na011000c.html. 
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participation in safe areas of UNMISS. The discussion now is not if the SDF’s 
participation in UN PKO is constitutional but if the five PKO principles governing the 
SDF’s use of force should be revised.335  The SDF’s demonstrated competence during its 
disaster dispatch stands to place indirect pressure in this regard, as the most trusted 
institution in Japan is subjected to borderline humiliating restrictions in seemingly 
innocuous activities like UN PKO.  Nonetheless, the SDF’s routine involvement in UN 
PKO today has evolved very slowly since 1991, which suggests numerous conditions 
exist to limit a remilitarization trajectory.  The current conditions influencing the SDF 
trajectory make fundamental change more likely, however. 
 Second, bait and switch tactics from more remilitarization minded actors and 
institutions might allow an expansion of the SDF’s roles or relaxation of legal norms.  
This could first provide the capacity to execute missions counter to the second and third 
central tenets without the initial intent of doing so.  Actors and institutions that push for 
remilitarization could then take advantage of these expanded roles or relaxed legal norms.  
For instance, the government’s perceived inability to react quickly to the disasters has 
created a desire in Japan to increase the government’s crisis management capacity.336  
The LDP’s new constitutional revision draft takes aim at this sentiment but it also 
includes several measures that would bring the SDF closer to remilitarization.  It 
reclassifies the SDF as a self defense military, adds the right to self defense to Article 9, 
clarifies language that would allow the right to collective self defense, and makes it easier 
to amend the constitution.337  If the LDP were able to push through this revision, it would 
provide the LDP with additional legal room to push for direct participation in foreign 
wars. 
                                                 
335  “Review of SDF Guideline on Weapon Use Postponed,” The Daily Yomiuri, January 11, 2012, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120110006213.htm. 
336 A March 2012 Daily Yomiuri editorial stated constitutional revision should center around 
emergencies.  It also praised the LDP’s efforts to revise the constitution given the need to address the 
government’s crisis management capabilities. Editorial: Talks on Revising Constitution Should Focus on 
Emergencies. 
337  LDP Constitution Revision Draft: Expands Govt Power in Emergencies and Calls for Self-
Defense Right. 
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3. A Dynamic Status Quo Rather than Remilitarization 
 Although the factors previously mentioned seem to be leaning toward 
remilitarization, complete remilitarization in the short or medium term does not seem 
likely for several reasons.  These reasons act as disincentives for a remilitarization 
trajectory and serve to limit changes to the fringes of the status quo bordering 
remilitarization. 
 First, the U.S.-Japan security alliance continues to guarantee Japan’s security 
from external threats.  Call it buck-passing, free riding, or cheap riding; Japan is fulfilling 
its obligations according to the provisions agreed upon in 1960.  Japan provides bases for 
the U.S. military, which allows the United States to project its power and influence in the 
region, and in turn the United States guarantees Japan’s safety in the event of an attack.  
Even though Japan does not believe a large-scale conventional attack is likely according 
to its 2010 NDPG, the United States continues to reassure Japan of its defense in more 
likely but smaller scale conflicts over territorial disputes.  This was made known by the 
United States after the 2010 Senkaku incident.  The deepening of the alliance after the 
disasters, and the United States’ refocus on the Asia-Pacific will make dislodging the 
alliance’s structural limitations against remilitarization more difficult. 
 Second, a dramatic leap toward remilitarization could prove disastrous with the 
most volatile threat for pro SDF containment: China.  If politicians or the bureaucracy 
were to push through radical revisions to many legal norms it would signal a clear break 
from the status quo and may initiate an overt arms race with China.338 
 Third, the nature of Japan’s relations with China also serves to mitigate the need 
to embark on a remilitarization trajectory in terms of balancing against China.  Much 
skepticism remains between the two nations on security issues but economically the two 
are highly interdependent.  China is Japan’s largest import and export market.339 
                                                 
338 Christopher Hughes believes Japan is already in a quiet arms race with China. Christopher W. 
Hughes, “Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global Power Projection,” 
Asia Pacific Review 16, no. 1 (2009), 96. 
339  “CIA World Factbook: Japan,” Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (accessed December 10, 2011). 
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 Fourth, two lost decades of economic stagnation compounded by the disasters 
does not bode well for Japan’s capacity or will to remilitarize.  A strong U.S.-Japan 
alliance and entangling itself economically with China provide a more fiscally sound 
alternative to remilitarization. 
 Fifth, a web of legal norms still exist that Japan must overcome before it can even 
begin to argue that it has remilitarized.  Many of these norms such as the constitution 
have proven to be very difficult to procedurally revise.  A great deal of political capital 
must be spent in order to make these changes and currently Japan’s economy is taking 
center stage. 
 Sixth, even though some actors and institutions may push for a remilitarization 
trajectory, the post World War II environment under which these entities were formed 
does not support a radical return to a militarist past.  For example, the SDF has never 
used force except one time in 2001 in an act deemed entirely within the scope of self 
defense.  The activities that the SDF find rewarding are those related to international 
security activities and domestic HADR.  The SDF may desire to be accepted by the 
public but they are not about to embark on a militarist past reminiscent of the 1930s.340 
 Finally, even though this thesis suggests a transition is occurring between 
ideological dogmatism and economic pragmatism, elements of Japan’s security identity 
of domestic anti-militarism still remain.  The public remains largely averse to anything 
resembling the offensive use of force.  Japan’s close ties with the United States also make 
Japan weary of the SDF’s own, even innocuous, international security activities as fears 
of entanglement are reinforced. 
 Altogether, these numerous disincentives provide serious limitations to Japan’s 
capacity and will to rapidly remilitarize.  The only plausible path to remilitarization is 
through a long-term gradual shift brought about by economic and security pragmatism.  
                                                 
340 Fruhstuck indicates that Japan, like many other European states, is in a “post-heroic” cultural 
phase.  This type of environment does not lead states to glorify violence.  International security activities 
and domestic HADR provide more motivation in this type of society. Sabine Fruhstuck, Uneasy Warriors: 
Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2007), 181–184. 
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A significant shock to the system may address some of these disincentives but would 
need to discredit all in order to facilitate a major change.  This is not likely.  For instance, 
a fait accompli action on the Senkaku Islands by China would likely be handled within 
the U.S.-Japan alliance structure.  The public’s aversion to offensive force would not be 
tested because it would be seen as a defensive action.  Such an action on China’s part 
would seriously jeopardize its economic relations with its two largest trading partners, the 
United States and Japan, and is likely a reason why the territorial dispute has not 
escalated into conflict to date. 
F. UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Be Skeptical of the Efficacy of HADR 
 At least in Northeast Asia, the short-term change in relations with China and 
South Korea shows that HADR is not an effective long-term tool for improving relations.  
This should not come as a complete surprise given the lack of security cooperation 
between Japan and its neighbors.  HADR is effective in providing a positive environment 
of cooperation for the political leadership to meet and discuss non-related issues.  The 
short-term gains in this regard may pay off in the long-term but fundamental issues such 
as historical interpretations and territorial issues will continue to trump these efforts as 
long as they are not solved.  Japan-South Korea relations stand to benefit the most as the 
2010 NDPG is targeting South Korea for improved relations and the DPJ is more 
amenable to non-provocative actions in the region. 
 In regard to U.S.-Japan relations, the efficacy of HADR is somewhat surprising.  
At the elite level, OPERATION TOMODACHI proved to be an effective tool for 
strengthening the alliance.  The SCC 2+2 statements made this very clear and Japan has 
in many ways come closer to the United States in the year following the disasters.  For 
instance, Japan selected the F-35 as its F-X.  Noda has leaned closer to the United States-
led TPP and has also welcomed the U.S. strategic focus shift to the Asia-Pacific.  
Surprisingly however, while the Japanese public is extremely thankful for the U.S. 
military’s support after the disasters, this has not translated into any significant change in 
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the public’s opinion regarding trust in the United States or positive views of U.S.-Japan 
relations.  In this sense, HADR is not an effective tool to boost the public’s positive 
perception in these two areas.  Public opinion matters because the public is becoming 
more aware of its security environment and has the ability to punish or reward politicians 
based on their increasing need to have a distinguishable security platform. 
 This is not to say the United States or any other state should not do its utmost in 
supporting countries in times of need, but that expectations should be managed as to how 
far this goodwill will create change. 
2. Focus on Futenma 
 As illustrated in the previous recommendation, Japanese public opinion toward 
the United States has not improved but actually worsened slightly since the disasters.  
Those that view U.S.-Japan relations negatively have outnumbered those that see it 
positively for the last two years.  The previous ten years before that were marked by a 
majority of positive views on U.S.-Japan relations (see Figure 37).341  This is a curious 
development given the conditions that should warrant an improved view of the United 
States.  The United States has ended the war in Iraq, not pressured Japan to support the 
Afghanistan War, aligned its strategic interests more closely with Japan in its focus shift 
toward the Asia-Pacific, and conducted a significant HADR operation after the Great 
East Japan Earthquake.342 
                                                 
341  The topic Figure 37 is illustrating is how Americans and Japanese view U.S. – Japan relations.  
“Feelings About U.S. Are Complex: Disaster Relief Operations Appreciated But Major Ally Not Fully 
Trusted.” 
342 The Obama administration has not pressured Japan to contribute in Afghanistan primarily because 
international support for the war is decreasing.  The conclusion of the MSDF’s Indian Ocean mission was a 
non-event in U.S. – Japan relations because it was seen from the U.S. perspective that it was no longer 




Figure 37.   The Daily Yomiuri Poll on Japan-U.S. Relations (From “Feelings About 
U.S. Are Complex: Disaster Relief Operations Appreciated But Major Ally 
Not Fully Trusted,” 2011) 
 The issue that seems to be driving a wedge between the Japanese public and the 
United States is Futenma according to a December 2011 poll that revealed 82% of the 
public feel a lack of progress on the Futenma relocation issue is having a negative effect 
on U.S.-Japan relations.  This should serve as a warning that if progress is not made on 
the Futenma issue in the eyes of the Japanese public, they are likely to be more skeptical 
of the United States and its policies in the region.  Not having the public’s backing will 
make the political leadership less inclined to risk loss of power and make a concerted 
policy effort with Japan in the Asia-Pacific more difficult. 
 The Futenma relocation issues needs further review to determine whether this is a 
temporary or permanent feature in U.S.-Japan relations. 
3. Do Not Miscalculate the SDF’s Trajectory 
 At first glance, the catastrophic nature of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the 
SDF’s unprecedented involvement might give significant evidence on the surface to 
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assume the SDF may rapidly retrench or remilitarize after the disasters.  Assuming either 
can lead to missed opportunities or a setback in relations. 
 If the United States assumes the SDF is retrenching after the disasters and places 
pressure on Japan for doing so, it has the potential to create a rift in relations.  
Furthermore, this assumption will distract policymakers and policy practitioners away 
from the opportunities available for increased cooperation in two areas.  First, the United 
States and Japan’s security policies have aligned in terms of its focus in the Asia-Pacific 
and on China and North Korea particularly.  Because Japan’s security policy supports an 
increased SDF operational tempo, the U.S. military stands to benefit in its own effort to 
monitor areas surrounding Japan.  A collaborative effort should be pursued in these areas 
in order to avoid unnecessary mission overlap and capitalize on the SDF’s robust MSDF 
and ASDF assets in areas surrounding Japan. 
 Second, the SDF proved itself as a competent HADR force and Japan’s security 
policy opens the door wider for more regional and international security activities.  
Although the opportunity for cooperation in Northeast Asia is limited, the SDF is 
increasingly participating in international HADR.  With the proven utility of the SDF’s 
DDHs and other MSDF assets for HADR, these assets can be used for more regional 
HADR in areas such as South and Southeast Asia.  A more confident SDF will also 
embolden their participation in these activities. 
 If the United States assumes the SDF is rapidly remilitarizing and pressures the 
SDF for increased international security contributions in a similar manner during the 
initial stages of the Iraq War, then entrapment fears may be triggered.  The ending of the 
Iraq War and planned withdrawal from Afghanistan make igniting these fears less likely 
but even the United States’ approach to the Asia-Pacific region has the potential to stoke 
these fears.  A confrontational approach toward China and North Korea by the United 
States will likely create distrust among the Japanese public and distance the DPJ from the 
United States in its efforts to be non-provocative in the region.  Entrapment fears could 
seriously setback any efforts on the United States part for the SDF to increase its 
international security contribution.  The alliance norms may be subject to dynamic 
changes as the United States holds elections in 2012 and Japan is poised for another 
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Lower House election at least by 2013 that could bring the LDP back into power or 
further fracture the government as third parties become more influential.  Managing the 
shift in security policy priorities will become essential. 
 The safest course of action the United States can embark on at this point is to 
understand a dynamic status quo is in the offing, which means there is some room for 
increased SDF activity especially in HADR and SDF operations in areas surrounding 
Japan.  Building on the U.S.-Japan’s joint relations in both areas will serve both states’ 
security interests. 
G. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
1. Significance Revisited 
 The Great East Japan Earthquake will be seared into Japan’s collective conscience 
for generations.  The SDF’s disaster dispatch will also have significant meaning for the 
SDF, as it was the first time the SDF received on a large-scale the public’s support and 
gratitude for its role.  Understanding what the disasters mean and do not mean for the 
SDF’s trajectory is a critical factor in the ongoing debate of the SDF’s future application. 
 The disasters do not mean the SDF will embark on a retrenchment or rapid 
remilitarization trajectory.  Japan’s security and economic interests have not seen 
fundamental change but rather trends in place prior to the disasters were aggravated or 
policies were validated.  Japan’s norms appear to have been the most fundamentally 
changed as the SDF came out of the disasters’ aftermath on top in the publics’ eyes.  
Nonetheless, changes will occur on the fringes of the status quo bordering 
remilitarization as numerous disincentives keep the SDF from rapidly moving toward 
remilitarization.  These changes will come about from a growing sense of economic and 
security pragmatism that results in engaging rather than containing the SDF. 
2. Research Shortfalls 
 It has only been one year since the disasters, which has significantly limited the 
sample size available for this research.  This thesis serves as a starting point for future 
research to focus on certain areas that are most likely to be affected by the disasters such 
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as norms and the evolving structure of actors and institutions that affect the SDF’s 
trajectory.  More time will also allow researchers to identify more distinguishable 
departures in these two areas. 
 Since extensive research has not been conducted on the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and its impact on the SDF trajectory due primarily to its recent occurrence, 
this thesis has necessarily focused on a broad range of SDF trajectory influence 
categories that may have been affected by the disasters: security interests, economic 
interests, norms, and actors and institutions.  Therefore, in depth research in any 
particular area has been limited but it has helped identify the most likely affected areas as 
discussed previously. 
3. Future Research 
 This thesis highlights several areas that would be useful for the SDF trajectory 
debate as more data becomes available.  First, the SDF’s domestic HADR involvement 
has been on the rise since the 1990s and culminated in its disaster dispatch after the Great 
East Japan Earthquake.  How transferable is the public’s increased trust in the SDF 
because of these activities to other more “normal” military operations?  More time may 
reveal that the SDF never fundamentally changes its international security activities.  
Why would that be the case? 
 Second, the trend among actors and institutions that control the SDF trajectory is 
to engage the SDF.  As the SDF becomes more involved in domestic HADR, is this trend 
defined more by the desire to improve the government’s crisis management capacity or 
are SDF interests also considered in general security policy formation? 
 Third, what are the limits of the trend from ideological dogmatism centered 
around domestic anti-militarism to economic and security pragmatism?  As the 
environment surrounding the SDF changes, how are these factors facilitating or hindering 
this transition? 
 Fourth, the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely be tested again in the near future by 
another “great” natural disaster in Japan.  How involved should the U.S. military be in 
these disaster relief efforts?  Japan does not rely on U.S. military forces in any significant 
capacity to support HADR in Japan.  Therefore, the mechanism to involve the United 
 163 
States in this situation does not exist outside of the relationships already in place for other 
joint military operations.  Too much U.S. military involvement in this case may prove 
detrimental to the overall relief efforts, as this requires a significant amount of 
coordination effort on Japan’s part.  At the same time, too little of a response may trigger 
negative views of U.S. military forces stationed in Japan.  An appropriate balance must 
be reached to ensure the U.S. military does not detract from the overall HADR operation 
and does not trigger negative views of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. 
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